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PREFACE 
t is my pleasure to introduce this ambitious and comprehensive ECMI-
CEPS Task Force Report on “Rethinking Asset Management”, which 
concentrates on financial stability, investor protection, product integrity 
and economic growth.  
The asset management industry has thrived in capturing the 
opportunities offered by the single market and the regulatory framework put 
in place in 1985 under the leadership of the European Commission. UCITS has 
been so successful that it has grown outside the European Union. It has 
become one of the most reliable and innovative pooled vehicles worldwide, 
serving tens of millions of investors in building their long-term financial 
security. The strength of flows before and after the financial crisis testifies to 
the trust that investors place in UCITS, accounting for half of the industry’s 
assets under management – notwithstanding that all managers may not have 
delivered relative positive returns net of fees.  
The strength of the asset management industry in Europe means a great 
deal to its economy. Beyond the number of jobs created, the €15 trillion under 
management is a significant force when it comes to supporting growth and 
financing investments, hence an important resource for citizens in Europe and 
beyond.  
The asset management industry was heavily impacted by the financial 
crisis as reflected in the overall reduction of assets under management and the 
associated fall in revenue. The industry has seized this opportunity to review 
its role, as well as some of its practices and instruments – including some 
alternative funds, certain money market funds strategies, the use of 
derivatives, product complexity, securities lending and the compatibility 
between daily valuation and long-term investing. A number of initiatives have 
been already taken to regulate these practices, which are reviewed in detail in 
this report.  
But the industry also faces a significant level of regulatory activity 
addressing the wider financial markets: MiFID II, Solvency II and shadow 
banking, to name only a few, as well as foreign initiatives with extra-territorial 
reach, such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) or the Volker 
rule enacted in the US. We should not underestimate the amount of work and 
Iii | PREFACE 
expense entailed by such reforms over a short time frame and their sometimes 
ambiguous impact on investors. 
The challenge today lies also in navigating between more regulation and 
better supervision. To that extent, the entire industry welcomes the creation of 
ESMA with its pan-European mandate but at the same time questions its 
relative lack of resources and the evolution of its positioning vis-à-vis the 
European Commission and national regulators.  
Beyond systemic risk and prudential regulation, investor protection at 
the point of sale (and this is one of the highlights of this report) is probably the 
one area where more needs to be done. Progress on depository aspects, 
investor compensation, disclosure and transparency has been notable in the 
last few years. However, we should avoid the errors of the past when some 
rules did not see the expected degree of transposition and implementation. To 
date, investor protection has not been approached holistically at pan-European 
level, or with a level playing field in mind, to the detriment of investors. Many 
national regulators have or are in the process of introducing rules on 
marketing, product approval and sales that create new barriers to the single 
market and limit the free circulation of capital.  
But we know that the key to successful development of long-term 
financial savings lies in the quality of investment solutions, distribution and 
selling practices. So it is high time to bring forward pan-European legislation 
addressing all (packaged) retail investment products and harmonising all 
aspects of distribution, including advice, disclosure, fees, inducements – and 
all other sources of potential conflicts of interest, training of sales and advice 
teams, and product-to-market principles. This report considers abundant 
evidence and examines different reform options in many of these respects. A 
level playing field is indispensable to avoid regulatory arbitrage in favour of 
less transparent or more expensive products, or across different distribution 
channels. Failing to take these steps would severely affect competition, choice 
and the value for money that investors receive.  
All these points are discussed and documented in this thorough and 
timely report prepared and issued by ECMI and CEPS, with a view to offering 
critical thinking as well as creative direction to the industry and policy-makers. 
I would like to thank them in the name of the entire working group whose 
inputs have been critical. 
Jean-Baptiste de Franssu 
Chairman of INCIPIT 
Former President, European Fund and Asset Management Association 
(EFAMA) | 1 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
ollowing the financial crisis, the asset management industry faces a dual 
challenge: regaining investors trust and coping with the post-crisis 
regulatory reform. Retail investors require more protection in the sale 
process to facilitate their access to the best-in-class products in order to save for 
their future. Distribution is the major stumbling block to competition and the 
area where substantial reform is needed to serve retail investors’ interests. The 
single market should be exploited to remove inefficiencies and promote 
competition among providers for product integrity to increase and feeds to 
decrease. Piecemeal solutions and distinctly national approaches will no longer 
suffice. We must insist on a holistic (and horizontal) approach across products, 
players and countries that prevents regulatory arbitrage, preserves financial 
stability and protects the investor. We must also work to unleash the full 
potential of the asset management industry to benefit the real economy. The 
stakes are high to make investment funds and other investment products 
deliver to European investors.  
In view of these imperatives, this Task Force report puts forward policy 
recommendations in seven main areas aimed at strengthening investor 
protection in the sale process, product integrity in UCITS, the management of 




o  Pre-contractual disclosure should be comparable for all retail investment 
products. 
The KIID (key investor information document) standard should apply 
across investment funds, insurance-based investment products, retail 
structured products and banking saving products — in line with the PRIPS 
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(packaged retail investment products initiative) initiative. Ultimately, 
uniform standards of pre-contractual disclosure should apply to all retail 
investments, whether packaged or not, and including pension products, to 
the benefit of investors. 
o  Selling practices should be regulated in the same manner across products 
and channels. 
The proposed extension of the rules governing MiFID (Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive) to structured deposits is a step in the right direction 
to stop regulatory distortions. Uniform rules on conduct of business and 
conflicts of interest should apply across products and distribution 
channels. MiFID and the IMD (insurance mediation Directive) should 
converge in this respect also in their implementation.  
o  Investor protection at the point of sale should be clearly distinguished 
from product integrity and financial stability concerns.  
It is important to draw a distinction between concerns over financial 
stability and product integrity, on the one hand, and the protection of retail 
investors at the point of sale, on the other. Complexity in product 
structuring should be addressed by product regulation to the extent 
necessary to ensure the integrity of retail investment products. By way of 
contrast, complexity in the risk-reward profile should be addressed by 
distribution rules. 
o  Retail investors should be encouraged to request investment advice for 
products with a complex risk-reward profile. 
Execution-only services should be reserved for investment products whose 
risk-reward profile may be understood by the average retail investor. 
Investors should be strongly urged to request investment advice when 
purchasing an investment product with a complex risk-reward profile. Both 
market and non-market risks (operational, counterparty and liquidity 
risks) are relevant in understanding the risk profile of a given product. 
o  Retail investors need more information about investment advice. 
Distributors should be completely transparent in describing to investors 
the character of the services they offer. The Task Force supports the 
proposal of the European Commission to require distributors to disclose 
whether advice is provided on an independent basis and whether advice is 
based on a broad or more restricted analysis of the market. Investors 
should also be informed about the cost of advice, whether in the form of RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 3 
inducements or up-front charges. Disclosure in these three respects should 
be meaningful for investors and where appropriate, standardised.   
o  Professional standards for advisers should be raised and harmonised.  
Europe needs a uniform approach to raise the professional standards of 
investment advisers and distributors, to improve the quality of advice. 
Ultimately, better advice would improve capital allocation by directing 
savers to the most adequate and cost-effective product solutions. Ongoing 
training is also needed to keep advisers up-to-date on market 
developments. 
o  A level playing field is needed to stop regulatory arbitrage. 
Additional steps are needed to close the gaps that allow the marketing of 
non-regulated products to retail investors. Two issues are of particular 
concern: the sale to retail investors of structured products and exchange-
traded notes that are not subject to product rules nor the approval of 
supervisors, and the different standards that apply to regulated products. 
 
2.  PRODUCT INTEGRITY 
 
o  UCITS needs to be governed by a single rule book; partial 
harmonisation can no longer be justified. 
The UCITS rules are loosely harmonised and implementation diverges 
across member states with respect to essential aspects, such as eligible 
assets, concentration limits and investment practices. Insufficient 
harmonisation also affects key elements of disclosure, such as total expense 
ratios. To strengthen product integrity and provide clarity to investors, 
UCITS needs a single rule book.  
o  The current rules on derivatives and financial indices should be fine-
tuned. 
The current rules on the use of derivatives and structured financial 
instruments in UCITS should be revised to strengthen product integrity. It 
would not be a matter of producing a major overhaul but of closing gaps to 
reduce the opportunities for arbitrage and deepen harmonisation to 
improve consistency. This report provides some ideas in this respect 
(chapter 3). 
o  Legislation should consolidate best practices on collateral management.  4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Task Force supports ESMA in its work to clarify collateral 
requirements for UCITS. The same rules should apply, however, to all 
retail investment products in the form of binding legislation instead of 
guidelines. Since collateralised transactions are a common practice in 
financial markets, a horizontal approach is needed, in coordination with 
international regulators.  
o  Legislation should require more transparency on securities lending. 
EU legislation is needed to bring more transparency into securities lending 
by UCITS and other retail investment products. Any broader issues related 
to securities lending in financial markets need to be considered 
horizontally and in coordination with international regulators. 
 
3.  NON‐MARKET RISKS AND DEPOSITARIES 
 
o  Non-market risks should be better communicated to retail investors. 
In a context where market risks are often transformed and repackaged, 
resulting in novel operational, counterparty or liquidity risks, it is essential 
to clearly communicate these non-market risks to investors. UCITS are 
already required to communicate these risks in the KIID, but closer 
supervision would ensure meaningful compliance. The effectiveness of the 
current standard of disclosure should be reviewed under PRIPS and 
extended to all retail investment products. 
o  The implementation of depositary rules should make sure that custody 
risks are managed instead of insured against. 
The depositary rules in the AIFMD (alternative investment fund managers 
Directive) should be implemented in a manner ensuring that custody risks 
are managed and not insured against. Strict liability should only fall on 
depositaries for the safe-keeping of instruments over which they have 
effective control, as recommended by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA). Depositary rules for UCITS should be aligned with the 
AIFMD, but with retail investors in mind. 
o  National rules should fully converge before a depositary passport is 
introduced in Europe. 
The Task Force would like to see a depositary passport in the future. 
However, full convergence of national rules should be achieved 
beforehand, based on the AIFM and UCITS V Directives, to avoid 
distortions of the kind identified by CESR (C E S R ) in 2010. Member states RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 5 
should conscientiously implement these directives and the European 
Commission should enforce compliance.  
 
4.  LONG‐TERM INVESTING 
 
o  Investment horizons should be better communicated to retail investors. 
Pre-contractual disclosure and investment advice should more carefully 
consider investment horizons. While UCITS may mention any ‘minimum 
recommended holding period’ in the KIID, investors would nevertheless 
benefit from consistent and more positive disclosure in this respect. 
Advisers should be expressly required to consider the investment horizon 
of their clients. 
o  A new long-term vehicle for retail investors should be introduced in 
Europe. 
Retail investors would benefit from having access to relatively illiquid 
asset classes to channel part of their long-term savings, including part of 
their retirement savings. A harmonised regulatory framework for long-
term retail funds (LTRFs) should therefore be considered. This report offers 
some initial ideas in this respect (chapter 5). 
o  Prudential rules should not hinder the ability of institutional investors 
to make long-term investments. 
The importance of long-term investing cannot be sufficiently stressed both 
to foster sustainable growth and to generate the returns needed to meet 
pension liabilities. In this respect, prudential rules should be reconciled 
with long-term investing. 
 
5.  RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
 
o  Institutional investors should consider engagement in their investment 
mandates. 
Environmental, social and governance (ESG) indicators are useful tools to 
mitigate risks and potentially increase returns. Policy-makers should 
actively support the development of integrated reporting standards for 
non-financial corporations. Institutional investors should pay more 
attention to engagement and ESG criteria in their investment mandates and 
voting policies. 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
o  Harmonised rules are needed for funds that present themselves as 
responsible. 
Responsible investment funds have the potential to combine attractive 
returns for investors with the achievement of ESG objectives. Europe needs 
a harmonised framework for retail funds presenting themselves as 
responsible, including responsible UCITS. This framework should be 
robust and ensure that the funds are indeed invested in a manner 
consistent with the ESG goals they purport to seek. 
o  The industry should commit to the success of the EU initiative on social 
entrepreneurship funds. 
Forthcoming legislation on social entrepreneurship funds is a useful 
instrument to promote impact investing. The Task Force invites the asset 
management industry to commit to the success of this initiative aimed at 
small and medium enterprises whose primary goal is to achieve positive 
and measurable social impacts. 
 
6.  VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
o  The proposed rules on venture capital should be flexible enough to 
unleash its full potential. 
The proposed regulation on European Venture Capital Funds (EVCFs) is of 
key importance for the economy, given the role of venture capital in 
financing entrepreneurship and innovation. Sufficient flexibility should be 
extended to qualifying funds and qualifying investments so that the 
passport becomes truly attractive for managers. Beyond building the single 
market, additional incentives will be needed to boost the ‘venture capital 
ecosystem’ in Europe, as considered in this report (chapter 5). 
 
7.  THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
o  The standard of harmonisation should be upgraded to complete the 
single market. 
Completing the single market is essential to foster growth and 
competitiveness in Europe. As highlighted recently by several heads of 
state and government, “The single market must be brought to its next stage 
of development, by reinforcing governance and raising the standards of RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 7 
implementation”.1 The single market for asset management products and 
services is of particular importance, given its role in financing the economy 
and providing retirement income. Divergent national rules on investor 
protection risk reversing the single market for retail investment products. 
o  Beyond issuing new rules, Europe needs better implementation and 
supervision of existing rules. 
The Task Force found that some of the rules recently reviewed, while not 
flawed, were ineffective due to the lack of appropriate implementation and 
supervision. More resources should be made available to make legislation 
work in practice. The role of ESMA should become more central, and the 
body should be endowed with adequate resources to carry out its tasks. 
o  The single market would benefit from promoting competition but also 
its competitiveness. 
Resolving the distribution conundrum is essential to foster competition, 
rationalisation and lower fees in retail markets. The European Parliament 
and member states should step-up their efforts to find a satisfactory 
solution in this respect. Next to fostering competition, policy-makers 
should also strive to promote the competitiveness of the EU in global 
markets for investment funds and asset management services 
* * * * 
                                                        
1 Joint Letter to President Van Rompuy and President Barroso of 20 February 2012, by David 
Cameron, Mark Rutte, Mario Monti, Andrus Ansip, Valdis Dombrovskis, Jyrki Katainen, 
Enda Kenny, Petr Nečas, Iveta Radičová, Mariano Rajoy, Fredrik Reinfeldt and Donald 




 Task Force was set up in late 2010 by the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) and the European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI), an 
independent research institute managed by CEPS, to investigate four 
seminal issues, in view of their importance for the European economy, the 
single market and investors: 
1)  The future of the asset management industry after the financial crisis and 
the adoption of the alternative investment fund managers Directive 
(AIFMD)  
2)  Product innovation in UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities) and the way forward to complete the single 
market and strengthen product integrity, 
3)  The distribution of investment funds and other products to strengthen 
the choice and protection of (retail) investors and 
4)  The contribution of the asset management industry to the economy and 
how to unleash its untapped potential. 
For this purpose, CEPS and ECMI brought together a wide range of 
stakeholders, including asset managers, custodian banks, academics, experts 
and policy-makers, under the chairmanship of Jean-Baptiste de Franssu, 
Chairman of INCIPIT. 
This report has two objectives: to serve as a reference work on asset 
management regulation and to carefully examine the desirability and 
feasibility of the multitude of ongoing regulatory reforms. It was 
acknowledged during the Task Force meetings that the nature and role of asset 
management products and services is not always clear to investors and other 
stakeholders. This report is aimed therefore at raising awareness of the asset 
management industry, its contribution to the economy, and the detail of its 
regulation in Europe. It was also felt during the Task Force meetings that 
recent and forthcoming regulatory reforms will have profound effects on asset 
managers, investors and the economy at large. This report considers therefore 
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most of the legislative proposals that were on the table at the time of drafting, 
including the implementation of the AIFMD, the review of the markets in 
financial instruments Directive (MiFID), and the packaged retail investment 
products initiative (PRIPS). It also examines the potential for further regulatory 
reform in some areas such as long-term and responsible investing. The drafting 
attempts to combine clear language and straightforward introductions with 
detailed and technical analysis and illustrations.  
This report is structured following a horizontal approach by substantive 
issues (financial stability, product integrity, investor protection and economic 
contribution), presented in five chapters. 
 
Chapter 1  Setting the scene: Asset management and its regulation 
in Europe 
Provides an introduction to the industry and its regulation. It 
argues that the AIFMD radically alters the picture and embodies 
in terms of substance the basic regulatory framework of asset 
management in Europe. It also anticipates the five regulatory 
trends that will contribute to shaping the future of the asset 
management industry in Europe.  
 
Chapter 2  Financial stability: Scoping the issues and navigating the 
regulatory reform 
Reflects on the issues of financial stability that concern the asset 
management industry and the progress achieved so far by 
regulation in addressing each of them. It also considers the 
examples of money market funds and exchange-traded funds. 
 
Chapter 3  Strengthening product integrity: Which way for UCITS? 
Considers product innovation in UCITS and the rules governing 
the use of derivatives and financial indices by presenting their 
strengths and shortcomings. It also elaborates on non-market 
risks and the role of fund depositaries. 
 
Chapter 4  Distribution: Single market, investor protection and 
investor choice. 
Examines the current state of distribution in Europe and a wide 
range of policy instruments to consolidate the single market, 
improve investor protection and foster investor choice. It refers to 
disclosure and comparability, product complexity and 
investment advice, among other aspects. 10 | INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 5  Nourishing the real economy: Today and tomorrow 
Assesses the contribution of the asset management industry to 
the financing of the economy, and in particular the need to foster 
some practices such as long-term investing, responsible investing 
and venture capital. 
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1.  SETTING THE SCENE: 
ASSET MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE 
AND ITS REGULATION 
his first chapter provides an overview of the asset management industry 
and its regulation in Europe, starting with the distinct characteristics of 
asset managers and investment funds, compared to other intermediaries 
and financial products. It then considers the size and organisation of the 
industry in comparison with that of the US, with special reference to the real 
level of dispersion that lies behind the high number of funds and management 
houses. The chapter then turns to investors – both retail and professional – and 
some key trends in their participation across industry segments. Before 
examining the regulatory aspects, the ground will be prepared by referring to 
the process of convergence between traditional and alternative asset 
management. Asset management regulation will be explained first with regard 
to its role and objectives, introducing the distinction between ‘product’ and 
‘manager’ rules. After this conceptualisation, the section will offer a broad 
overview of the current regulatory framework after the adoption of the 
alternative investment fund managers Directive (AIFMD) in 2011. Finally, 
reference will be made to two additional issues: the execution of the single 
market and the success of European funds and managers abroad. 
1.1  The distinct characteristics of asset management 
intermediation 
The asset management industry plays a distinctive role in capital markets by 
pooling the savings of investors and investing them strategically in financial 
instruments and other assets with the aim of generating returns. It is an agency 
business where managers offer chiefly two types of vehicles; i) mandates 
where the assets of a single investor are managed separately and ii) funds 
where the assets of several investors are managed jointly. Mandates service 
T12 | SETTING THE SCENE: ASSET MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND ITS REGULATION 
institutional investors and ‘high net worth’ individuals with a big pool of 
wealth to invest, whereas funds more frequently service small investors. In 
both instances, the investor benefits from a professional approach to asset 
allocation whereby experienced managers select and monitor the assets that 
become part of the investor’s portfolio. Investment funds bring in additional 
value by allowing investors to pool their savings, achieving risk reductions via 
diversification.  
It was felt during the Task Force discussions that the nature of the asset 
management business and its role in the economy are not always well 
understood by investors and politicians, as compared to that of banking or 
insurance,. The asset management industry fulfils an essential economic 
function by directing savings towards productive activities. It i) facilitates the 
participation of small investors in financial markets; ii) takes part in both 
primary and secondary equity markets; iii) provides short and long-term credit 
to corporations, financial institutions and governments and iv) participates in 
price discovery. Crucially, asset managers perform these functions on behalf 
and in the interest of investors who retain direct ownership over the assets 
managed – which are usually segregated or placed under the overview of 
independent entities called depositaries. These features are unique to the asset 
management industry and differentiate it from other intermediaries, such as 
banks and insurers (see Table 1). Asset managers are also different from other 
intermediaries in the way market risk is borne by investors; in contrast to bank 
deposits, market risk in investment funds is openly carried by investors and is 
not insured by sovereign governments. 
In spite of their distinct nature, asset managers interact with banks and 
insurers in different ways, to a similar extent as other players in financial 
markets and the real economy. In effect, asset managers can be commissioned 
by banks and insurers to manage their portfolios. Even when they are not 
externally commissioned, managers are nevertheless present within banks and 
insurers as part of their in-house teams or subsidiaries. Moreover, asset 
managers employing leverage frequently source it from banks under so-called 
‘prime-brokerage agreements’. Finally, banks and insurers act as distributors of 
funds manufactured by independent asset managers to their captive clienteles. 
In distributing third party funds, next to their own products, banks benefit 
from a direct access to the clients for which they primarily provide deposit and 
payment services.  
A further link among players is found in their corporate ownership 
structures, in spite of which asset management subsidiaries are managed as 
stand-alone businesses. At the end of 2009, an important part of asset 
management companies were owned by banking and insurance groups. France 
presents the largest number of independent management houses (over 60%) RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 13 
followed by the United Kingdom, where over 50% of the houses are 
independent, similarly to the US (EFAMA, 2011a, p. 14).  Bank affiliates remain 
the largest players in the asset management industry in Europe although some 
banking groups have substantially reduced their support for their captive 
business as a result of i) conditions linked to the receipt of state aid and ii) a 
commercial shift to deposits to comply with stringent capital requirements. 
Insurers also hold significant stakes in asset management companies, 
particularly in some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France. 
Table 1. A comparison of asset management and other forms of intermediation 



























































1.2  Industry size and industrial organisation 
Europe has come to hold a prominent position globally in the asset 
management industry. It accounts for about 30% of global assets under 
management (AuM), making it the second largest player in the world after the 
United States (see Figure 1). The size of the asset management industry 
appears directly related to the degree of economic development, the size of the 14 | SETTING THE SCENE: ASSET MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND ITS REGULATION 
relevant market and the level of market integration. If only US mutual funds, 
UCITS and similarly open-ended investment funds are taken into account, the 
market shares remain roughly the same. The 2% market share that Europe 
gains in mutual funds may be well explained by the 2% that Asia loses, given 
the relative success of UCITS among investors in Asia. UCITS is the 
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Industrial organisation is characterised by moderate (but rising) barriers 
to entry and high dispersion of intermediaries. Yet dispersion is much more 
prominent in Europe than in the United States. It is estimated that over 3,100 
asset management companies operate in Europe, including small specialised 
firms (boutiques), in contrast to less than 1,000 firms providing investment 
management services in the US market to fund investors (EFAMA, 2011a, p. 
12; ICI, 2011, p. 14). Only a small number of European firms manage assets in 
excess of €100 billion – eight in the UK, three in Germany and six in France, 
where data are available (EFAMA, 2011a, p. 13). The difference with the US is 
due mainly to the fragmentation of national markets. If funds rather than firms 
are considered, the average UCITS fund holds €150 million net assets while the 
average US mutual fund holds $1.5 billion (EFAMA, 2012, p. 9; ICI, 2011, pp. 
187-188).  
In effect, there are 54,000 open-ended funds in Europe, 67% of which are 
structured as UCITS, in contrast to 7,000 to 8,000 mutual funds in the US 
(EFAMA, 2012; ICI, 2011). However, assets under management in Europe are 
unequally distributed and concentrated in a small number of players. Using 
data of Strategic Insight on long-term UCITS, it appears that the top 10% 
largest funds in Europe hold approximately 65% of the assets in their category 
– UCITS funds excluding money market funds. By the end of Q3 2010, this top 
10 was formed by 1,884 funds, each of which held €1.13 billion assets on 
average while the biggest fund in the sample held €26 billion. Conversely, 80% 
o f  E u r o p e a n  f u n d s  h e l d  j u s t  2 0 %  o f  t h e assets. The right side of Figure 3 
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To overcome this state of relative fragmentation, changes were made to 
the UCITS framework so that management companies could operate cross-
border and merge their funds (UCITS IV, 2011). Mergers allow managers to 
rationalise their fund structures and exploit economies of scale. Ultimately in a 
competitive environment, the efficiencies generated would be passed through 
to investors in the form of lower fees and higher returns. The UCITS IV 
legislation facilitates both mergers and master-feeder structures. Given its 
recent entry into force, it is too early to pass judgement. However, important 
barriers to industry consolidation remain, including taxation. In effect, fund 
mergers become a tax event for investors in some member states, which could 
dissuade fund mergers, in spite of the cost efficiencies (EFAMA & KPMG, 
2010). For as long as tax harmonisation requires a unanimous decision by 
member states, the only feasible way out is coordination promoted by the 
European Commission, based on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (European Commission, 2006, p. 7).  
1.3  Investors’ weight and trends  
It is estimated that institutional investors account for about 68% of assets under 
management in Europe while retail investors make up the remaining 32%. 
These figures do not reflect the indirect participation of retail investors in 
investment funds via ‘wrappers’ such as unit-linked products offered by 
insurance companies. Unit-linked policies are life-insurance contracts for 
which the cover and premiums are expressed in terms of investment units, 
such as shares in investment funds. They are very popular in Denmark, 
Sweden and the Netherlands but also in large markets such as the UK, France 
and Italy.2 Inflows to unit-linked products totalled €112 billion in 2010 – a 
sizeable number if benchmarked to the net sales of UCITS funds over the same 
period (€290 billion) (CEA, 2012; EFAMA, 2012b).  
The large majority of retail investors hold their assets in investment 
funds rather than mandates, with the possible exception of high net worth 
individuals, given minimum assets under management thresholds. In effect, 
investment mandates are used extensively by institutional investors looking to 
externalise the management of their portfolios and find expertise in certain 
practices such as asset-liability matching. Discretionary mandates account on 
average for 50% of assets under management in Europe, although there are 
large differences among member states (EFAMA, 2011a, p. 13).  
                                                        
2 Popularity is measured in terms of annual premiums paid as a share GDP, based on 2010 





Institutional investors also invest in funds, including UCITS, given 
product quality and eased due diligence. In some countries the share of 
institutional participation in investment funds is well over 60%, in contrast 
with the US market where only 15% of net assets in mutual funds are held in 
institutional accounts (EFAMA, 2011a, p. 29; ICI, 2011, p. 184). Besides financial 
intermediaries, governments and non-corporations also invest in funds and 
discretionary mandates for a variety of purposes. It is notable in this regard the 
use of money market funds to manage corporate cash in some member states 
such as France (€340 billion net assets by end 2011 – AFG, 2012). This cash 
management function, however, is much less developed in Europe than in the 
US – net assets in money market funds in Europe accounted for approximately 
€1.2 trillion in 2011, in contrast with $2.6 trillion in the US (EFAMA, 2011b, p. 5; 
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1.4  Convergence between traditional and alternative strategies 
Traditional and alternative investments have been converging for some years, 
following the path of financial innovation, and changes in markets, correlations 
among asset classes, investor demand and regulation. The line between 
traditional and alternative asset management is sometimes difficult to draw. At 
the margin, traditional managers are those who invest in plain vanilla stocks 
and bonds and only pursue long-term strategies characterised by strong 
diversification and no leverage. This profile has been the object of regulation in 
the US (mutual funds) and Europe (UCITS) since 1940 and 1985, respectively, 
aimed at allowing the marketing of traditional funds to retail investors under 
conditions of high liquidity and transparency. By way of contrast, the concept 
of alternative strategies is all-embracing, comprising every style other than 
simple diversified long-only plain vanilla. The most general categorisation of 
alternative managers is made with reference to the asset class in which they 
primarily invest: i) hedge funds, invested in financial instruments; ii) private 
equity, in non-listed companies; iii) real estate funds and iv) commodity funds. 
The common ground among all alternative funds is that they attempt to 
provide investors with returns that are uncorrelated to other asset classes. For 
instance, hedge funds may invest in similar instruments as traditional 
managers but they are different in that they strive to provide returns even 
when markets fall (so-called ‘absolute returns’). For this purpose, they use a 
wide range of instruments and practices, including derivatives, structured 
products, leverage or short-selling in order to profit from unstable or falling 
asset prices. Of course, as in any other fund, returns are not guaranteed and 
there is no principal protection.3 The hedge-fund universe, however, is far 
from homogenous, with some managers for instance running significantly 
leveraged funds while others do not. Another typical hedge-fund strategy is 
the arbitrage of price differentials and other market inefficiencies, based on the 
managers’ in-house research capabilities.  
The convergence of traditional and alternative strategies is reflected both 
in hedge fund managers registering their own mutual or UCITS funds, and 
traditional managers investing in some asset classes or employing some 
practices that were previously seen as the exclusive realm of alternative funds, 
such as investing in (OTC) derivatives or running leverage. Overall, 
convergence has been the result of four main forces: 
                                                        
3 The reference to ‘absolute returns’ has been heavily criticised from this perspective, given 
that it may confuse retail investors and misrepresent the risks embedded in alternative 
products. RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 19 
i)  innovation, given the generalisation of the use of derivatives, structured 
instruments and other practices in financial markets; 
ii)  supply, given the interest of managers in expanding their investor base 
and product range; 
iii)  demand, given the growing funding gap in institutional investors’ 
balance sheets and their search for long-term returns and expertise in 
portfolio management in declining markets and 
iv)  regulation, given the convergence of the rules that apply to both types of 
managers. 
The interest of institutional investors in alternative investments has 
resulted over time in a significant expansion of their allocation to these 
strategies. The trend has been well documented both before and after the 
financial crisis (BIS, 2006; McKinsey, 2006; Deutsche Bank, 2011; P&I, 2011). 
Institutional investors have demanded higher transparency and better 
governance from managers, particularly after the crisis, prompting for instance 
hedge funds to abandon their ‘black-box’ approach to investing in order to 
expand or retain their business. At the same time, asset managers have 
implemented some of the features of alternative strategies in UCITS. The move 
is believed to be the consequence of: latent demand by retail investors, the 
uncertainties that surrounded the adoption of the AIFMD and the effect of 
prudential and other rules in shaping the preferences of institutional investors. 
The UCITS Directive has been permeable to alternative strategies by gradually 
opening up to innovations that were in general use elsewhere in financial 
markets, such as derivatives, structured instruments and others. Ultimately, 
financial innovation has changed the conception of traditional asset 
management, where the use of derivatives has been generalised both to 
mitigate risks and to generate returns (EFAMA, 2011c, p. 7; City Fund Services, 
2010). Despite institutional investors leading the way, the ‘new’ traditional 
funds are also present in the retail space – albeit subject to (increasingly tight) 
regulatory requirements with regard to counterparty and operational risks. 
In the coming years, additional changes in regulation that were adopted 
to take stock of the lessons learned notably in the financial crisis (such as the 
AIFMD) are expected to deepen convergence. On the one hand, the registration 
requirements, conduct of business rules and transparency obligations that used 
to operate only for traditional managers have been extended to the alternative 
space, thereby reducing the gap in terms of administrative burden – which 
acted as a major disincentive for alternative managers to launch their own 
mutual and UCITS funds. On the other hand, prudential rules, which influence 
the allocation of institutional investors by establishing capital and solvency 
charges, have been revisited to give more weight to the ultimate underlying 
rather than the legal form of the fund. It follows therefore that managers will 20 | SETTING THE SCENE: ASSET MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND ITS REGULATION 
increasingly offer customised solutions to institutional investors, where they 
will apply the best tools at their disposal, whether traditional or alternative, 
thereby furthering convergence. In the retail space, convergence will probably 
continue unless a deterioration of product integrity or any risk of misselling 
brings regulators to restrict the access of retail investors to certain products. 
1.5  The role of regulation in asset management 
Asset management regulation pursues a number of objectives, including 
financial stability, investor protection and the development of capital markets. 
Regulation has traditionally targeted retail investors, providing a framework 
for asset managers to structure and sell funds in the retail market. Mutual 
funds in the US and UCITS in Europe are the two most important examples, 
next to other less liquid structures in some member states. The goal of these 
frameworks is both to protect retail investor savings and promote their 
participation in capital markets. Retail investor protection does not attempt to 
deny market risks since these are inherent to any investment and in the case of 
investment funds are transparently and directly borne by investors. Protection 
refers instead to ensuring that retail investors can access funds that fulfil three 
basic criteria: i) are well diversified, ii) are well managed and iii) are 
transparent and well governed, thereby permitting investors to understand the 
risks embedded and choose in line with their investment objectives, risk profile 
and financial ability to bear possible losses. For this purpose, regulation 
addresses different areas, notably: 
o  product structuring (e.g. eligible assets, issuer concentration and 
leverage limits), 
o  risk management (e.g. risk management function, liquidity and 
redemptions), 
o  conduct of business (e.g. operating requirements, conflicts of interest) 
and 
o  disclosure to investors (e.g. transparency obligations, pre-contractual 
disclosure). 
Legislation that addresses all or most of these items, and in particular 
product structuring, is known as ‘product regulation’. 
Protecting retail investors was the primary concern of asset management 
regulation until the financial crisis of 2007-08, when it became apparent that 
regulation should more intensively target two other goals: financial stability 
and the ‘protection’ of professional investors. The work carried out by 
regulators to understand the causes of the crisis and devise the regulatory 
response concluded that asset managers were not at its source but still merited 
more attention from a financial stability perspective (Turner, 2009; de RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 21 
Larosière, 2009 and FSB, 2011a). In pursuit of more resilient and stable financial 
markets, existing asset management regulation revealed itself to be partially 
inadequate. Not only did it not cater specifically for financial stability but it 
was also patchy across jurisdictions and industry subsectors. In effect, some 
subsectors of the asset management industry were largely unregulated or 
subject to significantly different approaches across jurisdictions – in spite of the 
industry experiencing strong convergence and being eminently cross-national 
in its operation. To overcome these deficiencies, in 2011, the EU adopted the 
alternative investment fund managers Directive (AIFMD) with a distinct and 
overarching financial stability objective.4 In contrast to the UCITS legislation, 
the AIFMD is not ‘product’ but ‘manager’ regulation. In effect, the AIFMD 
does not consider product structuring and instead applies horizontally to all 
asset managers (except those operating under the UCITS rules). It introduces 
minimum operating requirements and extensive reporting to enable 
supervisors to effectively monitor financial stability. The US Dodd-Frank Act 
follows a similar approach in this respect, by mandating registration and 
reporting for systemic risk oversight.  
The crisis also revealed the importance of affording an adequate level of 
‘protection’ to professional and institutional investors. In effect, the road to the 
crisis proved that micro-risks, such as poor due diligence, have spill-over 
effects that may ultimately undermine financial stability (Turner, 2009 and de 
Larosière et al., 2009). Yet, the use of the word ‘protection’ carries a 
fundamentally different meaning in the professional space in comparison to 
retail investor protection. Where it comes to professional and institutional 
investors, the protective role of regulation is limited chiefly to: i) mandating a 
level of disclosure from managers that enables their clients to conduct 
meaningful due diligence processes and ii) making conduct of business 
principles explicit in regulation so that investors are better equipped to ensure 
that managers abide by their fiduciary duties. These two elements complement 
strictly prudential rules in the AIFMD and, by their connection with financial 
stability, are also integral parts of ‘manager regulation’. 
Manager and product regulation are cumulative, meaning for instance 
that most of the rules in the AIFMD are built-in the UCITS Directive. The 
question arises therefore whether product rules should be imposed on the 
different subsectors of the asset management industry. From a retail investor 
perspective, product rules may have a role to play in enabling investor access 
to particular products or strategies. By way of contrast, for professional and 
institutional investors, product rules would prove counterproductive. Notably, 
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product rules would: i) reduce the incentive of professional investors to 
perform their own due diligence, ii) unduly restrict the range of available 
investments in the market place and iii) induce relative simple and transparent 
intermediation in the asset management industry to move into other areas of 
financial markets that are comparatively more complex and opaque. In effect, 
product rules are no substitute for the prudential objective embedded in 
management rules, which are called upon to have a broader scope and 

























Finally, it is worth noting that asset management regulation may have 
other public policy objectives beyond financial stability, investor protection 
and fostering capital markets. Some of these other goals are promoting long-
term savings by providing for instance product rules for illiquid investments, or 
promoting socially responsible investment (SRI) by introducing a framework for 
the consideration of environmental, social and governance criteria in asset 
management (ESG). Two examples in these areas are open-ended real estate 
funds and SRI funds in Germany and France, respectively. Besides, regulation 
may also promote the participation of asset managers in not-for-profit 
activities, as in other parts of the financial services industry. In this latter 
respect, the European Commission proposed in 2011 a regulation on social 
entrepreneurship funds (SEFs). Last but not least, Europe has the opportunity to 
develop the AIFMD into a competitive management framework that would see EU 
managers offering their services around the world, generating jobs and wealth 
at home. RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 23 
1.5.1  Regulatory coherence and future steps 
The AIFMD radically alters the picture of asset management regulation in 
Europe. In contrast to UCITS, the AIFMD is a mandatory regime that applies to 
all managers, regardless of their market classification or business model. In 
effect, hedge funds, private equity, real estate funds, commodity funds and in 
sum all other non-UCITS funds will be affected by the AIFMD – the Directive 
applies however to the manager rather than the fund since it does not regulate 
product structuring. While most member states had legal forms to 
accommodate alternative investments before the adoption of the AIFMD, the 
added value of the Directive lies in its distinct macro-prudential approach and 
in aligning national rules to create a single market for the distribution of AIFs 
(Alternative Investment Funds) to professional investors in Europe.5 
Despite having been referred to as the hedge-fund Directive, the AIFMD 
embodies the basic regulatory framework of asset management activities in 
Europe. While formally independent from the UCITS Directive and ulterior in 
time, the AIFMD borrows a significant part of its content from the principles in 
the UCITS framework – for instance the parts concerning minimum operating 
conditions, conduct of business rules or segregation principles. In terms of 
substance, UCITS adds to the AIFMD framework product structuring rules 
and standardised disclosure for retail investors. In spite of the reference to 
‘alternative investment fund managers’ in its title, the substance of the AIFMD 
applies both to alternative and traditional asset managers, and to UCITS funds 
by virtue of the UCITS Directive and given its many similarities to the AIFMD. 
In the words of Amenc & Sender (2011, p. 8), “by including the depositary 
regulation in the AIFMD, and by explicitly relying on some of the UCITS 
objectives and references, regulators and politicians confirm that the AIFMD is 
a general framework that could encapsulate UCITS”. 
The role of the AIFMD as a general framework instead of a hedge fund 
regulation should be asserted both to clarify the substantive structure of asset 
management regulation in Europe and to open a new window of opportunity 
for managers and investors. The introduction of the AIFMD will encourage 
managers to reposition their business models in the next few years. The UCITS 
experience proves that there is sizeable demand for transparent and well-
governed financial intermediation. By extending these principles horizontally 
across the asset management industry, the AIFMD may generate similar 
success and industry growth, although challenges to implementation remain. 
At the same time, it may provide the ideal launch platform for specialised 
                                                        
5 For a survey of national rules for hedge funds, private equity and real estate funds, see 
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ii)  structured UCITS, at the level of pre-contractual disclosure and (in the 
review of MiFID proposed by the European Commission in 2011) 
sale practices, 
iii)  exchange-traded UCITS, at the level of pre-contractual disclosure and 
the redemption of units, among other aspects and 
iv)  money-market UCITS, at the level of eligible assets and maturity of the 
underlying. 
On the market side, concepts such as alternative UCITS and others 
have been coined to identify funds pursuing alternative investment 
strategies in compliance with the UCITS Directive.  
o  In its turn, AIFMD, by not considering product structuring, will 
encompass broadly speaking all non-UCITS managers and in particular 
hedge-funds, private equity and real state funds. 
o  Against the background of the proliferation of product types in asset 
management and other areas of financial intermediation, in 2012 the 
European Commission will propose to extend the model of standardised 
pre-contractual disclosure in UCITS (the key investor information 
document or KIID) to other retail investment products with an element 
of packaging, including notably unit-linked insurance policies and 
structured banking products, in the interest of retail investor protection. 
This proposal falls within the packaged retail investment products 
(PRIPS) initiative. 
o  Beyond EU rules, member states may still apply local legislation in some 
instances, including to: i) non-UCITS managers who are exempted from 
the AIFMD due to their size, ii) non-UCITS funds that are sold to retail 
investors and their managers and iii) funds whose managers have to 
comply with the AIFMD as long as no discrimination is introduced 
against managers domiciled in other member states. In cases in which 
managers are domiciled outside the EU, the AIFMD follows a phased 
approach that should end up by requiring foreign managers to comply 
with most of the provisions in the Directive if they market funds in the 
EU. Until that moment arrives, national rules (sometimes called national 
placement regimes) will continue to apply to non-EU managers. 
1.6  Success of the single market project 
In the context of European integration, the realisation of the single market 
appears as an additional objective in asset management regulation. The 
rationale is that market integration stimulates competition and allows 
providers to reach optimal operating scales, with the consequential gains in 
efficiency, reductions in costs and increases in returns. As for most other 26 | SETTING THE SCENE: ASSET MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND ITS REGULATION 
products and services, the execution of the single market for asset management 
is based both on harmonisation and mutual recognition. In effect, common EU 
rules on the structuring of products (funds) and/or the operating conditions of 
intermediaries (managers) are the initial step that makes mutual recognition 
work in practice. Mutual recognition then enables funds to be marketed in 
member states other than the one where they are domiciled. The mechanism is 
known as a ‘passport’, which in the case of UCITS extends to retail investors 
but is restricted in the AIFMD to professional clients, in line with the different 
scopes of the two directives. The AIFMD passport will enter into force in July 
2013. 
So far market integration in UCITS has been a success, building up 
slowly since 1985. Initially, management companies would clone funds using 
local subsidiaries given the reticence of local supervisors to grant mutual 
recognition of funds domiciled in other member states. Over time the passport 
was perfected allowing for the emergence of two main cross-border fund 
domiciliation centres, Luxembourg and Ireland, from where the bulk of cross-
border UCITS funds are marketed in the EU through local branches. Locally 
domiciled funds in other member states are also exported cross-border thanks 
to the passport. In 2011, a further step was taken by creating a management 
company passport (MCP), which allows the centralisation of asset 
management activities. Before the introduction of the MCP, management 
groups had to establish a fully functional management company in each 
member state where they domiciled a fund. The introduction of the MCP is 
aimed at reducing the large number of intermediaries (mergers and master-
feeder structures also became possible in 2011 for this same purpose).  
While no complete figures exist on the penetration of foreign funds in 
national UCITS markets in terms of assets under management, good proxies 
are available. Data from Lipper FMI, which monitors the source of assets for 
Luxembourg retail funds and other cross-border retail funds, suggest that the 
share of penetration of foreign players in national markets may not reach 20% 
on average (Lipper, 2010, p. 44). Where UCITS sold to institutional investors 
are taken into account, the share of cross-border assets is thought to have 
exceeded 40% in 2011, in contrast to just 21% in 2001 (Lipper, 2012, p. 6). In 
terms of registrations, the number of funds distributed in at least three 
countries reached 7,907 in 2010 with the average fund in this group being 
distributed in eight countries, including its own member state of domicile 
(PwC, 2011). The former figure represents a share of approximately 20% of 
UCITS funds. Given the introduction in 2011 of a simpler procedure to 
passport UCITS funds across member states, the penetration of foreign funds 
in national markets is expected to increase at a faster pace over the next few 




As to AIFs, no figures are available yet pending the introduction of the 
passport, but the stakes are high so that a single market for alternative funds 
and management services emerges in the EU despite the difficulties found in 
the adoption of the Directive and its implementation that may undermine the 
competitiveness of the European asset managers. In 2011, UCITS accounted for 
approximately 70% of the net assets in investment funds in Europe (EFAMA, 
2012a, p. 9), but future growth, hopefully propelled by the AIFMD passport, 
could increase the share of non-UCITS funds in overall net assets over the next 
few years. 
1.7  Opportunity abroad for EU managers 
Regulation has proven that it can help industry development and open 
opportunities for European asset managers in other areas of the globe. 
According to data from Lipper, as much as 25% of AuM in UCITS funds are 
sourced outside the European Union, with the majority of those assets coming 
from Asia and an increasing share from South America (Lipper, 2010, p. 39). In 
a period of slow growth in Europe, emerging economies represent a significant 
opportunity for European asset managers to market both their funds and their 
management services. For instance the client base of UCITS funds has become 
fairly international over the years – estimations by EFAMA indicate that over 
40% of UCITS net sales took place outside Europe in 2011 (EFAMA, 2011c, p. 
7). The challenge today is to develop the AIFMD into a competitive framework 
that would see EU managers successfully offering not only their funds but also 
their management services around the world.  




























As  AIFMD  (alternative  investment  fund  managers  Directive)  comes  into  force  and 
gains  momentum,  the  allocation  of  institutional  investors  to  non‐harmonised 
investment funds is set to increase further. Moreover, as prudential rules turn their 
attention to the ultimate underlying rather than the legal form of investment funds, 
the  access  of  institutional  investors  to  non‐harmonised  funds  will  be  eased.  The 
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… while new fund types will be pushed forward by regulators. 
Fragmentation of the UCITS brand is likely to come either at the point of sale (through 
immediate  changes  in  the  regulation  selling  practices)  or  at  the  level  of  product 
structuring (through future changes in product rules). At the same time, the AIFMD 
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2.  FINANCIAL STABILITY: 
SCOPING THE ISSUES AND 
NAVIGATING REGULATORY REFORM 
he asset management industry was fundamentally affected by the 
financial crisis, but is not seen to be one of its main causes. Still, asset 
management is interwoven with most if not all financial sector activities, 
and the industry will be strongly impacted by many of the measures taken in 
the meantime in the pursuit of more resilient and stable financial markets. In 
addition, parts of the asset management industry are strongly associated with 
the banking system, a connection that attracts increasing attention of policy-
makers.  
Financial stability may be broadly defined as the absence of disruptions 
in the ordinary functioning of financial markets that would significantly 
undermine the wider economy (Allen & Wood, 2006; Čihák, 2006 and Schinasi, 
2004). The events that took place in financial markets from 2007 onwards 
positioned financial stability at the centre of the regulatory agenda at global 
and regional level. The G-20 nations meeting in Washington, D.C. in 
November 2008 pledged to improve the regulation and oversight of all 
financial markets, products and participants as appropriate. In Europe two 
comprehensive reports – one commissioned by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) to Adair Turner (2009) in the UK and the other, by the 
European Commission to Jacques de Larosière (2009) – explored the causes of 
the crisis and the regulatory response that should follow. Both reports 
concluded that the asset management industry did not play a major role in the 
financial crisis.  
Acknowledging the limited role of asset managers in the financial crisis 
did not prevent regulators from further investigating the links between asset 
management and financial stability. In effect, the crisis prompted a step-change 
in the approach of authorities to the regulation and surveillance of all financial 
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intermediaries, including asset managers. The new approach of regulators 
highlights the importance of: i) targeting the economic substance of financial 
intermediation rather than its legal form, ii) challenging business models and 
strategies instead of focusing supervision on systems and processes, iii) 
monitoring markets continuously from a financial stability perspective and iv) 
taking action at an early stage before perverse developments become endemic 
and pose immediate threats to financial stability (Turner, 2009 and de 
Larosière, 2009). This new approach explains most of the regulatory and 
supervisory developments that are reshaping the asset management industry 
in Europe and globally, such as the enactment of the alternative investment 
fund managers Directive (AIFMD), the role of depositaries or the FSB 
monitoring of non-bank financial intermediaries. 
This section will consider the links between asset management and 
financial stability by first discussing the role of the industry in the crisis; then 
referring to selected issues of financial stability in asset management; and 
finally considering the major regulatory reforms undertaken to strengthen the 
resilience of the industry. The section will elaborate in particular on how the 
rules in the AIFMD address the links between financial stability and fund 
management. It will also consider in detail maturity transformation, as 
illustrated by the case of money market funds with stable net asset values, and 
the role of the new financial stability watchdogs, as illustrated by the case of 
synthetic exchange traded-funds. 
2.1  The role of the industry in the crisis of 2008 
Regulators worldwide have acknowledged that the asset management 
industry did not play a principal role in the crisis, with the exception of some 
money market funds. Notably the size of the industry and its volume of 
leverage did not make it systemically important (Turner, 2009 and de Larosière 
et al., 2009). Data from the IMF (2008) and the World Bank (2009) reveal that 
the levels of leverage in the asset management industry were moderate and 
significantly lower than in the banking industry. In 2008, the most leveraged 
asset managers, e.g. hedge funds pursuing capital of relative value and fixed-
income arbitrage strategies, were on average three times less leveraged than 
the 10 largest banks in continental Europe (see Figure 7). Pooling all hedge-
fund strategies together, their average leverage was 20 times lower than the 
average leverage of banks in Europe in 2008. In terms of size, over 3,000 asset 
management companies hold an average of €4 billion assets under 
management, which is roughly 50% of the average assets in domestic banks in 
the EU27. In rounded figures, assets under management in investment funds 
represent €6 trillion, in contrast to €34 trillion in domestic banks in the EU-27 
(EFAMA, 2011a and ECB, 2011). While banks provide a useful benchmark with 32 | FINANCIAL STABILITY: SCOPING THE ISSUES AND NAVIGATING REGULATORY REFORM 
regard to size, the activities of asset managers and banks are intrinsically 
different in nature. Crucially, the risk of loss in investment funds is borne 
transparently by investors, i.e. the direct owners of the underlying assets, and 
is not insured by sovereigns.  
In spite of their limited size, leveraged funds logically played a role in 
depressing asset prices (Turner, 2009 and de Larosière et al., 2009). Precisely 
because of their use of leverage, some hedge funds were part of the 
deflationary spiral. Those funds relied on banks and other counterparties to 
fund their exposures (under so-called ‘prime brokerage’ agreements). Where 
market conditions deteriorated, drops in asset prices prompted prime brokers 
to cut down on the financing and ask for more collateral or higher margins. In 
a deflationary spiral, financing restrictions forced hedge funds into fire sales 
and depressed prices further, restarting a vicious cycle in which prime brokers’ 
conditions would worsen further. Some hedge funds failed (about 1,500 in the 
US), but it is worth noting that the impact of these failures on the 
counterparties was not very significant probably given the difference in size 
(BIS, 2010, p. 56). In conclusion, while asset managers did not play a major role 
in the emergence of the crisis, some funds behaved pro-cyclically in a 
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In comparison to the rest of the asset management industry, money 
market funds (MMFs) were the most affected by the financial crisis. In 
September 2008, a fast-growing US MMF “broke the buck”6 by acknowledging 
a difference of 30-basis points between the face value of its units ($1.00) and 
their mark-to-market value. Contagion became widespread, involving large 
redemptions across the industry and further deterioration of conditions in 
money markets. The run prompted the US Treasury to introduce a temporary 
guarantee in favour of investors. The Federal Reserve was also forced to step in 
by extending credit lines in favour of banks to restore liquidity in money 
markets. In Europe, despite the lack of a harmonised definition of MMFs, some 
funds experienced similar problems as their US counterparts. Losses in Europe 
were borne primarily by asset management companies and their parent 
undertakings – either directly or indirectly. The ECB was also forced to 
intervene by providing assistance to restore liquidity in interbank and money 
markets. European interbank markets suffered dearly due to the reliance of 
European banks on USD-denominated MMFs, prompting the ECB and the 
Federal Reserve to increase their swap lines (McCauley et al., 2009). 
The problems experienced in 2008 were the consequence of i) poor 
investment decisions, ii) the deposit-like promises made by some MMFs, iii) 
the direct losses caused by the failure of Lehman Brothers and iv) the loss of 
confidence in the quality of the commercial paper issued by banks. In effect, 
some funds commercialised as ‘money market’ were invested in illiquid assets, 
including subprime CDOs (collateralised debt obligations), which significantly 
undermined their resilience to market shocks and their ability to meet 
redemptions. Some funds were performing significant maturity transformation 
while making deposit-like promises that misrepresented the risks to investors. 
Widespread reliance on ’liquidity through marketability’ proved flawed where 
market conditions deteriorated (Turner, 2009, p. 21).7 Growing redemptions 
and worsening conditions in money markets exhausted the ability of fund 
sponsors to keep stable NAVs. 
The run in 2008 revealed the relative systemic importance of MMFs, 
given their size and economic relevance, as well as their deposit-like promises 
(in some instances). MMFs a are very significant source of short-term funding 
for governments, corporations and financial institutions, including interbank 
markets – assets under management totalled more than $3.8 trillion in the US 
and $1.3 trillion in Europe in 2008 (McCauley et al., 2009).  
                                                        
6 If a fund’s net asset value (NAV) falls below $1.00, it is said that the fund “broke the buck”. 
7 ‘Liquidity through marketability’ is the ability to recover the value of assets before their 
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2.2  Issues of financial stability in fund management 
Beyond the limited role of asset managers in the financial crisis, regulators 
have reconsidered their approach to the industry in their efforts to strengthen 
the overall resilience of the financial system. The Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), established in 2009, is coordinating under a G20 mandate an effort to 
strengthen financial stability through regulatory and supervisory reforms. 
Among several other work streams initiated, the FSB is considering non-bank 
financial intermediation from a financial stability perspective, including fund 
management (FSB, 2011a). The work of the board in this regard follows three 
main steps: i) building global monitoring capabilities to capture the scale and 
trends in non-bank financial intermediation, ii) indentifying broad themes that 
concern financial stability and iii) assessing in detail specific concerns and 
proposing concrete actions (FSB, 2011b, p. 7). The approach of the FSB consists 
therefore of first casting the net wide and then narrowing down the scope of its 
analysis (FSB, 2011a).  
In relation to asset management, the FSB is largely taking stock of the 
work carried-out previously at the national and international level by IOSCO 
(2009), the European Commission (2009a) and the UK FSA (2005). These 
reports consider that while the asset management industry does not pose in 
itself an immediate threat to financial stability, there are a number of areas 
where regulatory and supervisory reform could strengthen the resilience of the 
industry and its contribution to stable financial markets. Five broad themes of 
financial stability in asset management emerge from the work carried out by 
these regulators: i) the overall size of the industry and its economic 
importance, ii) leverage and pro-cyclicality, iii) maturity and liquidity 
transformation, iv) transparency of the underlying exposures and v) links with 
the banking system. Most of these themes are already the object of supervisory 
oversight and regulation in the EU and the US.  
i)  Overall size and economic importance. The asset management industry is 
projected to experience significant growth in the medium to long-term, 
as tighter regulatory requirements are imposed on banks in the 
framework of Basel III (FSB, 2011a). The growth of asset management 
intermediation and capital markets is expected to have an overall 
positive impact on financial stability by reducing the importance of 
banks in the financial system and the wider economy. However, there is 
a reasonable likelihood that business previously undertaken by banks 
will move to the asset management industry, undermining the 
effectiveness of some of the rules under Basel III. Moreover, some areas 
of the asset management industry are expected to play an increasingly 
important role in financing the real economy. In this respect, regulators 
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standards and oversight from a financial stability perspective that are 
consistent at international level. 
ii)  Leverage and pro-cyclicality. Funds may gather leverage by borrowing 
directly from banks or other counterparties or using repurchase 
agreements (secured financing). Moreover, practices such as securities 
lending, re-hypothecation of collateral, short-selling and derivatives also 
amplify fund leverage. The average leverage in the asset management 
industry is low in comparison to other intermediaries but somewhat 
significant in some alternative investment funds (see figure above). High 
leverage multiplies the exposure of funds to risk. It amplifies the impact 
of price shocks and raises the probability of fire sales when financing 
withdraws under stressful market conditions. Stated otherwise, it 
magnifies the risks embedded in liquidity and maturity mismatches 
since borrowing is very sensitive to a reduction in market confidence and 
might suddenly dry up or not be rolled over. In this respect, supervisors 
have agreed to enhance their oversight capacities in order to monitor the 
level of leverage in the industry and its potential contribution to pro-
cyclicality. 
iii)  Maturity and liquidity transformation. Investment managers can 
theoretically perform significant maturity and liquidity transformation, 
as seen for instance in some money market funds before the introduction 
of tighter rules on both sides of the Atlantic. In general, the degree of 
liquidity of investment funds depends on three aspects: a) the maturity 
or liquidity of the underlying positions, b) the leverage of the fund and 
the maturity of its financing and c) the redemption policy of the fund as 
represented to investors for the sole purpose of a light increase of overall 
performance. Where these aspects are not aligned and appropriately 
managed, funds may incur significant asset-liability mismatches, engage 
in destabilising fire sales and ultimately fail to meet redemptions. 
Managers need therefore to manage both their underlying portfolios 
(using appropriate risk and liquidity management processes) and 
redemptions by investors (using instruments such as gates, side-pockets 
and suspensions). Ultimately, the liquidity of the underlying assets 
should be explicit for investors, as well as the possibility that 
redemptions may be limited in the event of exceptional market 
circumstances. 
iv)  Transparency of the underlying exposures. The risks embedded in 
investment funds depend on their underlying assets and are therefore 
significantly different across funds, even if they pursue similar 
investment strategies. Transparency is essential for financial stability – 
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cannot distinguish good from bad assets (Bank of England, 2011). At the 
same time, opaque instruments create contingent exposures that may 
only become evident during times of market stress (FSB, 2011a). Opacity 
in financial instruments appears directly related to their level of 
complexity since complex instruments are harder to value and more 
difficult to understand in terms of the risks they carry. As a matter of 
principle, investment funds need to be fully transparent about their 
underlying assets so that unit holders are able to determine the ultimate 
risk to which they are exposed (FSB, 2011b). Supervisors should also be 
able to monitor aggregate exposures to better understand movements in 
markets that may impact financial stability. 
v)  Links with the banking system. There is anecdotal evidence that banks may 
set up investment management activities to arbitrage the rules under 
Basel III. Some market intelligence suggests for instance that the limits 
introduced to proprietary trading by banks in the US have resulted in the 
transformation of some proprietary trading desks into stand-alone hedge 
funds (Fitch Ratings, 2011b and Strategic Insight, 2010). Similarly, 
supervisors are looking at the use of synthetic ETFs (exchanged traded 
funds) by some banks to finance their balance sheets at a lower cost than 
repo transactions and potentially lower requirements in terms of 
regulatory capital (FSB, 2011c). They are equally looking at similar 
practices such as securities lending. In this respect, regulators need to 
constantly monitor market developments and business models and be 
ready to act quickly to inhibit regulatory arbitrage of banking rules 
through the asset management industry. 
Table 3. Themes of financial stability in fund management and regulatory actions 
















































































2.3  Minimum common rules for the industry – the AIFMD 
The financial crisis prompted regulators to devise a comprehensive approach 
to regulate and supervise all financial intermediaries from a financial stability 
perspective, including asset managers. Europe led the way in this respect with 
the enactment of the alternative investment fund managers Directive (AIFMD) 
in 2011. The Directive is indeed comprehensive by targeting all alternative 
fund managers and introducing minimum common rules to address macro-
prudential risks, micro-prudential risks and the protection of professional 
investors. It overcomes the fragmentation of regulation and supervision in 
member states and introduces a single market for AIFs, providing a significant 
opportunity for industry development but simultaneously reducing the 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.  
The AIFMD is primarily aimed at ensuring that all managers fulfil 
minimum standards for financial stability purposes. In line with this goal, it 
applies to all alternative asset managers, independently of the specific strategy, 
business-model or subsector. The conscious choice of a horizontal piece of 
legislation aims to provide consistency and avoid the risk of ill-categorising 
market practices and opening windows for arbitrage. Only managers that 
handle UCITS and no AIFs are exempted from complying with the AIFMD.8 In 
effect, the UCITS Directive already goes far in ensuring the resilience of 
managers and funds in the interest of financial stability – and certain elements 
of the directive will be revised in 2012 in line with the AIFMD. Despite its all-
                                                        
8 Small managers are also exempted from the scope of the AIFMD but they may opt-in. See 
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encompassing scope, the AIMFD contains elements of tailoring depending on 
the size and economic nature of different activities (e.g. additional obligations 
for funds running high leverage). Building on these common rules, secondary 
and other legislation is bound in the future to pay more attention to specific 
business models, such as private equity, real state funds and other models well 
established in the marketplace. For instance, legislation is due to be enacted in 
2012 that will be based on the AIFMD but tailored to the specificities of venture 
capital and its role in the economy.9 
The AIFMD does not regulate funds, but rather managers. It does not 
deal therefore with portfolio composition – it does not limit eligible assets, 
issuer concentration, leverage or risks. Instead, it acts at the level of the 
manager by setting minimum operating requirements, mandatory registration 
and conduct of business rules. In so doing, it levels the playing field 
(proportionately) with other financial intermediaries that carry out economic 
functions of comparable economic significance. At the same time, registration 
allows supervisors to identify managers and, thanks to the reporting 
obligations introduced by the Directive, conduct effective macro-prudential 
oversight. The Directive complements its approach to financial stability by 
mandating comprehensive disclosure to (professional) investors so that they 
are able to carry out meaningful due diligence. Its intention here is to take 
stock of one of the main lessons of the financial crisis: namely that micro-risks, 
such as poor due diligence, can over time result in significant threats to 
financial stability (Turner, 2009 and de Larosière et al., 2009). Regulating 
portfolio composition instead could have induced moral hazard on 
professional investors and undermined their incentive to carry out their own 
due diligence.  
Small funds are exempted from complying with most of the AIFMD 
since they do not have a material impact on financial stability. The initial 
proposal of the European Commission fully exempted managers under €250 
million assets under management. Under this de minimis threshold, the 
Directive would have affected around 70% of assets in hedge funds and 90% of 
assets in open-ended non-UCITS funds, but only 15% and 36% of managers, 
respectively (European Commission, 2009a, pp. 46-51).10 The final text, 
however, opts for a mixed approach that exempts managers under €100 
million assets under management or €500 million if investors are locked-in for 
five years and in the absence of leverage.11 It also opts for a partial exception 
                                                        
9 Legislative proposal COM (2011) 860 final (venture capital funds). 
10 The extent to which it will apply to private equity and funds was not surveyed by the 
Commission. 
11 Article 3.2, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 39 
instead of a full exception, since managers under the threshold are obliged to 
register and provide simplified reporting to authorities to enable more 
effective financial stability oversight. The objective is to allow supervisors to 
have a fuller picture of the market without imposing administrative burdens 
on small managers which they would not be able to bear given their size. It is 
however uncertain whether the obligations imposed meet the latter objective. 
In the pursuit of a level playing field with comparable intermediaries, 
the AIFMD requires managers to provide an initial capital of €300,000 and 
additional capital at a ratio of 0.02% of their assets under management in 
excess of €250 million.12 The sum serves as a minimum entry requirement to 
the industry for managers over the de minimis threshold. It decreases as a 
proportion of the total assets under management, meaning the larger the fund, 
the lower the capital ratio (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Initial capital and own funds in the AIFMD 
€ million 
AuM  100  250  500  1,000  10,000 
Capital for the first €250m AuM  0.300  0.300  0.300  0.300  0.300 
AuM in excess of €250m  0  0  250  750  9,750 
Additional capital (ratio = 0.02%)  ‐  ‐  0.050  0.150  1.950 
Total capital  0.300  0.300  0.350  0.450  2.250 







In effect, managers experience economies of scale in terms of regulatory 
capital, the more assets they manage. The former makes clear that the objective 
of capital requirements in the AIFMD is to ensure that the manager is 
financially sound and capable of performing his/her tasks rather than 
providing for the risk of its activities, which is in principle borne directly by 
investors under conditions of transparency and no government guarantees. 
Capital requirements are complemented by additional own funds or insurance 
to cover potential professional liability. It is feared however that capital 
requirements may jeopardise the economic viability of some subsectors of the 
asset management industry. 
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The AIFMD addresses many of the issues of financial stability identified 
in fund management: 
i)  Prudential oversight. To enable effective macro-prudential oversight, the 
AIFMD requires managers to report detailed information about the 
funds they manage to supervisors. In particular, managers need to 
disclose the main markets and instruments in which they trade, and their 
principal exposures and concentrations of each fund.13 The reporting 
frequency depends on the size of the manager and the fund; ESMA 
proposed that funds report twice a year, except funds below the de 
minimis thresholds (once a year) or more than €1.5 billion assets under 
management (four times a year).14 The format of disclosure is 
harmonised so that supervisors can aggregate information easily. In 
order to allow the efficient exchange of information with supervisors 
outside the European Union, reporting will be standardised and will 
follow the model template for hedge funds provided by IOSCO (2009) 
with some adjustments to account for the broader scope of the AIFMD.15 
Managers are however very concerned about the costs of reporting and 
question the relevance of some of the information as well as the ability of 
supervisors to digest it.  
ii)  Leverage and pro-cyclicality. The Directive follows a commitment and 
monitoring approach by requiring managers to: a) set their own leverage 
limit, b) communicate it to investors and supervisors and c) be able to 
demonstrate compliance.16 If the manager employs leverage on a 
substantial basis, it faces additional reporting requirements as to the main 
sources and amount of leverage. To define the use of leverage on a 
substantial basis, ESMA does not favour the use of a single threshold but 
instead invites supervisory authorities to consider a range of 
circumstances, including the nature, scale and complexity of the AIF and 
the markets in which it operates.17 Reporting would extend not only to 
the borrowing of cash and securities but also to the leverage embedded 
in derivatives and the re-use of assets by the manager (e.g. re-
hypothecation of collateral).18 If any threat to financial stability emerges, 
supervisors are entitled to introduce limits on leverage proportional to 
                                                        
13 Article 24, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
14 Box 110.4, ESMA Technical Advice, ESMA 2011/379 (AIFMD implementation). 
15 Annex V, ESMA Technical Advice, ESMA 2011/379 (AIFMD implementation). 
16 Articles 15.4, 23.1.a and 25.3, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
17 Box 111, Technical Advice, ESMA 2011/379 (AIFMD implementation). 
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that threat.19 ESMA guidance suggests that limits may be imposed to 
control for: a) counterparty risk to other financial institutions, b) pro-
cyclical effects, c) asset-liability mismatches and d) concentration of risks 
in particular markets.20 The national authority would need to notify its 
decision to ESMA and the ESRB but consultation is regrettably not 
compulsory even though financial stability is inherently a cross-border 
issue.21 The AIFMD contains other provisions directed at mitigating pro-
cyclicality; notably, managers are required to conduct stress tests and to 
report their results to supervisors in order to reduce the reliance on pro-
cyclical risk metrics such as value at risk (VaR).22 The AIFMD does not 
address directly the use of securities lending, repo transactions or the re-
investment of collateral, even though their link to leverage and pro-
cyclicality is well known. These practices are in general use throughout 
financial markets and therefore necessitate a horizontal approach across 
intermediaries, which the FSB is due to bring forward in 2012 or 2013 
(FSB, 2011b). 
iii)  Maturity and liquidity transformation. The AIFMD operates at three levels: 
a) risk management, b) disclosure to investors and c) reporting to 
supervisors. Managers are required to build up liquidity management 
capabilities and processes, including monitoring and stress-testing.23 The 
AIFMD does not impose close-ended structures for illiquid funds but 
follows once more a commitment and monitoring approach. In this 
respect, managers need to: a) set out an investment strategy, liquidity 
profile and redemption policy both in normal and exceptional market 
circumstances, b) communicate them to investors and c) ensure they are 
consistent.24 Supervision should focus indeed on checking the 
consistency and prudency of these three items to mitigate the risk of 
liquidity and maturity mismatches. For prudential policy purposes, 
managers need to notify to supervisors the percentage of assets subject to 
special arrangements, such as gates or side-pockets, given their illiquid 
                                                        
19 Article 25.3, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
20 Box 101.4, Technical Advice, ESMA 2011/379 (AIFMD implementation). 
21 Article 25.3, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
22 Articles 15.3.b and 24.2, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
23 Article 16, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
24 Articles 23.1.h and 16.2, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 42 | FINANCIAL STABILITY: SCOPING THE ISSUES AND NAVIGATING REGULATORY REFORM 
nature.25 The activation of any of these arrangements should be 
communicated to investors immediately.26 
iv)  Transparency of the underlying. The AIFMD mandates extensive disclosure 
to supervisors in terms of instruments, markets and exposures.27 ESMA 
suggests that funds disclose the main categories of assets in which they 
invest, including their short and long market values, turnover and 
performance.28 For investors, disclosure obligations in the AIFMD do not 
reflect directly the underlying but more broadly the fund’s investment 
strategy and the types of assets in which it may invest.29 The degree of 
transparency of the underlying exposures of the fund is left rather to the 
prudential regulation of institutional investors. For instance, the 
Solvency II regime for insurers will apply punitive solvency charges to 
funds that do not provide full transparency on the underlying. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision will be considering the capital 
treatment of investment funds in 2012 (FSB, 2011b). 
v)  Links with the banking system. Managers need to take all reasonable steps 
to avoid conflicts of interest and otherwise manage and disclose those 
conflicts so that they do not adversely affect the interests of investors.30 
This rule affects in particular prime brokerages, that is, the provision of 
financing and market-making services to funds by banks and investment 
firms. Notably, prime brokerage agreements need to spell out the 
conditions under which the assets of the AIF (authorised investment 
fund) may be transferred and reused by the counterparty.31 The 
independence of the custody function is key to ensure that the fund 
assets are not transferred or reused without the explicit consent of the 
manager and full transparency to investors. In this regard, prime brokers 
are prohibited from acting as fund depositaries unless they introduce a 
functional and hierarchical separation of both functions.32 Managers 
need to give full account to investors of the extent to which the prime 
broker may reuse the fund’s assets.33  
                                                        
25 Articles 23.4 and 25.2, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
26 Box 108.5, Technical Advice, ESMA 2011/379 (AIFMD implementation). 
27 Article 24, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
28 Box 110.3.e, Technical Advice, ESMA 2011/379 (AIFMD implementation). 
29 Article 23.1.a, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
30 Articles 1.d and 14, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
31 Article 14.3, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
32 Article 21.4, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
33 Article 23.1.o, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 43 
In sum, the AIFMD represents a consistent framework for the regulation 
of the wider asset management industry from a prudential policy perspective 
by introducing minimum common rules and addressing in particular: a) 
prudential oversight, b) leverage and pro-cyclicality, c) maturity and liquidity 
transformation and d) links with the banking system. It relies on the prudential 
rules applicable to institutional investors when it comes to transparency of the 
underlying. Despite much controversy over the enactment of the Directive, the 
Task Force is satisfied that the final text goes in the right direction in 
addressing the links between financial stability and the asset management 
industry. In so doing, and by introducing a single market for alternative 
managers and funds, it represents a significant opportunity for the industry 
and investors. Limits to securities lending, repo transactions and the re-
hypothecation of collateral exceed the scope of the AIFMD but need to be 
addressed in a horizontal manner that applies (proportionately) to all 
intermediaries in financial markets. The challenge over the next few years will 
be to implement the AIFMD in a manner that limits compliance costs and 







referring  to  some  of  their  features:  a)  the  absence  of  borrowing  and  leverage 
restrictions mandated by regulation, b) the presence of significant performance fees, 
c) limited redemption windows, d) significant participation held by the manager, e) 



























trillion  in  assets  under  management,  roughly  the  same  as  in  2008  (see  Figure  8). 
According to AIMA (2011), hedge funds in Europe account for about $450 billion, over 
80% of which is managed by entities domiciled in the UK (FSA, 2011a). Most hedge 





they  are  estimated  to  account  for  7%  of  the  outstanding  value  of  the  global 
convertible bond market, 4% of the interest rate derivatives market and 6% of the 
global commodity derivative markets (FSA, 2011a). Unfortunately, evidence of trade 








a  voluntary  survey  of  the  industry  conducted  yearly  by  the  regulator  and  may 
therefore not be fully representative. 
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2.4  Problems raised by maturity transformation – money market 
funds 
Broadly speaking, money market funds (MMFs) are open-ended investment 
funds that offer high liquidity to investors by holding short-term instruments. 
The ECB defines MMFs as “collective investment undertakings whose units 
are, in terms of liquidity, close substitutes for deposits, and which primarily 
invest in money market instruments [...] and/or pursue a rate of return that 
approaches the interest rates of money market instruments”.34 MMF first 
originated in the US and then appeared in Europe following a more open 
approach to the use of the money market fund denomination. By end 2011, 
MMFS accounted for about $2.6 trillion assets under management in the US, 
according to the Investment Company Institute,35 and €1.2 trillion in Europe 
under the UCITS brand, according to EFAMA (2011c, p. 5). 
In the US, MMFs are mutual funds regulated under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and that comply with specific requirements on credit-
quality, diversification and maturity (2a-7 rule). Notably funds are not allowed 
to hold more than 3% of their assets in second-tier securities or more than 5% 
of their assets in any single issuer or face caps as to the average weighted 
maturity of their portfolios. Under the 2a-7 rule, US MMFs value their assets at 
amortised costs and offer a stable net asset value (NAV) to investors. Funds, 
however, need to monitor in parallel the mark-to-market valuation of their 
portfolio. If the market value falls 50 basis points below the face value, the 
fund would need to ‘break the buck’ and devalue their shares. Breaking the 
buck is rare in historical terms, since only two US MMFs have done so prior to 
the 2006-08 financial crisis since their inception in the 1970s (PWGFM, 2010, p. 
8).  
In contrast to the US, European MMFs may have either stable (40% of 
AuM) or fluctuating NAV (60%). Stable NAV funds first appeared in Europe in 
the 1980s; they were predominantly denominated in dollars and domiciled in 
Ireland to serve US clients (EFAMA & IMMFA, 2009, p. 2). In 2008 still more 
than half of European MMFs with stable NAV were denominated in dollars 
( M c C a u l e y  e t  a l . ,  2 0 0 9 ,  p .  6 8 ) .  O v e r  t i m e ,  m o s t  M M F s  i n  E u r o p e  c a m e  t o  
operate under the UCITS Directive, complying with its investment restrictions 
and enjoying its marketing passport (EFAMA & IMMFA, 2009, p. 4). However, 
before 2010 there was no single approach to the definition of MMFs in Europe. 
While some member states regulated MMFs in a manner similar to the US, 
                                                        
34 Annex 1 Part 3 Category 4 Regulation 2423/2001 (consolidated balance sheet of the 
monetary financial institutions). 
35 http://www.ici.org/research/stats/mmf/mm_02_16_12 RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 47 
others followed different approaches. In some jurisdictions, insufficient 
regulation opened the opportunity for managers to use the denomination 
‘money market’ in funds with a relatively illiquid underlying. In 2010, ESMA 
introduced guidelines to restrict the use of the term ‘money market’ under the 
UCITS brand to funds that comply with special limits as to the eligibility, 
credit-quality, diversification and maturity of their underlying, in addition to 
the general UCITS requirements.36 
The challenges experienced by MMFs in 2008 showed their importance 
in providing short-term financing to both corporations and financial 
institutions, including notably banks. The run on some MMFs in 2008 was the 
consequence of multiple factors, including: i) inadequate portfolio composition 
that included complex and illiquid assets, ii) insufficient transparency towards 
investors on the risks embedded in some funds and iii) the use of rounded 
NAVs and redemptions at face value in some funds (PWGFM, 2010, pp. 8-11). 
In Europe, given the lack of a single regulatory definition of MMFs, these 
problems are more difficult to trace. On both sides of the Atlantic, however, a 
number of MMFs performed significant maturity transformation without 
appropriately managing investor expectations and aligning their redemption 
policies. A survey of the relevant policy documents and academic literature 
would explain the factors that led to the run in 2008 as follows:  
i)  Inadequate portfolio composition. In the run-up to the financial crisis some 
MMFs invested in complex and illiquid assets. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that some MMFs had substantial holdings of subprime 
collateralised-debt-obligations (CDOs) in the US and in Europe (Evans, 
2007; Zingales, 2008). These at the time highly-rated securities satisfied 
the regulatory requirements imposed on MMFs while providing 
attractive returns, despite embedding risks that were not at all in line 
with the investment policy that investors expected from MMFs. 
ii)  Insufficient transparency. Money market funds are generally perceived 
and sold to investors as safe investments. Some MMFs, essentially in the 
US, by offering immediate redemptions and even transaction services 
similar to cash accounts, are wrongly perceived as near-equivalents to 
bank deposits. Moreover, past instances of sponsor support resulted in 
some investors perceiving MMFs as carrying some sort of guarantee.  
iii)  Rounded NAVs and redemptions at face value. The price of units in MMFs is 
typically rounded to €1.00 or $1.00, fostering the expectation that it will 
not fluctuate. Such expectations may lead some investors to react 
disproportionately versus relatively small changes in the price of shares, 
                                                        
36 ESMA Guidelines CESR/09-85 (common definition money market funds). 48 | FINANCIAL STABILITY: SCOPING THE ISSUES AND NAVIGATING REGULATORY REFORM 
particularly under exceptional market circumstances. Redemptions may 
then undermine the NAV of a fund so the manner in which such losses 
are distributed among investors is most relevant. To ensure shareholder 
equity, losses need to be borne proportionately by all shares, including 
the ones just being redeemed. Otherwise, investors have an incentive to 
redeem their units immediately in case of market stress, which has the 
potential of being destabilising. Where the face value of units is lower 
than the market value, redemptions at face value would push the losses 
onto the remaining investors, as in stable NAV MMFs. The increased 
participation of sophisticated investors in MMFs is believed to have 
reduced the stability of their investor base (PWGFM, 2010, p. 20).  
Some MMFs have historically relied on sponsor support to maintain 
their face value – even well-managed funds investing in high-quality securities 
with short maturities (PWGFM, 2010, p. 19). Sponsor support is however not 
limited to the MMF industry. It takes multiple formats, such as capital 
contributions, purchases of securities or guarantees by management houses or 
their parent institutions. It is not explicit, since otherwise sponsors would have 
to account for this support in their balance sheets. Moody’s (2010) identified at 
least 146 support events before 2007 in over 30 years of operation of MMFs. 
Yet, there is growing a consensus that sponsors are no longer able to provide 
support given: i) the growing size of the industry, ii) higher correlations across 
securities and counterparties, iii) lower maturities and more frequent turnover 
and iv) a more volatile institutional investor base (Moody’s, 2010; PWGFM, 
2010).  
Regulatory reform has concentrated on portfolio composition, limiting 
the range of eligible instruments for MMFs. In Europe, ESMA guidelines create 
a two-tier system of MMFs by distinguishing between: short-term MMFs, which 
may have a constant net asset value, and (non-short-term) MMFs, which may 
use the label ‘money market’ but are constrained to have a floating NAV.37 
Both types of funds need to invest with the primary objective of maintaining 
the principal of the fund and providing a return in line with money markets. 
Managers are prohibited from relying exclusively on credit ratings to 
determine the credit quality of the instruments in which they invest and are 
expressly required to take into account operational and counterparty risks. The 
difference between short-term MMFs and (non-short-term) MMFs hangs in the 
maturity of the instruments in which they may invest, as reflected in Table 5. 
                                                        




















38  6 months  12 months  Fluctuating only 
Notes:  Residual Maturity (RM): Pending maturity until the legal redemption date. 
Weighted Average Maturity (WAM): A measure of the average length of time to maturity of 





Following the revision in 2010 of rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company 
Act, US MMFs are subject to the same maturity limits as European short-term 
MMFs. In addition, they have to comply with liquidity requirements so that at 
least 10% of assets are held in cash or cash-equivalent instruments and 30% in 
assets maturing in one week. The SEC also included provisions to limit the 
participation of MMFs in repurchase agreements and to facilitate the use of 
suspensions by MMFs and their orderly liquidation (PWGFM, 2010, pp. 14-15). 
It is worth noting, however, in contrast with the SEC rules, ESMA guidelines 
are soft law. In this respect, the European Commission should consider the 
possibility of bringing forward a legislative proposal to harmonise MMFs in 
Europe. 
The restrictions imposed on eligible assets are of crucial importance. But 
other relevant issues remain unresolved and  need to be addressed by 
regulators, including: i) the inequitable distribution of any losses caused by 
redemptions, given its potential destabilising effect in exceptional market 
circumstances and ii) the issue of 'sponsor support' and the extent to which it 
may be withdrawn or factored in the capital requirements of the sponsoring 
entity (FSB, 2011a and 2011b). Moreover, they need to deal with the effects of 
government intervention and sponsor support in 2008, which “distorted the 
incentives of managers and probably also price formation in money 
markets”  (Zingales, 2008, p. 7; PWGFM, 2010, p. 3).39 Any change in these 
                                                        
38 Provided that the time remaining until the next interest rate reset date is equal to or less 
than 397 days. 
39 In 2008, the US Treasury introduced a temporary guarantee in favour of investors in 2a-7 
MMFs. Losses in Europe were borne primarily by asset management companies and their 
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respects would have to control for the possibility of reduced investor demand 
for MMFs and lower availability of short-term funding for corporations, 
financial institutions and governments, and would have to be accompanied by 
restrictions on unregulated substitutes where demand may shift, thereby 
diluting the positive effects of further reform of MMFs on financial stability. 
The challenges experienced by MMFs in 2008 provide the perfect 
example of how maturity transformation (the lack of alignment between the 
fund’s underlying, investor expectations and redemption policies) can pose 
systemic risks. The SEC considered in 2010 as many as five reform options: 
mandating floating net asset values; mandating redemptions in kind under 
stressed market circumstance; providing a private emergency liquidity facility 
to MMFs; ensuring investments in MMFs in way similar to bank deposits; and 
even regulating stable NAV funds as special purpose banks (PWGFM, 2010). 
Ultimately, the choice boils down to two options: i) asserting the risks 
embedded in MMFs and clarifying their fund nature whereby the principal is 
not guaranteed; or ii) driving the industry and investors towards the banking 
system or bank-like structures based on capital requirements, deposit 
insurance and emergency liquidity facilities. The first choice is preferable by 
far: MMFs can play a significant role in diversifying the sources of financing 
from bank loans to securities, bringing forward disintermediation and 
developing capital markets, but further reform is needed to re-assert the fund 
nature of MMFs.  
2.5  Continuous market surveillance – ETFs and bank financing 
Following the experience in the financial crisis, a new approach to supervision 
has developed based on monitoring business models and markets 
continuously from a financial stability perspective and taking action at an early 
stage in the product life cycle (Turner, 2009; de Larosière et al., 2009). For this 
purpose, a range of bodies has been created at national and international level, 
including the Financial Stability Board (FSB) at global level, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU and the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) in the US. At the same time, supervisors and regulators 
around the world have strengthened their expertise on financial stability. The 
warnings issued in the context of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are a good 
example of this new approach to supervision and the way these new bodies 
work in practice (BIS, 2011; FSB, 2011; Bank of England, 2011; ESRB, 2011; 
                                                                                                                                             
parent undertakings – either directly or indirectly. The Federal Reserve and the ECB 
intervened by providing assistance to restore liquidity in interbank and money markets.  RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 51 
ESMA, 2011a; AMF, 2011). The key issue from a financial stability perspective 
is the funding function that synthetic ETFs play for banks. 
Most ETFs replicate the composition of an index, either by directly 
holding the securities (physical ETFs) or by entering into a derivative contract 
(synthetic ETFs). In the latter case, the fund manager usually contracts a total 
return swap with a bank that delivers the performance of the given index in 
exchange for the cash collected from the end investors, plus a fee. To cover the 
counterparty risk, the bank gives the fund manager the beneficial or direct 
ownership over a substitute basket of securities, whose components are 
generally unrelated to the underlying tracked by the fund but should have a 
similar market value. The advantage of synthetic ETFs for investors is their 
lower error in tracking the index, in comparison with physical ETFs where 
deviations are inevitable given physical replication. The drawback for 
investors is that they are not only exposed to the index but also to the 
substitute basket of securities, if the swap counterparty were to default. 
Exposure to the swap counterparty is however limited to a maximum 10% of 
the fund’s market value for those ETFs that operate under the UCITS rules, 
that is, the vast majority of ETFs in Europe. Beyond counterparty risk, 
investors in synthetic ETFs also become exposed to the operational risks 
involved in managing the swap and the substitute basket. The former is not to 
say that counterparty and operational risks are not present in physical ETFs, in 
particular where they engage in securities lending to raise additional revenues. 
From the point of view of financial stability, regulators are wary of the 
use of synthetic ETFs by banks as a source of financing. Currently, only a small 
number of European banks are active in the synthetic ETF market, although 
these banks are significant in size. They are present not as outright investors 
but as counterparties, frequently to their own fund management subsidiaries. 
In a synthetic ETF structure, banks receive the cash from end investors and use 
it to finance the inventory of assets they hold for market-making purposes. 
From this perspective, a synthetic ETF structure is a substitute for issuing 
commercial paper or entering into repurchase agreements. A working 
document from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimates that 
using ETFs can result in substantial cost savings for banks – the higher the 
short-term interest rates that apply to repos, the larger the savings in using 
ETFs (Ramaswamy, 2011). Ultimately, managers and banks arbitrage the 
difference in repo rates between the assets in the basket whose return is 
tracked and the substitute basket transferred to the fund manager by way of 
guarantee. Given the incentives for banks to increase the use of ETFs to raise 
funding, regulators have endeavoured to better understand the possible effects 
that a potential over-reliance of banks on synthetic ETFs in the future could 
have on financial stability. Regulators are also considering the role of securities 52 | FINANCIAL STABILITY: SCOPING THE ISSUES AND NAVIGATING REGULATORY REFORM 
lending by investment funds (including physical ETFs) in bank funding since 
banks may benefit from any difference in liquidity between the securities 
borrowed from the fund and the collateral posted to it.  
At present the ETF industry is not systemically relevant, given its size. 
Synthetic ETFs just account for roughly 1.5% of the investment management 
industry in Europe, in terms of assets under management. Their underlying 
swaps would therefore make up for a relatively small proportion of global 
derivative markets – approximately 10% of equity-linked OTC forwards and 
swaps and 3% of total equity-linked OTC derivatives, including options, in 
terms of notional amounts outstanding (Amenc et al., 2012, p. 54, based on BIS 
statistics). The concern of regulators is rather that growth in the industry and 
competition among providers could result in a reduction in the quality of the 
assets in the substitute basket, vulnerability of the banking system to a run on 
ETFs and an increase in the complexity of ETF structures that would 
undermine risk-monitoring (BIS, 2011; FSB, 2011; Bank of England, 2011; ESRB, 
2011; ESMA, 2011a; AMF, 2011). Complexity and doubts about collateral 
quality could trigger redemptions in ETFs leading to a substantial reduction in 
available bank funding. Bank counterparties would have contractual 
obligations, or otherwise reputational incentives, to service redemptions. 
Investors in ETFs, who expect continuous liquidity, may quickly flee from 
ETFs and behave adversely before any restrictions are imposed on 
redemptions.  
The industry has responded to these objections by increasing the level of 
transparency on all fronts, including the components of the substitute basket 
and the structuring of ETFs, addressing some of the concerns raised by the 
regulators. Other issues cannot be addressed by asset managers but rather by 
their bank counterparties, such as explaining how banks replicate the returns 
of the given index and how they account for their funding exposures to 
synthetic ETFs. It is essential from this perspective that asset management and 
banking regulators work together to find holistic solutions to the issues raised 
by financial stability bodies. They should address not only ETFs under the 
UCITS rules but more importantly those exchange-traded products (ETPs) that 
behave similarly without being subject to equivalent rules in terms of 
counterparty risk mitigation and disclosure.  
The intervention of the financial stability bodies may have resulted in 
significant redemptions from synthetic ETFs that may not have been in the best 
interest of investors. However, it has also managed to raise much-needed 
awareness among investors about the counterparty and operational risks 
embedded in derivatives and securities lending transactions, in ETF products 
and beyond. Higher transparency and stricter discipline will no doubt benefit 
the asset management industry in the long run and facilitate an adequate level RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 53 
of protection for investors and safeguards to financial stability. Awareness has 
also grown about securities lending and its role in bank financing. The case of 
ETFs illustrates a positive change in supervisory oversight, which has become 
much more proactive, open to the public and mindful of economic incentives, 
emerging trends and business models. The burden has been shifted to 
intermediaries to publicly demonstrate that their activities are socially useful, 
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The UCITS regulatory framework was adapted and developed over the 
years to strengthen the single market, take stock of changes in financial 
markets and improve risk management. In 2003 the UCITS III Directive 
represented a turning point for product structuring by expanding the scope of 
eligible assets and permissible investment practices beyond the traditional 
realm of plain vanilla equities and debt securities. The 2003 Directive came to 
modernise the UCITS framework 17 years after its introduction. In so doing, 
they helped UCITS overcome some of its limitations, including the use of 
derivatives, within a more robust risk management framework. In 2009, the 
UCITS IV Directive furthered strengthened risk management, clarifying the 
limits to embedded leverage and exposure to market risk. Forthcoming 
legislation (UCITS V) is due to strengthen the management of non-market risks 
in UCITS in 2012. 
As mentioned, portfolio structuring in UCITS is based on strict exposure 
limits and the liquidity of the underlying assets to allow frequent redemptions 
by investors (at least fortnightly). In line with these principles, more illiquid 
assets and strategies cannot be accessed directly but through the use of 
derivative financial instruments and subject to a set of conditions that will be 
fully discussed in the next sections. Originally, the use of derivatives in UCITS 
was limited to hedging risks and so-called ‘efficient portfolio management’. 
Today however, UCITS funds are allowed to use derivatives as an integral part 
of their investment strategy not only to limit market risks but also to generate 
returns.  
3.2  Product innovation under UCITS explained 
The 2003 UCITS III Directive expanded the scope of eligible assets and 
permissible investment practices. As a result the UCITS product range has 
grown over the years based in particular on the use of derivatives and 
structured financial instruments. While long-only funds and traditional 
strategies remain the core of the UCITS offering still today, the use of 
derivatives has generalised both to achieve reductions in market risk and 
generate returns (EFAMA, 2011c). In 2008 the use of derivatives was estimated 
to have grown at a yearly rate of 10% since the introduction of the UCITS III 
Directive (PWC, 2008). Some UCITS exploit the possibilities offered by 
derivatives and structured financial instruments to a fuller extent, for instance 
to gain exposure to otherwise ineligible assets or implement alternative 
investment strategies. The product range within UCITS today is varied and 
also includes structured funds offering some sort of capital protection. 
Arguably the two most relevant developments in the UCITS product range are 
alternative UCITS funds and UCITS exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Both sorts 56 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
are structured to comply in full with the requirements in the Directive and 
benefit from its passport to broaden their access to investors. This section will 
consider the size and characteristics of these two product offerings. 
3.2.1  UCITS alternative funds 
A survey of industry participants carried out on behalf of the European 
Commission in 2007 concluded that UCITS III allowed the structuring of funds 
replicating several alternative investment strategies (PwC, 2008b). The 
marketplace has come up with different names to refer to UCITS that follow 
alternative strategies, such as newcits, UCITS III products or absolute-return 
UCITS. The difficulty in defining alternative strategies means that the scope 
and size of alternative UCITS remain unclear. EFAMA broadly defines them as 
“UCITS which aim to manage the risk/return trade‐off by the use of a wide 
range of strategies and instruments” allowed under UCITS III and later UCITS 
IV (EFAMA, 2011c).  
Each fund classification results in a different estimation of the size of this 
market segment. According to Strategic Insight (2010),40 there are about 1,000 
alternative UCITS and they account for over €115 billion in assets under 
management. In other words just 4% of total assets under management in long-
term UCITS would pursue alternative strategies.41 If compared to the global 
hedge fund industry size (€1,240 billion in 2010 according to Hedge Fund 
Research – HFR) alternative UCITS would however account for a significant 
share of alternative funds in Europe. Other studies assess alternative UCITS at 
less than €100 billion in assets under management (Tuchschmid et al., 2010, 
based on data from Nara Capital). 
Alternative UCITS have experienced rapid growth since 2005. Strategic 
Insight estimates that they accounted for 15% of total net flows into long-term 
UCITS in 2010. In absolute values, these flows were bigger than the ones 
experienced by similar non-UCITS products. If this trend was to continue, 
under reasonable assumptions, alternative UCITS could account for 10% of 
UCITS assets in 2020 (SI, 2010). Future growth will depend among other factors 
on the continued interest of high net worth individuals and institutional 
investors.  
 
                                                        
40 Strategic Insight is an investment management research and consulting company in New 
York. It produces a comprehensive range of databases, in-depth studies, internet libraries 
and on-demand research (see www.sionline.com). 





In the near future, alternative UCITS will compete with funds handled 
by managers under the AIFMD to attract professional investors. The 
alternative investment fund managers Directive will reduce the competitive 
advantage of UCITS in terms of marketing passport, transparency and 
regulatory seal. The interest of institutional investors in alternative strategies 
derives from their need to diversify their exposures and hopefully gather the 
returns needed to meet their liabilities. The extent to which institutional 
investors will prefer alternative UCITS over AIFMD funds will depend, among 
other factors, on their efficiency in terms of regulatory capital. To date, national 
authorities have frequently imposed limits on the ability of insurance 
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2010b; PwC, 2008b). Solvency II allocates capital charges with reference to the 
underlying and could partially reverse this situation for managers who 
succeed in providing investors with a full look-through into the assets 






implementation  of  alternative  strategies  in  UCITS  may  only  be  partial,  given  the 
restrictions imposed by regulation. In a study presented to this Task Force, Amenc and 
Sender (EDHEC‐Risk, 2010b) consider the fitting of different hedge fund strategies 
within  the  UCITS  regulatory  framework.
43  The  main  conclusions  of  this  study  are 
summarised below: 
o  Strategies that invest in a diversified pool of liquid securities, such as equity 
long‐short,  are  the  easiest  to  implement  in  UCITS  since  they  comply  more 














                                                        
42 Regulatory capital requirements under Solvency II will enforce full look-though into the 
underlying of investment funds, whether UCITS or AIFs, and so not impact on the move of 
alternative strategies into UCITS. They will, however, demand adaptation from managers to 
offer products that maximise expected returns while minimising regulatory capital and 
building the infrastructure necessary to comply with stringent transparency and reporting 
obligations. 
43 The EDHEC-Risk Institute is part of the EDHEC Business School in Nice, France. The 
Institute undertakes research in finance from a theoretical and applied perspective (see 
www.edhec-risk.com for more information). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 59 
o  Those  strategies  that exceed  concentration  limits  and  do  not  comply  with 










have  a  level  of  risk  comparable  to  some  UCITS,  as  far  as  leverage  provides  an 
approximation  to  risk.  Yet,  another  study  presented  to  the  Task  Force  members 
showed that alternative UCITS carry, on average, significantly less risk than hedge 
funds in terms of standard deviation (Tuchschmid et al., 2010). According to this later 
study,  alternative  UCITS  offer  in  general  better  liquidity,  lower  attrition  rates  and 
lower dispersion of return than hedge funds. The lower attrition rate suggests that 
alternative  UCITS  are  less  likely  to  fail  than  hedge  funds  and  are  therefore  more 
resilient  (Tuchschmid  et  al.,  2010).***  However,  the  lower  attrition  may  also  be 
explained  by  the  ability  of  hedge  funds  to  stop  their  reporting  to  the  relevant 
database,  which  is  not  possible  under  the  UCITS  Directive.  With  regard  to 
performance,  the  research  presented  to  this  Task  Force  by  Professor  Tuchschmid 
(HEG  Geneva)  did  not  find  conclusive  evidence  that  hedge  funds  outperform 
alternative UCITS.  





*  Shorting  above  10%  of  the  NaV  of  the  fund  would  need  to  be  done  synthetically  via 





3.2.2  UCITS exchange-traded funds 
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are open-ended funds listed and continuously 
traded on a secondary market, most of which track and index. The open-ended 
fund structure differentiates ETFs from other exchange-traded products 
(ETPs), which are subject at most times to lower, if any, regulatory standards. 60 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
The vast majority of European ETFs are structured to comply with the UCITS 
regulatory framework.44 ETF structuring is not homogenous but may be based 
on directly holding a representative basket of securities (physical ETFs) or 
accessing the return of that same basket through a derivative contract 
(synthetic structures). In stylised terms, both structures rely on the 
participation of an authorised participant or market-maker to provide the 
underlying securities or the derivative instruments.45 Also common to both 
structures is the creation and redemption process which takes place in the 
primary market, between the asset manager and the market-maker. In effect, 
the authorised participant places the ETF units in the secondary market, where 
they are traded by investors (mostly institutional).  
ETF units are continuously traded and settled on exchange-like stocks, 
offering intra-day liquidity, subject to market conditions. The units are 
lendable so investors may take long and short positions. Trading involves 
specific costs, however, such as brokerage fees and the application of related 
regulation, such as MiFID and the rules on short-selling. While unlisted mutual 
funds are redeemable at their net asset value, not all ETFs offer investors the 
possibility of redeeming their units at NAV. However, the UCITS Directive 
contains strict requirements in this respect, forcing UCITS ETFs to accept 
investor redemptions at NAV. 
Most European ETFs are UCITS and are therefore structured to comply 
with the rules on portfolio construction, risk management and investor 
protection in the UCITS Directive. At present there are no specific UCITS rules 
for ETFs but, following a consultation in 2011, ESMA is expected to introduce 
additional requirements for listed funds in 2012.46 The most relevant UCITS 
rules for ETFs are the provisions governing a) index composition and b) 
counterparty risks and collateral. The former are relevant for all ETFs that track 
and index, as for any other index-tracker UCITS. The latter are relevant for all 
ETFs using OTC derivatives or lending part of their securities, as for any other 
UCITS engaging in those practices. In effect, the specificity of ETFs from the 
perspective of the UCITS rules follows from their trading on secondary 
markets rather than from the way in which they are structured. 
                                                        
44 Internal industry figures indicate that 85% to 95% of European ETFs are UCITS. 
45 In synthetic structures, the swap is provided by a counterparty, which may be an affiliate 
to the market-maker or authorised participant but not the same entity. Market-makers or 
authorised participants deal with the ETF shares, whereas the counterparty deals with the 
ETF assets (in practice the swap). 
46 ESMA Consultation Paper, ESMA/2012/44 (ETFs and structured UCITS). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 61 
Index-based ETFs follow both major market indices and narrower 
indices focused on specific sectors, themes and styles. While most ETFs follow 
traditional strategies, an increasing number of them track tailored-made 
portfolios or indices. Investors increasingly demand ETFs offering specialised 
exposure to more exotic asset classes such as commodities, alternatives, 
currencies and credit. A small number of ETFs are even actively managed (less 
than 4% globally– see DB, 2011). In parallel to demand factors, the industry 
acknowledges a growing interest by different suppliers, in particular: a) banks 
interested in synthetic replication and b) asset managers interested in 
expanding their business (BlackRock, 2011).  
At least 80% of assets in European ETFs are held by institutional 
investors (BIS, 2011; DB, 2011) who invest in these products for a variety of 
purposes, including managing asset allocation, taking tactical positions and 
increasing diversification. ETFs are often employed to hedge other exposures, 
instead of using futures and notes. By way of contrast, retail investors are 
usually interested in using ETFs to access broad market indices as core 
holdings. From this perspective, ETFs present fierce competition to unlisted 
index funds, which are progressively losing market share. Some ETFs also 
compete with more specialised funds and may be used by retail investors as 
satellite investments to access selected exposures. Buy-and-hold retail investors 
will not benefit, however, from the intra-day liquidity offered by ETFs. 
ETFs have known success thanks to their competitive fees and liquidity, 
in comparison with unlisted index funds. By mid-2011, there were over 1,000 
ETFs in Europe with over €240 billion assets under management (BlackRock, 
2011; DB, 2011). Since 2005, the European ETF industry grew five-fold, now 
accounting for approximately 8% of the long-term UCITS, that is UCITS 
excluding money market funds, but less than 2% of the overall asset 
management industry in Europe.47 The ETF industry has grown in Europe 
above the global average but has not yet reached the size of the US industry. 
Since 2000 the annual growth rate for ETF assets was 83% in Europe compared 
to just under 30% in the US (BlackRock, 2011). Yet the US accounts still for 
m o r e  t h a n  7 0 %  o f  t h e  a s s e t s  m a n a g e d  b y  E T F s  g l o b a l l y . 48 According to 
                                                        
47 Some ETFs invest in money-market instruments or have intra-day recommended holding 
periods. 
48 The US ETF market has a longer track record than the European one and is subject to 
different constraints and realities. In the US, ETFs are registered under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and classified as unit investment trusts or open-ended funds if they 
engage in securities lending. ETFs are not classified as US mutual funds, given the limited 
redeemability of their shares. In terms of structuring, the use of derivatives is limited by the 
requirement to hold at least 80% of their assets in securities matching the name of the fund 
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industry figures, yearly growth in Europe could reach 20% to 30% per annum 
in the next few years, led to a large extent by the growth in synthetic 
replication by European banks. Synthetic ETFs experienced large redemptions, 




3.3  Three concerns about the UCITS regulatory framework 
The expansion in the scope of eligible assets and investment practices under 
the UCITS Directives has led to significant innovation, based on the use of 
derivative and structured financial instruments. Arguably, regulation has not 
fully kept pace with the intensity of product innovation in UCITS. It is argued 
that the current regulatory framework raises potential concerns with regard to 
a) product integrity, b) investor protection and c) the single market, as 
described below. 
i)  Product integrity. Product innovation in UCITS has led to the use of 
relatively complex financial instruments and investment practices. These 
involve specific risks, in particular: a) operational risks when it comes to 
the trading, settlement, valuation and segregation of assets; b) liquidity 
risks in view of UCITS redemption obligations and liquidity profile as 
advertised to investors and c) counterparty risks including the risk 
related to the quality of the collateral held as way of guarantee. On the 
                                                                                                                                             
(the SEC, however, is consulting on the use of derivatives). These limitations are in contrast 
with the use of OTC derivatives (such as total return swaps) under UCITS. US regulation, 
however, allows for the use of substantial leverage to deliver a multiple of the performance 
of the underlying index. These products are used intra-day by professional investors and 
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positive side, the use of some of these instruments and investment 
practices may smooth market risk (the volatility of returns given changes 
in market variables). It may also allow managers to present investors 
with predefined pay-outs, subject to the realisation of certain conditions 
in the market place – structured UCITS, as in the definition of regulation 
583/2010. However, where market risks are repackaged, operational, 
liquidity and counterparty risks are usually affected. Frequently, market 
risks are transferred away to other agents generating counterparty risk 
(the risk of default of the counterparty in a derivative or structured 
financial instrument). This risk of default is mitigated via due diligence 
in the selection of the counterparty and the posting of collateral or other 
guarantees. Managing collateral, in its turn, is also subject to operational 
risks, particularly where collateral is re-invested or the UCITS structures 
most of its portfolio using derivatives. In view of these risks, managers 
are required to implement sophisticated risk management processes 
when they use complex financial instruments and investment practices. 
Ultimately, the responsibility falls on managers to structure their 
products in a manner according to their risk management capabilities. 
Yet, complexity may reduce the ability of supervisors to monitor 
compliance and the ability of investors to understand the risks 
embedded.  
ii)  Investor protection. From a retail investor perspective, product integrity is 
paramount, since most individuals do not have specific knowledge of 
finance. The use of some complex financial instruments and investment 
strategies raises questions as to a possible mismatch between UCITS 
liquidity requirements and the liquidity of the underlying assets, as well 
as to a possible mispricing or misrepresentation of operational, 
counterparty or liquidity risks. Most retail investors are not equipped 
with the knowledge and skills to discern these questions and their 
possible impact on their savings. UCITS rules were devised for retail 
investors, to allow them to access a range of investment funds under 
diversification, liquidity and risk limits. The existence of this set of rules 
entails by itself a certain guarantee of product integrity by the competent 
authorities, including a supervisory duty to ensure that managers adhere 
to the rules in practice. By way of contrast, where it comes to 
professional investors, the role of regulators and supervisors is more 
limited. Professional investors are supposed to have the specific 
knowledge to evaluate the risks in complex financial instruments. 
Chapter 4 considers investor protection at length. 
iii)  The single market. Product innovation in UCITS has taken different shapes 
across member states, sometimes building on the divergent transposition 64 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
of the directives, highlighting that the process of harmonisation of the 
UCITS rules is far from achieved. From the perspective of retail 
investors, a plurality of national rules does not help the understanding of 
the risks involved in UCITS products. The differences among national 
bodies of legislation affect in particular the frontier of eligible assets and 
permissible exposures, as well as the management of heightened 
liquidity, operational and counterparty risks. The duties and liabilities of 
depositaries also vary widely across member states, but the European 
Commission is scheduled to put forward a legislative proposal in 2012 to 
harmonise the depositary rules in UCITS in line with the AIFMD. Key 
aspects of disclosure are affected as well, such as the calculation of total 
expense ratios. 
3.4  Derivatives and structured financial instruments in UCITS 
As a follow up to the concern about product integrity outlined above, this 
section aims to bring clarity to the discussions surrounding the use of 
derivatives and structured financial instruments under the UCITS regulatory 
framework. The section is structured in three parts: a) firstly, a general 
reflection on the use of derivatives in fund management and the role of fund 
regulation, b) secondly a critical analysis of the current UCITS rules governing 
the use of derivatives and financial indices and c) finally, a discussion on how 
to strengthen the UCITS regulatory framework and product integrity.  
3.4.1  Why do funds use derivatives? And the role of fund regulation 
This section provides an approximation of the use of derivative financial 
instruments by investment funds and the general role of fund regulation in this 
regard. It does not consider the provisions of the UCITS Directive, which are 
discussed in the section immediately after. Derivatives are contracts whose 
value is based upon or derived from other assets or metric, called underlying 
or reference asset (Swan, 2000). Funds use derivatives both to manage certain 
risks and implement some investment strategies. An example of the former is 
the use of derivatives to increase diversification and hedge risks; for instance a 
currency derivative would protect holders of a fund denominated in euros 
against a decrease in the value of an investment in dollars due to a decline, not 
in the value of the investment itself but of the dollar currency (SEC, 2011). Yet 
derivatives may also be used by asset managers as an integral part of portfolio 
construction to gain or reduce exposures. This is because derivatives 
sometimes carry lower transaction costs than direct investments (see Deli & 
Varma, 2002; Koski & Pontiff, 1996). In addition, derivatives allow managers to 
access leverage and thereby increase the potential for future returns or losses. RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 65 
This leverage arises in those derivatives that require an initial outlay smaller 
than the potential liability (e.g. futures, swaps and options). 
Derivatives are more attractive the higher the costs involved in accessing 
the underlying (Deli & Varma, 2002). Illiquid assets carry by definition 
relatively high transaction costs, which means derivatives are likely to be less 
expensive than investing directly in some illiquid assets. Professors Deli and 
Varma consider this cost advantage in the framework of open-ended funds. 
They observe that cash-flow shocks amplify the cost advantage of employing 
certain derivatives for open-ended funds. In effect, shocks induced by outflows 
from (and inflows to) a given fund may force the asset manager into liquidity-
motivated trading. When compared to informed trading, liquidity-motivated 
trading carries an opportunity cost and the risk of outright losses (Grossman & 
Stiglitz, 1980, in Deli & Varma, 2002). Certain derivatives are useful tools to 
manage the liquidity of investment funds in this respect. 
Derivatives involve a series of risks such as: a) leverage risk, associated 
with the potential liabilities embedded; b) liquidity risk, in particular for non-
standardised derivatives for which no liquid market exists and c) counterparty 
risk, given that derivatives do not only generate exposure to the reference asset 
but also to the creditworthiness of a financial intermediary. Borrowing an 
example from the SEC (2011) in the US, when a bank and a fund enter into a 
total return swap on stock issued by a corporation in the pharmaceutical 
sector, the fund not only gains exposure to the pharmaceutical industry (the 
industry associated with the issuer’s reference asset) but also to the banking 
industry (the industry associated with the fund’s counterparty). 
Derivatives are subject to regulatory scrutiny from various angles, 
including market infrastructure and financial stability. From the perspective of 
retail fund regulation, what matters is the impact of the use of derivatives on 
product integrity, as regards the protection of retail investors. Regulation 
needs therefore to determine the use of derivatives that is permissible in retail 
funds in accordance with the interest of retail investors and the frontiers of risk 
management. Moreover, the limitations imposed on investments in derivatives 
should be consistent with the ones imposed on direct investments, in order to 
avoid the use of derivatives to arbitrage the latter’s limits.  
Strict rules for direct investments by retail funds may result in 
distortions if not matched by similar rules for derivative exposures. It is worth 
noting that some of the practical advantages of using derivatives in fund 
management, such as lower transaction costs, are magnified by some of the 
operational safeguards built into fund regulation. For instance, rules requiring 
the segregation of client´s assets may impose a cost on some direct investments 66 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
that would exceed the cost of accessing the same assets via derivatives.49 
Differences in the rules that determine which assets are eligible to be accessed 
directly versus accessed via derivatives could also introduce unintended 
incentives to structure portfolios using derivative instrument rather than direct 
investments. 
Fund regulators need to carry-out a balancing exercise with regard to the 
use of derivatives. In the swap example above, the fund transfers the 
operational risks involved in accessing directly the underlying asset but 
acquires some counterparty risk. Fund regulators need to balance the risks 
transferred to the counterparty against the risks incorporated into the fund, 
which are borne by the unit holders. From the perspective of fund regulators, 
interested in ensuring the security of retail fund investors, this counterparty 
risk can be mitigated by posting collateral or other guarantees.50 Collateral 
requirements appear therefore as an essential component of fund regulation 
when it comes to the use of derivative financial instruments by investment 
funds. 
At a theoretical level, the use of derivatives may exacerbate the agency 
conflicts between managers and investors (Deli & Varma, 2002). Under 
conditions of insufficient transparency, some derivatives could potentially be 
used to increase the level of risk over the one advertised to investors. This is 
because some derivatives require a small initial outlay in comparison to the 
potential gains or losses, resulting in embedded leverage that is hard to 
observe. It is a general agency conflict in asset management that poorly 
performing funds have an incentive to increase risks, hoping to raise 
performance and attract inflows – while good performing funds have an 
incentive to reduce risks to the level that allows them to avoid outflows (Koski 
& Pontiff, 1996). Regulation therefore needs to elicit the exposure (leverage) 
embedded in derivatives to mitigate the agency conflicts that exist in their use. 
Transparency and the appropriate measurement of leverage and risk are 
therefore essential parts of fund regulation. 
Fund regulators therefore need a comprehensive response to address the 
questions surrounding the use of derivative financial instruments by retail 
investment funds. The figure below represents the wide range of issues that 
regulators need to take into account for this purpose, most of which are 
                                                        
49 It is understood that derivatives may not be held in custody by the fund depositary. See 
discussion later in chapter 3 on non-market risks and fund depositaries. 
50 Other public authorities, such as the ones interested in safeguarding financial stability or 
promoting effective corporate governance, would, however, carry out a different balancing 
exercise when it comes to the use of derivatives by investment funds. For a discussion of 
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consider these rules in detail explaining their strengths but also advancing 
some of its deficiencies. 
3.4.2.1  Global exposure to market risk under UCITS IV 
The exposure of UCITS to derivatives is limited in volume by national 
legislation depending on the approach followed to calculate this exposure. The 
UCITS IV Directive allows two approaches, either the calculation of the 
incremental exposure and leverage generated by the use of financial 
derivatives instruments (commitment approach) or the market risk of the 
UCITS portfolio as a whole (market risk approach based on advanced risk 
metrics).52 The methodologies to calculate these exposures are not harmonised 
but are codified in national legislation. ESMA guidelines propose a standard 
commitment approach and a standard market risk approach, which are not 
binding on member states, except on a comply-or-explain basis.53 
o  The commitment of a fund to a derivative represents a measure of its 
potential liabilities, otherwise stated, its leverage due to the use of such 
derivative. Under the standard commitment approach, each derivative is 
given the market value of an equivalent position in its underlying. The 
methodology proposed by ESMA to calculate the value of the underlying 
position is fairly straightforward, suitable only for simple derivative 
instruments. It takes into account hedging and netting, as well as the 
risks involved in securities lending and repurchase agreements. The final 
value of the derivative exposure using the standard commitment approach 
is limited by the UCITS IV Directive to 100% of the fund’s NAV, which 
means the total risk exposure of a UCITS fund to any instrument should 
be kept below 200% its NAV.54 
o  The market risk approach is based on the estimation of the potential loss of 
the UCITS due to market risk. Among the different metrics available, 
value at risk is the most popular (VaR). It provides an estimation of the 
potential decrease in value of the current UCITS portfolio based on the 
past performance of its components. A VaR (20 days, 99%) of €5 million 
means that under normal market circumstances, there is a 99% 
probability that the UCITS portfolio will not lose more than €5 million in 
value in 20 trading days. The application of the VaR depends on the type 
of fund. ESMA guidelines limit the VaR of funds whose objective is to 
outperform an (unleveraged) benchmark to twice the VaR of this 
                                                        
52 Article 41.1, Implementing Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). 
53 Article 16.3, Regulation 1095/2010/EU (ESMA). 
54 Article 51.3, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 69 
benchmark, while UCITS with an absolute return objective need to keep 
their VaR below 20% of their net asset value. Keeping with the previous 
example, an absolute return UCITS with €5 million VaR should have at 
least €25 million assets under management. As the VaR metric is based 
on past performance, managers should conduct stress testing on the value 
of their portfolio to control for the impact of exceptional market 
conditions. They should also back test their models to monitor their 
reliability. 
The commitment approach and the risk management approach are 
widely different and can be arbitraged to gain additional exposure to market 
risk. For instance, within the risk management approach, funds may arbitrage 
the VaR limits set by ESMA by finding a benchmark where twice its VaR 
exceeds 20% the fund´s net asset value.55 ESMA does not encourage member 
states to strictly regulate the circumstances under which each approach needs 
to be employed. It considers that the responsibility should fall on asset 
managers to choose, based on their investment policy and the use they make of 
derivatives. Yet, ESMA considers the risk measurement approach should be 
preferred whenever the UCITS has “more than a negligible exposure to exotic 
derivatives”.56  
The boundaries of derivative exposure are loosely harmonised in UCITS. 
National rules may put forward virtually any methodology to calculate the 
exposure to derivatives or the level of market risk in a UCITS portfolio.57 They 
may also apply different limits to maximum exposure of a UCITS portfolio 
under the market risk approach since the limits to VaR in ESMA guidelines are 
                                                        
55 A fund following the absolute VaR approach (where the fund´s VaR is limited to 20% of 
the fund’s NAV) may find it convenient to switch to the relative VaR approach (where the 
fund´s VaR is limited to twice the VaR of an unleveraged benchmark). By finding an 
appropriate benchmark (or building a tailor-made one), the fund may be able to carry on its 
activities increasing its leverage over 20% its NAV. To avoid this, ESMA invites member 
states to require UCITS to fully document their choice of VaR approach and control whether 
a switch is motivated by having exceeded the 20% NaV limit.  
56 Box 1.4.a, ESMA Guidelines CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS 
IV). 
57 Articles 41.3 and 41.4, Implementing Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). 
The first provision allows member states to calculate global exposure by using the 
commitment approach, the value at risk approach or other advanced risk measurement 
methodologies, as may be appropriate. The second provision allows member states to 
permit management companies to apply calculation methods that are equivalent to the 
standard commitment approach described by the Directive. 70 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
not binding.58 While member states and national supervisors converge towards 
the ESMA guidelines, the single market would benefit from further 
harmonisation in this regard.  
It is important to note, however, that VaR does not measure directly the 
incremental exposure or leverage gathered through the use of derivatives. It is 
instead an estimation of the potential loss of the UCITS due to market risk 
based on assumptions such as normally distributed returns. It is therefore 
possible that a UCITS employing VaR to calculate its global exposure presents 
a level of leverage that exceeds 200% of its NAV. For instance, arbitrage 
strategies that take long and short positions may have low VaR but very high 
leverage – although both positions would ordinarily offset one another. No 
hard limits to leverage apply in practice to UCITS funds; instead ESMA 
guidelines require that managers disclose in the prospectus the expected level 
of leverage and the possibility that actual leverage may exceed the level 
announced (if applicable).59 Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that VaR 
does not capture all the relevant risks, and in particular the so-called ‘fat-tail’ 
risk (the risk of high loses in abnormal market circumstances). In effect, to 
calculate the VaR of a given portfolio, the manager has to assume a certain 
distribution of returns. If a normal distribution is assumed, the probability of a 
fat-tail event occurring may be underestimated. In addition, those funds that 
employ leverage magnify the impact of extreme market events in their 
portfolios. It follows therefore that limits in terms of VaR need to be 
complemented by leverage limits and rigorous stress testing. 
3.4.2.2  Counterparty risk and collateral requirements under UCITS IV 
The risk embedded in a derivative is composed of market risk (the risk 
associated with the underlying or reference asset) and counterparty risk, which 
depends on the credit-worthiness of the counterparty and the quantity and 
quality of the collateral transferred as guarantee. The UCITS IV Directive 
                                                        
58 Only the incremental exposure to derivatives is capped at 100% NAV. There are no 
harmonised limits to the market risk of the UCITS portfolio other than the ones set in ESMA 
guidelines – Article 51.3, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV) and Article 41.1, Implementing 
Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). Box 1 in ESMA Guidelines, CESR/10-
778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS IV) states that “a UCITS may consider 
appropriate for the calculation of global exposure only those methodologies on which CESR 
has published level 3 guidelines”. However, this assertion is inconsistent with Article 16.3, 
Regulation 1095/2010/EU (ESMA), which provides that member states are only obliged to 
follow ESMA guidelines on a comply or explain basis. 
59 Box 24.2, ESMA Guidelines CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS 
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requires that counterparties to OTC derivative transactions are subject to 
prudential regulation and approval by member states.60 It also limits the net 
counterparty exposure to 10% per OTC derivative transaction and 20% per 
counterparty, measured as a ratio of the UCITS assets under management.61 
This net exposure takes into account the collateral received by the UCITS, as 
long as it is liquid and certain.62 A UCITS fund may therefore be structured 
fully synthetically based on a single derivative contract, such as a total return 
swap, on the condition that the counterparty posts enough collateral.  
Collateral requirements are not harmonised in UCITS. ESMA guidelines 
set a number of high-level principles with regard to collateral quality: a) high 
liquidity and short-settlement cycle; b) very high grade credit rating and c) 
residual correlation with the counterparty.63 Collateral of a lower quality may 
be employed on condition that an appropriate discount rate (haircut) is applied 
to its market value. The application of haircuts (over-collateralisation) is 
sometimes advisable also for highly rated financial instruments. The lack of 
harmonised rules results sometimes in divergent implementation. For instance, 
equities posted as collateral in Ireland are subject to a 20% haircut while in 
Luxembourg any haircut is agreed between the fund manager and the 
depositary (BIS, 2011). Collateral selection should configure a diverse basket of 
securities to avoid concentration in specific issuers, sectors or geographies but 
once more no detailed rules exist in this regard.  
Establishing the quality of a given collateral basket is a complex exercise 
from the perspective of the fund manager. It is inherently difficult to anticipate 
the level of liquidity and correlation of financial instruments, particularly 
under the sort of stress scenario that may precede or follow the failure of a 
given counterparty. The derivative counterparty is usually best positioned to 
assess the quality of the collateral. Yet it faces a conflict of interest when it 
comes to selecting the composition of the given collateral basket, since higher 
quality may reduce the profitability of the derivative transaction. Higher costs 
would ultimately undermine the commercial interest of market-makers, asset 
managers and investors in entering into some derivative transactions. 
                                                        
60 Article 50.1.g.iii, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). 
61 Article 43.1, Implementing Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). Article 
52, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). Member states may raise the second limit to 35% 
under some circumstances. 
62 Articles 43.3 and 43.4, Implementing Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). 
63 ESMA Guidelines, CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS IV). These 
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The value of collateral needs to be constantly monitored to ensure that 
counterparty exposure remains within the UCITS limits. A depreciation in the 
market value of the financial instruments posted as collateral would require 
the fund to demand additional guarantees to the counterparty. ESMA 
guidelines only observe that collateral must be capable of being valued at least 
daily. Besides monitoring valuation, collateral management also requires 
segregating the assets to ensure the fund can access them promptly in case of a 
c o u n t e r p a r t y  d e f a u l t .  N o  s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e  i s  m a d e  i n  U C I T S  I V  t o  t h e  
depositary requirements for collateral arrangements.64 ESMA expects collateral 
arrangements to be fully enforceable by the UCITS at any time without 
reference to the counterparty. This expectation has not been technically defined 
in line with market practice and the relevant provisions of Directive 
2002/47/EC (collateral Directive).65 The UCITS V Directive, scheduled for 
2012, is due to address these issues while the implementation of the AIMFD 
proposed by ESMA already advances some solutions in this respect (see 
below).66  
Collateral management becomes more complex when the assets are re-
used. Directive 2002/47/EC states that collateral-takers have a right of use in 
relation to financial collateral but also a parallel obligation to provide 
substitute assets of an equivalent nature and value. In order to mitigate 
operational risks, ESMA considers that UCITS should not exercise this right of 
use, which means cash collateral should only be invested in risk-free assets and 
non-cash collateral should neither be invested nor pledged. 
Given the lack of clear and detailed rules, transparency is essential to 
allow investors to assess the quality of the collateral and the level of 
diversification, among other aspects. Yet, retail investors are ill-equipped to 
understand these aspects. Collateral management is particularly important for 
those UCITS that are fully synthetic, such as swap-based UCITS funds, 
including synthetic ETFs. Many asset managers have gone a long way toward 
improving the disclosure of collateral arrangements and composition. Yet, the 
                                                        
67 ESMA has however proposed a framework for the custody of collateral for alternative 
funds handled by managers under the AIFMD. See ESMA Technical Advice, ESMA 
2011/379 (AIFMD implementation). 
65 ESMA may wish to limit collateral arrangements in UCITS to “title transfer arrangements” 
within the definition of Article 2 of Directive 2002/47/EC (collateral Directive). Under “title 
transfer collateral arrangements”, the collateral provider transfers full ownership of the 
financial collateral to a collateral taker. They are in contrast with “security financial 
collateral arrangements”, in which full or qualified ownership remains with the collateral 
provider. 
66 ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD), pp. 158-159. RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 73 
law does not yet impose uniform disclosure requirements in this regard. ESMA 
is expected to introduce guidelines in 2012 that will clarify the transparency 
duties of UCITS managers with regard to collateral arrangements. 
Securities lending and repurchase agreements result in similar 
counterparty and operational risks as some derivative instruments. The 
Directive requires that UCITS take into account these transactions when they 
calculate their counterparty exposure, which cannot exceed 20% of the UCITS 
NAV for all transactions with the same counterparty.67 The industry best 
practice is to post collateral to reduce counterparty risks in securities lending 
and repurchase agreements. However, the UCITS rules do not clarify whether 
this  collateral can be considered when calculating the UCITS counterparty 
exposure to comply with the 20% limit. Moreover, the ESMA principles on 
collateral apply only to the collateral received by the fund in OTC derivative 
transactions and not to the collateral received in securities lending and 
repurchase agreements.68 In contrast with these principles, the collateral 
received in securities lending and repo transactions (up to 100% of its value) 
may be reinvested by the UCITS in financial assets providing returns above the 
risk-free rate of return.69 Yet, the exposure generated needs to be taken into 
account when calculating the UCITS global exposure.70 In sum, securities 
lending and repurchase agreements are subject to the general rules on 
counterparty and global exposure in UCITS, but to different rules when it 
comes to the collateral received by the fund in these transactions. In addition, 
there is no limit on the amount of assets that a UCITS may lend, which opens 
the door for fully lent portfolios (at least theoretically). 
3.4.2.3  Underlying assets to financial indices under UCITS IV 
Financial derivatives need to be based on assets that are eligible for direct 
investment by UCITS (transferable securities and money market instruments), 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates and currencies. Derivatives on other 
assets, such as commodities, are therefore not permissible. The derivative must 
be looked-through to factor the underlying into the general issuer 
                                                        
67 Article 41.4, Implementing Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). 
68 Box 26, ESMA Guidelines CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS 
IV). ESMA is schedule however to update these guidelines in 2012 (see ESMA 2012/44).  
69 Box 9, ESMA Guidelines CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS IV). 
70 Article 41.4, Implementing Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). 74 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
concentration limits in UCITS.71 Article 52 of the UCITS IV Directive details 
these limits, aimed at ensuring the diversification of the portfolio and usually 
referred to as the 5/10/40% rule – which is however the object of divergent 
interpretation across member states.  
UCITS may also employ derivative instruments to access financial 
indices as long as the given index represents an adequate benchmark and 
satisfies certain transparency requirements.72 This practice is common to some 
exchange traded-funds and other UCITS that replicate the performance of 
market indices using total return swaps. The look-through principle does not 
apply to the underlying of financial indices which may be composed of 
otherwise non-eligible assets, such as commodities, property or hedge funds.73 
There is only a requirement that the underlying components are sufficiently 
liquid to allow the physical replication of the index.74 For hedge-fund indices, 
ESMA advises member states to set certain requirements in terms of due 
diligence and conflicts of interest.75 
On the presumption that indices are representative of a relevant market, 
the ordinary diversification requirements in Article 52 of the UCITS IV 
Directive are relaxed. In principle, the index components need comply with 
Article 52, either considering the index on its own or within the UCITS 
portfolio as a whole.76 However, the general issuer concentration limit is raised 
from 5% to 20%, which may be further increased by member states up to 35% 
in some cases.77  
Issuer limits do not apply directly to assets other than shares and debt 
securities, such as commodities, which may be accessed through financial 
indices, given the non-application of the look-through principle. In effect, the 
UCITS IV Directive does not impose direct limits to the exposure gained 
                                                        
71 Article 51.3 (third indent), Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). See also Article 43.5, 
Implementing Directive 2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV) and Box 37.5, ESMA 
Guidelines CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS IV). 
72 Article 53, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). See also the more detailed provisions in 
Article 9, Implementing Directive 2007/16/EC (eligible assets, UCITS III). 
73 Article 51.3 (third indent), Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). See also Box 37.6, ESMA 
Guidelines, CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS IV). 
74 Article 9.1.b.iii, Implementing Directive 2007/16/EC (eligible assets, UCITS III). 
75 ESMA Guidelines, CESR/07/434 (hedge fund indices). 
76 Article 9.1.a, Implementing Directive 2007/16/EC (eligible assets, UCITS III). See also Box 
27.5 and 27.6, ESMA Guidelines CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, 
UCITS IV). 
77 Article 53, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 75 
through financial indices to individual assets or groups of assets.78 It is 
therefore possible for an index to comply with the issuer concentration 
requirements but exceed these limits in terms of exposure. Due to the 
methodology followed, a component that represents less than 20% of the index 
could have an impact in excess of 20%, opening the opportunity for arbitrage 
(ESMA, 2011). 
The UCITS Directive expressly requires that financial indices represent 
“an adequate benchmark for the market to which they refer” but the concepts 
of ‘benchmark’ and ‘market’ are left largely undefined 79 From the UCITS 
Directive, it only transpires that financial indices need to measure the 
performance of a representative group of assets in an appropriate way.80 As a 
result of this loose phrasing, the door is opened for the construction of tailor-
made indices to underlie derivatives in UCITS. It is reported that indices are 
used to wrap investment strategies and arbitrage the limitations imposed to 
direct investments, in terms of eligible assets and issuer concentration (ESMA, 
2011). Far from representing a passive benchmark, some indices are rebalanced 
at very short intervals (daily or even intra-daily) and do not have a single 
objective but one that changes in accordance with market conditions (ESMA, 
2011). 
In sum, principle-based regulation for derivatives and financial indices 
does not match the rule-based approach followed by the UCITS Directive with 
regard to direct investments. The contrast between these two approaches sets 
the incentives for arbitraging the hard limits imposed in terms of eligible assets 
and diversification for direct investments, via the use of derivatives based on 
financial indices.  
3.4.3  Where should we go from here? Revisiting the UCITS rules on 
derivatives and indices. 
As detailed in the previous sections, the UCITS rules are fairly comprehensive 
when it comes to governing the use of derivative and structured financial 
instruments. Notably, the rules a) limit the global exposure of UCITS to market 
risk; b) limit counterparty exposure and require that collateral is of sufficient 
quality, legal certainty and liquidity and c) impose diversification 
requirements on the underlying, including on financial indices. The detail and 
                                                        
78 It is only required that the performance of a single constituent does not ‘unduly influence’ 
the performance of the index as a whole (see Article 9.1.a.i, Implementing Directive 
2007/16/EC on eligible assets, UCITS III). 
79 Article 53.1.b, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). 
80 Article 9.b.i, Implementing Directive 2007/16/EC (eligible assets, UCITS III). 76 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
sophistication of the UCITS rules are built to ensure a high level of safety for 
retail investors. The UCITS framework has proved over time both its resilience 
and its capacity to accommodate innovation. Yet, some of the provisions in the 
Directive may have fallen out of place with innovation by product providers. 
Some of the rules regarding the use of derivatives have been questioned by 
observers who consider they may be arbitraged easily to structure products 
with undisclosed or underrepresented risks such as: a) counterparty risk given 
inadequate collateralisation; b) liquidity risk for non-standardised derivatives 
and illiquid reference assets; c) operational risk present in more complex 
instruments and strategies and d) leverage risk that is difficult to observe and 
measure. Overcoming these concerns would require a targeted reform of the 
UCITS regulatory framework. It would not be a matter of producing a major 
overhaul but of closing gaps to reduce the opportunities for arbitrage and 
deepen harmonisation to improve consistency. The box below advances some 
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Better understand derivatives and the use that funds make of them. The UCITS 
IV Directive distinguishes centrally cleared from over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives and imposes additional requirements on the latter category with 
regard notably to the management of valuation, liquidity and counterparty 
risks.81 However, beyond this straightforward distinction, derivatives and the 
use that funds make of them remains largely uncategorised under the UCITS 
framework. ESMA guidelines employ concepts such as standard versus exotic 
derivatives, and negligible versus non-negligible that would need to be further 
defined to better understand the risks involved and the regulatory approach 
that should be followed.82  
Delineate the circumstances under which a fund needs to follow the market risk 
approach instead of the commitment approach to the calculation of its global exposure. 
ESMA guidelines require funds that have a ‘non-negligible exposure to exotic 
derivatives’ to follow the market risk approach instead of the commitment 
approach to calculate their global exposure.83 The guidelines invite managers 
to use a maximum loss approach to determine whether the use of exotic 
derivatives represents more than a negligible exposure for the given fund.84 
ESMA should consider the feasibility of using a more straightforward 
definition of negligible exposure, for instance, in terms of a percentage of assets 
under management or further harmonising the maximum loss approach. 
Similarly, the guidelines provide an illustrative list of standard and non-
standard (exotic) derivatives, but the criteria used to allocate derivatives to 
each category are unclear. Better definitions of these concepts would be 
necessary to reduce the discretion of funds when it comes to choosing the 
market risk approach or the commitment approach to global exposure, thereby 
reducing the opportunity for arbitrage.  
Besides global exposure, the categorisation of derivatives (and the 
categorisation of their use) is also relevant from the perspective of 
counterparty and collateral requirements. For instance, a threshold could be 
established over which the limits to counterparty exposure would be below the 
general limit of 20%, in particular for funds that are fully synthetic. Such a rule 
                                                        
81 Article 50.1.g, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV) and Article 44, Implementing Directive 
2010/43/EU (risk management, UCITS IV). 
82 Box 1, ESMA Guidelines, CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS 
IV). See also Article 3.1, Commission Recommendation 2004/383/EC (UCITS III, use of 
financial derivative instruments). 
83 Box 1, ESMA Guidelines, CESR/10-778 (global exposure and counterparty risk, UCITS 
IV). 
84 Explanatory text to Box 1, ESMA Guidelines, CESR/10-778 (global exposure and 
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would take stock of industry best practice, such as the over-collateralisation of 
funds based on total return swaps. 
Set hard limits on the leverage gathered through the use of derivatives.  In 
contrast with the commitment approach, the market risk approach does not 
measure directly the leverage gathered through the use of derivatives. In effect, 
a UCITS fund that measures its global exposure using the market risk 
approach may have a leverage exceeding 200% of its net asset value. It follows 
that, even though VaR is a useful tool to measure and manage market risk in a 
fund, it does not fully substitute for limits to leverage. In spite of this, an inner 
tension underlies the calculation of global exposure since exotic derivatives are 
precisely those where it is not feasible in practice to apply the standard 
approach to calculate the embedded leverage. While maintaining the 200% 
leverage limit would be desirable, there is a practical difficulty in devising a 
methodology to estimate the leverage in exotic derivatives. A possible solution 
would be to devise a methodology that gives an overshot estimation and 
applies in addition to the VaR limit. 
Clarify and harmonise the collateral requirements for OTC derivatives. At 
present, only high-level principles inform the use of collateral to reduce 
counterparty exposure. These principles refer to liquidity, valuation, issuer 
credit quality, correlation, diversification, legal certainty and the re-use of 
collateral. They touch on all the relevant aspects but need to be further 
specified, in particular with regard to diversification and correlation. In 
addition, these principles should be extended to the collateral received in 
securities lending and repurchase transactions where they currently do not 
apply. Detailed rules on collateral should be uniform across member states. 
ESMA is expected to bring forward additional guidance in this respect in 2012 
but legislative action may be preferred to ensure convergence in national 
implementation.85 
The UCITS Directive relaxes the scope of eligible assets for derivatives 
backed by collateral of sufficient quality, liquidity and legal security. In such 
instances, the degree of liquidity that the underlying may lack is substituted by 
the liquidity of the collateral. However, the former will only work in practice if 
the fund can claim the collateral immediately from the depositary without 
recourse to the counterparty and prior to any bankruptcy proceedings.86 To 
                                                        
85 ESMA Consultation Paper, ESMA/2012/44 (ETFs and structured UCITS). 
86 From the perspective of financial stability, the use of derivatives should be considered 
taking into account the effect of the use of derivatives in the financial system as a whole and 
in particular their complexity and interconnectedness. RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 79 
ensure legal certainty, collateral arrangements in UCITS would ideally follow 
the ‘title transfer arrangements’ defined in Article 2 of the collateral Directive.87  
The European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) will re-shape the 
OTC derivative markets in Europe by introducing further standardisation and 
other measures to mitigate counterparty and operational risks. Eligible 
derivatives that are currently cleared bilaterally will be brought to central 
clearing counterparties, while derivatives that are not eligible to be centrally 
cleared will be subject to reviewed collateral requirements. From this 
perspective, any reform of UCITS rules regarding derivatives should be 
coherent with the changes introduced by EMIR.88 
Revise the rules on financial indices. The UCITS Directive relaxes the issuer 
concentration limits for funds that track widely recognised indices that 
benchmark relevant markets. The idea is that market indices are by definition 
diversified. However, the lack of definition of ‘benchmark’ and ‘market’ has 
resulted in the creation of funds that track narrow tailor-made indices. Issuer 
concentration limits are arbitraged since principle-based regulation for 
financial indices does not match the hard limits imposed on direct investments. 
As a result, some managers use financial indices not to track a relevant market 
but rather to package investment strategies with more flexibility (even active 
strategies). To avoid arbitrage, the concepts of ‘benchmark’ and ‘market’ 
should be narrowly defined. Tailor-made indices that have not been designed 
to track a relevant market but to package a given investment strategy should 
be subject to the same limitations as direct investments. Besides, issuer 
concentration limits are no substitute for exposure limits in particular for 
financial indices where the methodology applied may result in higher 
exposures to a given asset (or asset class) than the limits imposed per issuer. 
ESMA is due to put forward additional guidance in this regard in 2012, but 
binding legislation should be preferred. 
                                                        
87 Article 2.b, Directive 2002/47/EC: “Title transfer financial collateral arrangement means 
an arrangement, including repurchase agreements, under which a collateral provider 
transfers full ownership of financial collateral to a collateral taker for the purpose of 
securing or otherwise covering the performance of relevant financial obligations”. In 
contrast with Article 2.c of the same directive: “Security financial collateral arrangement 
means an arrangement under which a collateral provider provides financial collateral by 
way of security in favour of, or to, a collateral taker, and where the full ownership of the 
financial collateral remains with the collateral provider when the security right is 
established”. See also note 68 above. 
88 Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, proposed by 
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Advance towards a single rule book and simplify the structure of the regulatory 
framework to facilitate convergence in its implementation. The UCITS regulatory 
regime is composed of a number of directives, regulations and guidelines 
which are transposed and implemented by the 27 member states. At this stage 
in the development of the UCITS market, it is argued that the use of directives 
and guidelines is no longer justified to accommodate national preferences. 
There is a need for more detailed rules in three main areas: eligible assets, 
global exposure and collateral requirements. For instance, currently there is 
neither a uniform approach to calculate global exposure nor a uniform limit, 
except the ones set in ESMA guidelines. Divergent implementation ultimately 
undermines the single market and makes it difficult for all participants to 
assess the level of risks and compare funds coming from different jurisdictions.  
Moreover, the UCITS framework is an intricate set of legislative texts 
that comprises the Directive itself, several implementing texts, ESMA 
guidelines and the national transposition of all of these. There is scope to 
clarify and simplify the structure of the UCITS rules to strengthen them. High-
level principles are difficult to identify in the UCITS Directive since they are 
mixed in with detailed provisions. At the same time, the level of detail is not 
uniform, which does not help regulatory consistency either. The virtue of 
implementing legislation is that it can be more quickly adapted to cope with 
changes in market circumstances and product innovation. In sum, improving 
the hierarchy and structure of the UCITS legislation would be helpful to 
achieve three objectives: i) clarify the high-level principles, ii) reduce the 
opportunities for divergent implementation and regulatory arbitrage and iii) 




function.  Managing  risks  is  a  highly  specific  activity  that  depends  on  the  strategy 
followed by the fund and the instruments or markets in which it invests. It is also 




When  it  comes  to  regulating  risk  management,  the  trade‐offs  between 
principled and detailed rules are exacerbated. Principled rules allow flexibility but are 
difficult  to  monitor  and  enforce,  while  detailed  rules  have  mirror  attributes;  they 
facilitate  supervision  but  may  petrify  the  risk  management  function.  The  UCITS 
Directive combines both types of rules: 









































is  unlikely  to  capture  all  relevant  risks  and  it  may  undermine  qualitative  risk 
management. In effect, some risks are inherently hard to measure and would pass 
unnoticed if the focus is placed solely on measuring risks instead of managing them.  
Managers  and  supervisors  need  to  bear  in  mind  that  risk  metrics  under‐
represent certain risks (such as liquidity risks in extreme market events) and are based 
on  past  performance.  They  should  therefore  give  equal  importance  to  additional 
mechanisms such as stress testing or scenario analysis. If compliance is focused solely 






The  UCITS  Directive  (Article  38.1.b  Implementing  Directive  2010/43/EU,  risk 
management,  UCITS  IV)  does  not  require  the  risk  management  function  to  be 
separate  but  leaves  this  to  the  discretion  of  member  states,  in  contrast  with  the 
AIFMD (Article 15 Directive 2011/61/EU (AIMFD), which imposes the functional and 
hierarchical  separation.  The separation  of both  functions  derives  from  a  mistaken 
conception of fund management. In effect, managing risks is an integral part of the 
mandate  of  asset  managers  who  administer  a  portfolio  on  behalf  of  investors  to 
protect their capital and generate returns. The split between the risk and portfolio 





















































3.5  Coming to terms with non-market risks and fund depositaries 
This section considers non-market risks and fund depositaries by first 
clarifying the notion of non-market risks and then discussing the depositary 
rules under the AIFMD and the UCITS Directive. Particular attention is paid to 
the implementation of the rules in the AIFMD and the need to manage instead 
of insure non-market risks. 
3.5.1  Rare but significant: What are non-market risks?  
Non-market risks may be defined as those that do not depend on market 
developments such as changes in value of underlying assets, currencies or 
interest rates. A similar terminology was first employed by EDHEC-Risk in its 
study “The European fund management industry needs a better grasp of non-
financial risks”, which was presented to the Task Force and discussed in-depth 
with the participating authorities, custodian banks and fund managers. The 
report considers “the security of settlement, custody and control operation 
outside the traditional space of securities held by central securities 
depositaries”(EDHEC-Risk, 2010a, p. 17). In effect, non-market risks can be 
defined as those that do not derive from changes in the value of an asset but 
from major operational risks or counterparty failures. Operational risks 
comprise internal or external failures in trading, settlement and valuation 
processes, as well as legal risks and failures in the segregation of client assets. 
Non-market risks have a low frequency but on average higher impact 
than market risks. In effect, the occurrence of a non-market event may 
completely wipe out the value of a portfolio or entail its physical 
disappearance, for example, in case of a loss of assets that might be 
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ensuring the uniformity and clarity of the law, ii) consider the specific methods 
that help manage and mitigate non-market risks and iii) establish the 
maximum level of non-market risks that is tolerable for investor protection 
purposes and ultimately financial stability. The regulation of funds for retail 
investors has to pay particular attention to the two last elements: risk 
mitigation and risk limits. In addition, it needs to provide for the effective 
disclosure of non-market risks that should allow investors to make informed 
decisions. 
Custody and operational risks are an integral part of the risk 
management function. To mitigate these risks, a fund manager needs to put in 
place a number of processes, including: segregating client assets to avoid the 
loss of assets held under custody and instances of fraud, managing legal risks 
in trading and settlement; including in particular controlling the legal title over 
the assets and collateral held by the fund and establishing strong valuation 
processes. To minimise conflicts of interests and ensure the integrity of the 
segregation of assets, the depositary function should not be carried out by the 
manager itself but by an independent third party.  
3.5.2  A matter of principles: The depositaries rules under the AIFMD 
(and forthcoming UCITS V) 
A depositary is an agent whose primary role is keeping securities and other 
financial instruments on behalf of others (BIS, 2003). They should be 
independent, that is, depositaries should not act as counterparties to the fund 
except if their depositary and counterparty functions are functionally and 
hierarchically separated.90 For most securities listed in regulated markets, 
central securities depositaries (CSDs) perform the so-called ‘notary function’ 
by keeping a central register of a particular issue of securities for the purpose 
                                                        
90 Prime brokers act as counterparties by providing finance to fund managers, fulfilling an 
essential role for investors. Their financing is used both for leverage purposes, suitable to 
some investment strategies, and for bridge financing, allowing managers to swiftly seize 
investment opportunities. Prime brokers have frequently performed the role of custodians 
facing a clear conflict of interest. Article 21.4 of Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD) requires the 
functional and hierarchical separation of the depositary and prime brokerage functions. By 
separating prime brokerage and custody, depositary costs will become more explicit. It is 
thought that prime brokers subsidised depositary services through the revenues obtained by 
financing funds. Part of these revenues came from re-using the collateral posted by the 
funds by way of guarantee (Article 14.3 of Directive 2011/61/EU requires any re-use of 
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of enabling the settlement of transactions.91 Fund depositaries hold securities 
on behalf of their clients via participation arrangements with CSDs and 
independently hold those other assets for which no CSD exists.  
The segregation of client assets has been an integral part of UCITS since 
its inception.  In effect, depositaries were regulated by the original 1985 
Directive but only at the level of principles.92 These principles worked well for 
over 25 years, until the Madoff affair and the default of Lehman made it 
apparent that they had not been kept up to date. Drafted with plain-vanilla 
bonds and equities in mind, they were not adequate for the exotic assets and 
strategies allowed by UCITS III. Moreover, insufficient harmonisation resulted 
in different levels of protection for investors across member states. A mapping 
exercise by ESMA revealed scattered transpositions and widely different 
interpretations of the depositary rules, despite UCITS being marketed under a 
European passport.93 
Following the mapping by ESMA, the revision of the depositary rules 
should naturally have taken place in UCITS. However, due to the legislative 
agenda, the rules were revised to be first inserted in the AIFMD. The switch 
immersed depositaries into a highly political discussion on hedge funds which 
somewhat distorted the process. The UCITS principles on depositaries were 
incorporated into the AIFMD and developed in great detail. The AIFMD rules 
on depositaries are scheduled to be incorporated (with minor changes) into the 
UCITS framework in 2012.  
The concept of deposit is simple and refers to keeping an object in a vault 
on behalf of someone else. Civil law countries apply an obligation of 
restitution, which may only be exonerated in exceptional circumstances, while 
common law countries apply a more flexible standard (duty of care). Deposit 
involves a simple separation of ownership and possession of a given object. It 
becomes complicated for dematerialised securities where possession and 
sometimes ownership are represented by one or several notations in securities 
accounts.  
The duties of fund depositaries in EU regulation may be boiled down to 
three: i) control the title of any assets received by the fund, ii) keep assets in 
custody or, where this is not possible, keep their records and iii) monitor cash 
flows and other oversight functions. The difference between custody and record-
                                                        
91 In Europe, despite liberalisation efforts, CSDs remain largely national. MiFID gives issuer 
the freedom to designate any EU CSD to settle its transactions. However, there remain 
barriers in national legislation. 
92 Article 14, Directive 85/611/CEE (UCITS I). 
93 ESMA Paper, CESR/09-175 (mapping of duties and liabilities of UCITS depositaries). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 87 
keeping is the fundamental one in the discussion. Custody involves holding a 
security, either physically or electronically while record-keeping only concerns 
taking note of an ownership right without holding the asset. The AIFMD 
imposes strict liability for the loss of an asset kept in custody while liability in 
record-keeping arises in case of negligence or intentional failure (see below).94  
Strict liability means a depositary is liable except in very rare 
circumstances. The AIFMD refers to “an external event beyond the reasonable 
control of the depositary”.95 Strict liability is coupled with a reversal of the 
burden of proof, which means the depositary is liable unless it can prove the 
above event occurred in practice.96 Strict liability only applies in case of the loss 
in assets held in custody. Yet, determining which assets can be kept in custody 
instead of kept in record is not self-evident. The difference between property 
and contractual rights has been advanced in this regard, but it is not 
satisfactory since the content and form of these rights are not harmonised 
across jurisdictions. Lack of harmonisation of securities law suggests that any 
formal criterion would be inadequate and that a functional approach is 
preferable.  
In addition to the safekeeping of assets, depositaries are required to 
oversee compliance by the manager in a number of areas. Most notably, 
depositaries need to ensure that any instruction by the manager, operation 
with fund units or their valuation is in accordance with national law and the 
fund rules. They are also required to monitor all cash flows involved in fund 
transactions (no account may exist without the overview of the depositary to 
avoid any fraudulent cash transfer). By entrusting these functions, regulation 
takes stock of the trend to externalise back office functions to custodian banks 
and formally gives an auditing role to depositaries. The only risk is to raise 
costs for managers and investors by duplicating the tasks carried out 
elsewhere, particularly where it comes to the valuation of the fund units.97 In 
their oversight capacity (as in their record-keeping capacity), depositaries face 
                                                        
94 Articles 21.7, 21.8, 21.9 and 21.12, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
95 Article 21.12, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
96 The burden is reversed because it does not fall on the plaintiff (the manager or the 
investor) to prove there is no external event, so that the defendant (the depositary) is liable. 
Instead, the burden falls on the depositary to prove there is an external event and it is not 
liable. Still, the manager or the investor will have to prove prima facie (indicative proof) that 
the asset was held under custody by the depositary and has been lost. Article 21.13, 
Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
97 The list of oversight functions in the AIFMD (Article 21.9) has been copied from UCITS IV 
(Article 22). However, the scope of these duties remains to be defined by ESMA in both 
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liability only in case of intent or negligence. The liability in these instances 
refers to the compensation of the damage caused by not performing a duty 












































3.5.3  The challenge of implementation: Managing versus insuring non-
market risks 
It is a general principle that risks should be managed and only secondarily 
insured. The opposite may result in perverse incentives such as the ones 
present in the originate-to-distribute models that led to the 2008 financial crisis. 
With regard to depositaries, the former principle entails that the level of 
liability imposed needs to match their ability to effectively fulfil their duties. 
Avoiding insuring non-market risks is ultimately the objective of the AIFMD 
where it excludes liability in case of external events. In effect, if strict liability 
would fall on depositaries in circumstances that are outside their control, the 
outcome would be in stark contrast with the objective of the rules themselves 
and the lessons learned from the financial crisis. The devil however is in the 
detail and the balance between managing and insuring non-market risks in the 
fund industry depends on multiple factors:  
o  Determining the instruments to which the duty of custody (instead of 
record-keeping) applies 
o  Defining external event 
o  Defining loss of assets, as opposed to their temporal unavailability 
                                                        
98 For instance, if a manager diverts cash, the depositary would be liable if it negligently 
failed to monitor this cash transaction. A depositary would also be liable for any loss caused 
by carrying out instructions in conflict with national law or the fund rules. For other 
functions, such as overseeing the valuation of units, the liability of the depositary will 
depend on how these duties are defined by ESMA. RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 89 
o  Defining immediate restitution (restitution without undue delay) 
o  Clarifying the role of CSDs 
o  Allocating responsibilities between fund depositaries and managers 
o  Improving the legal certainty of securities holding transactions 
In sum, the extent to which non-market risks are managed instead of 
insured depends on: i) the precise content of the duties and standards imposed 
on depositaries, ii) the ability of depositaries to fulfil those duties within the 
legal framework of securities holding transactions and iii) the distribution of 
responsibility between fund managers and depositaries.  
To avoid insurance, liability for the loss of financial instruments should 
only fall on depositaries where they have effective control over these 
instruments. This means that the duty of custody should be restricted to those 
financial instruments over which the depositary controls their transfer (the 
transfer of the legal title). In effect, the difference between managing and 
insuring the loss of financial assets depends on determining which instruments 
are apt to be held in custody (instead of record-keeping) and in which 
circumstances. A functional approach based on the notion of control over those 
instruments is preferable to a formal approach, given the fragmentation of 
securities law.  
In its advice to the European Commission to implement the AIFMD, 
ESMA proposes to restrict the custody function to transferable securities, 
money-market instruments and units of collective investment undertakings.99 
It does however consider that the list may be revised in the future to include 
other instruments over which the depositary would have control, defined as 
the ability to instruct the transfer of an instrument and retrieve it if ever lost.100 
ESMA rightly considers that the forthcoming securities law Directive (SLD), by 
harmonising the law that applies to securities holding transactions in the 
European Union, may invite a revision of the list of financial instruments 
eligible to be held in custody. 
The advice highlights that holding derivatives in custody is not feasible 
in practice (except those embedded in securities) and limits the role of 
depositaries to ownership verification and record-keeping. The former may 
change when the forthcoming European market infrastructure Regulation 
                                                        
99 Transferable securities [including those that embed derivatives in accordance with Article 
51.3, final sub-paragraph of Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV) and Article 10 of Directive 
2007/16/EC (eligible assets, UCITS III)], money market instruments or units of collective 
investment undertakings [as listed in Annex I, Section C of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID)]. 
Box 79.1 ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD). 
100 ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD), p. 157. 90 | STRENGTHENING PRODUCT INTEGRITY: WHICH WAY FOR UCITS? 
(EMIR) introduces central clearing for certain types of derivative instruments 
and harmonises other aspects that affect derivatives transactions. Besides 
derivatives, ESMA also excludes from the custody function any financial 
instrument held by the issuer or its agent, unless it is held in an account in the 
name of the depositary.101 The role of CSDs is not clarified further from this 
perspective, pending the adoption of a forthcoming legislative piece on the 
matter (see below). 
Any transferable securities, money-market instruments or units of a 
collective investment undertaking received by the fund as collateral should be 
held in custody.102 The former however applies only to collateral arrangements 
under Directive 2002/47/EC (collateral directive).103 As a corollary, any 
instrument’s collateral pledged by the fund falls outside of the custody 
function since the depositary does not retain control over it. 104 Similarly, assets 
that are subject to a repurchase agreement, are lent or reused abandon the 
custody books of the depositary.105 
Beyond the list of assets to which the custody duty applies, the liability 
of depositaries depends on the concept of damage (loss of an asset) and the 
conditions for exoneration. The AIFMD only exonerates depositaries if they 
can prove that the loss is attributable to “an external event beyond their 
reasonable control”.106 T h e  a d v i c e  o f  E S M A  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  
separate elements which the depositary would need to prove: i) that there was 
no error or omission on its part, ii) that it could not have prevented the event 
or the loss and iii) that it had the appropriate due diligence processes in place. 
The third element is the most important since it requires depositaries have 
comprehensive processes in place to monitor, identify and mitigate potential 
risks.107  
The concept of loss is defined by ESMA so as to exclude the temporal 
unavailability of assets, during for instance liquidation or bankruptcy 
                                                        
101 Box 79 and p. 157, ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD). 
102 ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD), pp. 158-159. 
103 This report proposes to formally restrict the available collateral arrangements in UCITS to 
those allowed under Directive 2002/47/EC (collateral Directive). See p. XX. 
104 Box 79, ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD). 
105 Any asset that was held in custody will cease to be held in custody if subject to a 
repurchase or lending agreement during the effective duration of the agreement. The same 
applies to the re-hypothecation of collateral received by the fund. ESMA 2011/379 (technical 
advice, implementation AIFMD), p. 158. 
106 Article 21.12, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
107 Box 92, ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 91 
proceedings. The distinction between temporal and permanent loss mitigates 
substantially the principle of strict liability and the obligation of immediate 
restitution. ESMA places on each depositary the responsibility to determine 
when there is no scope to recover the given asset.108 The lack of a time frame 
(which, once exceeded, would entail the immediate restitution) means that 
managers and depositaries will negotiate a solution to the given loss or bring 
the matter to adjudication.  
A high standard of liability increases the incentives of depositaries to 
effectively manage non-market risks but may reduce these same incentives for 
asset managers who see their liabilities transferred away. Fund managers are 
responsible for certain non-market risks such as the ones embedded in 
derivatives and other instruments that are not held in custody by the 
depositary. Managing non-financial risks is therefore a shared responsibility. 
Yet, the AIFMD alters the duty of depositaries towards managers by allowing 
investors to present direct claims against the depositary.109 To avoid setting 
perverse incentives on managers, this possibility should only be offered where 
the fund manager has defaulted from its obligation to recover the lost assets 
from the depositary.  
Overall, the implementation proposed by ESMA strikes a good balance 
between duties and liabilities to ensure that non-market risks are managed by 
asset managers instead of insured by depositaries: i) it restricts the custody 
function to those instruments over which the depositary has control, ii) it 
distinguishes permanent from temporary loss and iii) it puts the stress on 
comprehensive risk management. By insisting on risk management (both as a 
duty on its own and as a condition for depositaries to avoid liability where an 
external event results in the loss of an asset), ESMA has succeeded in 
reconciling strict liability with the managing of non-market risks, avoiding 
perverse incentives for both asset managers and depositaries. Supervision will 
however play a key role in ensuring effective risk management takes place in 
practice. At the time of writing, the process of implementation is not 
completed, and the final result will depend on the will of the European 
Commission to follow the advice of ESMA and the absence of opposition from 
the European Parliament and the Council.  
                                                        
108 Box 91, ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation AIFMD). 
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3.5.4  The wider challenge: Future regulatory reform and the role of 
depositaries 
The Task Force agreed that the AIFMD rules on depositaries are overall a step 
in the right direction by clarifying the duties and liabilities of depositaries and 
fund managers with respect to non-market risks. Previously, the nature of the 
custody obligation and the standard of liability were given by the law of the 
home member state of each fund where divergent rules applied. Following the 
introduction of the new depositary rules in the AIFMD and UCITS, a uniform 
regime will exist in Europe affording an equivalent level of protection to 
investors, independently of the home country of the investment fund. In 
addition, the AIFMD rules ensure the independence of the depositary function 
by introducing the functional and hierarchical separation of the prime 
brokerage function and requiring consent and transparency for the fund assets 
to be reused by prime brokers.110  
While the rules in the AIFMD are an important step forward, some 
issues remain to be tackled. Several regulatory initiatives are in the pipeline 
that will directly impact the management of non-market risks by fund 
managers and depositaries:  
o  The securities law Directive (SLD) that will clarify and harmonise the 
law that applies to securities holding transactions in the European 
Union. 
o  The legislation on central securities depositaries (CSDs) that will 
harmonise the functioning of CSDs and certain aspects of securities 
settlement in the European Union. 
o  The European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) that will address 
OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories in the 
European Union. 
Beyond the European Union, additional efforts are needed to achieve 
more consistency in the law that applies to securities holding transactions and 
CSDs. However, the same standards cannot be expected in emerging countries, 
which lack the infrastructure and legal rules present in advanced jurisdictions. 
The former should not result in professional investors being denied the 
possibility of accessing investments in emerging markets, as long as 
appropriate safeguards are put in place, both in terms of risk management and 
disclosure. This principle is in the spirit of the AIFMD, which permits under 
certain conditions the transfer of liability to sub-custodians in emerging 
economies so that professional investors can access investment opportunities 
                                                        
110 Article 14.3, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD).  RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 93 
in countries where depositaries are not subject to standards equivalent to the 
ones in the AIFMD.111 Chapter 4 (Box X) considers this issue in more detail. 
To the extent that the harmonisation of depositary rules would be 
successful and effective across all member states, it may become possible to 
introduce a depositary passport in the future. The single market for financial 
services has been strengthened by the new depositary regime in the AIFMD 
and the UCITS Directive. However, in order to realise the full potential of the 
single market, the full harmonisation of depositary duties and liabilities should 
be followed by the introduction of a depositary passport. The European 
Commission could commit to consider in the medium run the convenience of 
introducing a depositary passport by introducing a review clause in its UCITS 
V proposal scheduled for 2012. 
The Madoff affair and the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008 brought 
regulators to step up their efforts to improve the oversight of non-market risks 
and clarify the duties and liabilities of fund depositaries. Awareness of these 
risks among investors has increased, particularly among professional and 
institutional investors, which is most welcomed. However, most retail 
investors remain unaware of the non-market risks and how they may impact 
their savings. The Task Force considered that more action is needed to improve 
the knowledge and visibility of non-market risks among investors. 
 
 
                                                        
111 Where the local entity does not satisfy the general requirements for delegation, the 
depositary may still delegate safekeeping to a local entity, as long as the law of the third 
country requires local custody, the AIF manager authorises it and investors are duly 
informed. Additional conditions apply to the transfer of liability to this local entity, namely 
the fund rules need to allow for such a transfer and investors need to be informed prior to 
their investment (see Article 21.11, Directive 2011/61/EU – AIFMD). 94 | 
 
 
4.  DISTRIBUTION: THE SINGLE MARKET, 
INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CHOICE 
his chapter aims to present a complete picture of fund distribution and 
related aspects from a regulatory perspective and advance proposals to 
complete the single market and improve investor protection. The first 
section will introduce the regulatory framework for fund distribution in 
Europe and the main changes introduced by the AIFMD. The second section 
will consider regulatory reform and in particular how to exploit the single 
market potential, improve retail investor protection and enhance investor 
choice. 
4.1  How does distribution work in Europe? 
From a regulatory perspective, the distribution of investment funds in the EU 
follows a two-step approach that differentiates market access from marketing 
requirements. As a first step, any fund has to comply with a number of 
conditions to be granted the possibility of placing their products in the 
marketplace (market access). As a second step, the sale process is itself 
regulated to protect investors (marketing rules). The functioning of this 
framework is characterised by the distribution of powers between Brussels and 
national capitals, as defined in the EU treaties. Market access is primarily an 
EU competence, which means member states may limit market access only 
where no EU rules exist, while investor protection is clearly a shared 
competence so member states may easily ‘goldplate’ marketing rules 
established at EU level.112 Figure 15 represents this difference graphically. 
                                                        
112 Article 4.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes that shared 
competence between the Union and the member states applies in several areas, including 
consumer protection. Article 169.4 establishes that measures adopted by the Union in the 
field of consumer protection cannot prevent any member state from maintaining or 
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extend the AIFMD passport to allow the marketing of certain AIFs to retail 
investors as long as they do not discriminate between local AIFs and AIFs 
coming from other EU member states.113 The extension of the AIFMD passport 
to retail investors is discussed later on. 
The passport in the AIFMD will replace the national rules that had 
previously governed the ability of EU managers to market non-harmonised 
funds to professional investors (sometimes called national private placement 
regimes).114 It will do so, however, only for investment funds handled by 
managers operating under the Directive. The harmonisation of national rules 
on market access for professional investors was declared an EU policy 
objective in 2006 (EC, 2006, p. 13). At the time, the idea was to remove national 
barriers to transactions between designated market participants by getting rid 
of national rules on product approval and providing exemptions to conduct of 
business and disclosure requirements (EC, 2006, p. 13). The 2008 financial crisis 
prompted a policy shift that resulted in the AIFMD following a substantially 
different approach than envisaged in 2006. In effect, the Directive disables 
national rules on product approval in its field of action but it goes much 
further than originally anticipated in terms of harmonisation. The biggest 
policy change affects conduct of business and disclosure requirements which 
have not disappeared but have been rethought and codified in detail to ensure 
that the ultimate beneficiaries are sufficiently protected and professional 
investors have access to the information they need to conduct meaningful due 
diligence. Table 8 presents this policy shift by comparing the policy in 2006 













                                                        
113 Article 43, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
114 Private placement regimes were defined in 2008 by the European Commission as “a 
distribution method through which authorised market participants can buy and sell 
financial instruments to each other without having to comply with the rules that would 
usually apply when the same instruments are offered to the public or to retail investors” 






















Once funds are granted market access (first step), they may actively sell 
their units to investors as long as they respect a set of marketing rules (second 
step). Investors are subject to different levels of protection at the point of sale in 
accordance with their level of expertise. Marketing rules cover two main areas: 
pre-contractual disclosure and selling practices. Pre-contractual disclosure 
refers to the information that should be made available to investors before a 
purchase is concluded. The UCITS Directive requires the publication of a fully 
harmonised key investor information document (KIID) aimed at retail 
investors.115 The AIFMD also contains requirements on pre-contractual 
disclosure but with a different scope given the professional nature of investors 
in AIFs. As for selling practices, these are mainly regulated by the markets in 
financial instruments Directive (MiFID, under review in 2012) and national 
implementing legislation. The main conduct of business rules in MiFID I refer 
to: 
o  Client categorisation (retail investors, professional investors and eligible 
counterparties)116 
o  Conflicts of interest and inducements117  
o  General disclosure to clients (complementary to the principles in UCITS 
and AIFMD)118 
o  Order handling (advised and non-advised sales, suitability and 
appropriateness tests)119  
                                                        
115 Regulation 583/2010 (UCITS IV implementation, KIID).  
116 Article 4.1.12, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
117 Articles 13.3, 18.1 and 18.2, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID) and Article 26, Directive 
2006/73/CE (MiFID implementation). 
118 Articles 19.2, 19.3 and 19.8, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
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o  Marketing rules120 
Beyond market access and marketing, the distribution of investment 
funds also hangs on efficient and compatible processing. Fund distributors 
need in practice to handle orders, deliver units and receive payments. In 
Europe, there is no single model to process the distribution of fund units or 
shares, which represents a major obstacle to efficient cross-border distribution. 
Beyond national peculiarities, distribution either employs transfer agents (TAs) 
or central securities depositaries (CSDs). Each model presents its own strengths 
but the main concern is fragmentation itself. A hybrid model would ideally 
combine the settlement security of CSDs with the ability to identify orders 
present in TAs, both of which are essential for secure and efficient distribution. 
Standardisation proposals have been put forward by market participants that 
foster convergence between both models (CACEIS, 2011). Cross-border 
distribution is also helped by international CSDs and global transfer agents, 
which are an alternative to national systems.  
The EU regulatory framework for fund distribution is currently at an 
advanced but still incomplete state of development. Progress has been 
achieved slowly and recently in a number of areas, such as: market access for 
non-UCITS funds under the AIFMD, conduct of business and transparency 
obligations for funds marketed to professional investors also under the AIFMD 
and standardised pre-contractual disclosure for retail investors under UCITS 
IV. Yet more progress is needed still to overcome difficulties in a number of 
areas, including i) the definition of professional and eligible investors, ii) 
marketing rules and selling practices, such as the definition of advice, 
independence and professional standards for advisers, iii) the level-playing 
field among retail investment products and iv) the convergence of fund 
processing models. The following sections will consider these latter issues in 









                                                        
120 Article 19.2, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID) and Articles 24 and 27, Directive 2006/73/CE 
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activities would lead to the Directive not being applied in practice. Banning offshore 
products  or  other  blanket  limitations  to  market  access  would  amount  to  market 
foreclosure, and face challenge by trading partners as it happened with early drafts of 
the Directive. Despite much controversy, the AIFMD strikes a reasonably good balance 









the  passport  will  not  be  available  for  offshore  funds  so  they  will  continue  to  be 
marketed  in  each  member  state  under  the  existing  national  private  placement 
regimes; ii) from 2015, the passport will most probably be introduced but co‐exist for 









2011/61/EU,  AIFMD,  under  the  national  placement  regimes).  The  figure  below 
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handled by managers who do not comply with the AIFMD may not be marketed in 
Europe actively through the AIFMD passport, but since the Directive does not prohibit 
reverse  solicitation,  member  states  may  allow  professional  investors  to  purchase 




The  question  of  reciprocal  market  access  remains  controversial  for  EU 







4.2  An agenda for regulatory reform: Which goals? 
“Confidence in European financial markets is the main driver encouraging retail 
and institutional investment flows, thus boosting integration.” 
EIWG – European Investors Working Group, 2010 
Several legislative reforms are impacting the picture of distribution in Europe, 
including the UCITS IV Directive, the AIFMD, the review of MiFID and the 
insurance mediation directive (IMD), and the initiative on packaged retail 
investment products (PRIPS). This section will consider these reforms with 
reference to three overarching objectives: completing the single market, 
improving retail investor protection and expanding the choice of investors. In 
effect, the Task Force considers that regulatory reform should focus on: i) 
leveraging the potential of the single market, making it work better in practice 
through further harmonisation and faster procedures, ii) radically improving 
retail investor protection, following a horizontal approach across all retail 
investment products and iiic) expanding or at least preserving the choice of 
retail and professional investors.  
4.2.1  Leveraging the single market potential 
Completing the single market is essential to foster growth and competitiveness 
in Europe. Advancing the single market is an inexpensive policy but progress 
remains slow. In 2011 the European Commission put forward its strategy to RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 101 
advance the single market with several concrete proposals.121 However, more 
progress is needed and the single market “must be must be brought to its next 
stage of development, by reinforcing governance and raising standards of 
implementation”.122 Advancing the single market for asset management 
products and services is of particular importance, given notably their 
importance for the financing of businesses and governments and the provision 
of retirement income to European citizens (see chapter 5). In this regard, action 
is needed at several levels, including market access, pre-contractual disclosure, 
selling practices and fund processing. The following paragraphs consider the 
progress achieved so far in each of these fields and highlight those areas where 
more action is needed. 
Market access 
The experience gathered in UCITS shows that national barriers that frustrate 
pan-European market access are not easy to overcome. The UCITS passport 
took years to work reasonably well in practice, given the notification procedure 
foreseen to market funds in other member states. National supervisors applied 
overly comprehensive and divergent requirements to validate notifications. A 
recent survey revealed the persistence of many hurdles to fund distribution at 
the notification stage just before the introduction of UCITS IV in July 2011 
(CACEIS, 2011). The top seven target countries for fund distribution required 
submission of up to 10 different documents in varying formats; in most 
instances they also required these documents to be locally certified and 
transmitted by a local agent (CACEIS, 2011). UCITS IV has put an end to most 
of these issues by introducing a simplified notification procedure and 
prohibiting member states from requiring additional documents at this 
stage.123 Documents are now transmitted between supervisors, avoiding 
certification requirements and the participation of local agents, and bringing 
the overall time spent in this procedure down to 10 working days instead of 2 
months. The harmonisation of authorisation requirements in UCITS IV 
however  may not stop member states from demanding additional documents 
at a later stage, as long as marketing rules remain loosely harmonised. 
The passport introduced by the AIFMD takes good account of the best 
practice established by UCITS IV, including the transmission of the notification 
                                                        
121 European Commission Communication COM(2011) 206 final (Single Market Act). 
122 Joint Letter to President Van Rompuy and President Barroso of 20 February 2012.  
123 The list of documents is limited to the fund rules or instruments of incorporation, latest 
annual report and any subsequent half-yearly reports, and the key investor information 
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by the home supervisor, a closed list of documents and a maximum delay, 
which is fixed at 20 working days.124 In effect, all non-UCITS funds which had 
so far not enjoyed cross-border market access may from July 2013 benefit from 
the AIFMD passport to market their units to professional investors if they 
comply with the Directive. With the AIFMD being a novel piece of legislation, 
ESMA will have to play a pivotal role in ensuring supervisory cooperation and 
procedural convergence.  
The AIFMD passport affects the marketing to professional investors of 
funds handled by managers who comply with the Directive. There are 
however several national examples of alternative funds being successfully 
marketed to retail investors, such as open-ended real estate funds. The 
European Commission envisaged the introduction of a passport for some of 
these products in 2006 but has so far not proposed legislation in this respect. 
The introduction of the AIFMD may in fact operate against the pan-European 
marketing of retail AIFs. The Directive formally allows member states to 
extend its passport to retail funds but is however unlikely to lead to the 
development of a pan-European market for retail AIFs. The AIFMD does not 
match the UCITS approach to product regulation that most member states 
would require to grant access to retail investors.125 Moreover, the Directive 
prohibits member states from discriminating between national and other EU 
AIFs in their ability to access retail investors. Member states are permitted by 
the Directive to impose additional requirements on specific categories of AIFs 
marketed to retail investors but are expressly prohibited from imposing 
different  requirements on AIFs coming from fellow EU member states. The 
problem in practice will be in determining when these additional requirements 
apply to the same or a distinct category of AIFs, on which the presence of 
discrimination will hang. Besides, member states are not expressly prohibited 
from discriminating against non-EU funds wishing to access retail investors.126 
                                                        
124 Article 32, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). See also Annex IV of the same directive. 
125 In effect, non-UCITS funds marketed to retail investors, such as open-ended real estate 
funds, are backed by product regulation. See for instance the Expert Group Report on Open-
Ended Real Estate Funds published in 2008 by the European Commission. The report details 
the depth and types of requirements set in national rules to protect retail investors (eligible 
assets, risk-spreading, borrowing, frequency of redemptions, liquidity requirements, 
independent valuation, depositary, conflicts of interest and others). They effectively amount 
to product regulation, in contrast with the AIFMD. In some respects however, the AIFMD 
provides for stricter requirements than national rules for retail AIFs, in which case the latter 
will need to adapt to comply. 
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Pre-contractual disclosure 
In terms of pre-contractual disclosure, the level of harmonisation is different 
for professional and retail investors, in line with the different level of 
standardisation required by these groups. The UCITS IV Directive introduces 
full harmonisation of the key investor information document (KIID) with an 
implementing regulation on its objectives, elements and format.127 In addition, 
ESMA guidelines provide a standard template, instructions to maintain clear 
language and layout and harmonised methodologies to calculate the charges 
and ‘risk-reward’ indicators.128 The UCITS Directive expressly states that 
member states may not impose additional requirements on the content or 
format of the KIID.129 Each fund produces a single KIID document valid for all 
member states, save for its translation into the national languages of the 
countries where it is marketed.130 In spite of this substantial progress, some 
member states are reported to still demand additional documents to funds 
marketed in their jurisdictions. Further harmonisation is therefore necessary to 
overcome market fragmentation. 
Disclosure requirements for alternative funds follow a different 
approach since they are directed to professional investors. They aim at 
enabling i) due diligence by these investors and ii) supervisory monitoring for 
financial stability purposes. The former means that while the AIFMD provides 
for significant pre-contractual disclosure, this is mostly not standardised, in 
contrast with the UCITS KIID.131 One notable exception refers to the disclosure 
of leverage where a harmonised calculation methodology is proposed by 
ESMA in its advice to the European Commission, given the relevance of this 
ratio for macro-prudential oversight.132 From a single market perspective, the 
g o a l  s h o u l d  b e  t o  a v o i d  t h e  d i v e r g e n t implementation of the disclosure 
requirements in the Directive that would undermine cross-border marketing. 
                                                        
127 Regulation 583/2010 (UCITS IV implementation, KIID)  
128 ESMA Guidelines, CESR/10-1321, CESR/10-1320, CESR/10-674 and CESR/10-673, 
respectively. 
129 “Key investor information shall be used without alterations or supplements, except 
translation, in all Member States where the UCITS is notified to market its units in 
accordance with Article 93” —Article 78.6 Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). 
130 Article 94.1.b, Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS IV). 
131 Article 23, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). See also Chapter VIII.II in ESMA/2011/379 
(AIFMD, implementation, advice). 
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Selling practices 
As for selling practices, MiFID provides partial harmonisation in a number of 
areas including in particular how to distinguish retail from professional clients, 
how to establish that a given fund is adequate for an investors and how to 
manage conflicts of interest in distribution. The substance of these rules is 
discussed later on with reference to investor protection. From a single market 
perspective the level of harmonisation of selling practices in Europe remains 
insufficient. Different implementation of the rules in MiFID I by member states 
has raised the barriers to market certain products in some countries (Valiante, 
2011). Distinct national rules are partially justified by the differences in the 
distribution models that prevail in national markets (the bank-insurer model in 
most of continental Europe versus third-party financial advisors in the UK). 
Yet, further harmonisation would be positive to consolidate national best 
practices and promote convergence. Fragmentation represents also a 
significant regulatory and supervisory cost since similar gains in investor 
protection may be realised by common rules. The review of MiFID in 2012 is an 
opportunity to advance in this respect.  
Fund processing 
The convergence of fund processing is also a crucial element to achieve a truly 
single market. The European Commission highlighted in 2006 that message 
routing, order-processing and settlement had not kept pace with market 
growth and changes in distribution (European Commission, 2006, p. 9). These 
inefficiencies persist due to industry inertia and coordination difficulties, 
despite efforts led by industry associations. In effect, solutions to standardise 
and facilitate cross-border distribution are currently available, offered mostly 
by international CSDs and financial messaging firms, but have not yet been 
widely adopted. Regulators should monitor and stimulate convergence in close 
contact with the industry, removing any regulatory barriers. If coordination 
difficulties persist, the use of standards could be envisaged to correct market 
failures.  
4.2.2  Regulatory reform: Revisiting retail investor protection 
This section examines the reasons that justify investor protection, the 
achievements of EU regulation and its shortcomings with a view to proposing 
a comprehensive agenda directed at radically improving retail investor 
protection in the Europe. The section is structured in four parts. The first one 
considers the fundamentals of investor protection by both referring to selected 
empirical evidence and the theory underpinning investor protection and 
introducing the EU regulatory framework, including the proposals tabled by 
the European Commission in the past few years to improve retail investor RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 105 
protection. The other three parts of this section will propose a reform agenda 
based on three objectives: ii) fostering disclosure and comparability so that 
investors can make informed decisions, ii) awarding a level of protection that 
takes into account the degree of complexity of each product and iii) ensuring 
investors can access transparent, independent and quality advice.  
4.2.2.1  Fundamentals of retail investor protection and its regulation in the EU 
Retail and professional investors need a different standard of protection. 
Traditionally, investor protection has been reserved for retail investors when 
they access financial instruments directly. The 2008 financial crisis prompted a 
change in approach by revisiting the protection afforded by regulation to 
professional investors, including institutional ones. The protection of 
professional investors is based on two pillars: minimum disclosure to enable 
the conduct of meaningful due diligence processes and conduct of business 
rules to enforce the fiduciary duty of product providers against their clients. 
The AIFMD follows this approach with a double objective: reduce systemic 
risk and protect the ultimate beneficiaries of pension funds, insurers and other 
institutional investors in alternative funds.  
Retail investors are subject to a different standard of protection. For 
professional investors the focus is on enforcing disclosure to enable meaningful 
due diligence while for retail investors the focus is on assisting (and in the 
margin substituting) them in their investment decisions. Table 9 summarises 
the two different approaches to investor protection which run in fact through 





















Multiple reasons justify retail investor protection, proportional to the 
characteristics of investors, products and sale processes. Retail investors lack 
specific knowledge in finance and the ability to understand the risks involved 
in financial products. These products are to a large extent so-called experience 106 | DISTRIBUTION: THE SINGLE MARKET, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CHOICE 
or credence goods (i.e.: their performance cannot be fully ascertained until 
their life cycle has ended). The market is therefore characterised by 
asymmetries of information between manufacturers, distributors and 
investors. Some products exhibit complex risk and pricing structures that are 
difficult to apprehend even by individuals with a reasonable degree of 
expertise in finance. Moreover, most individuals purchase infrequently so any 
experience gathered is likely to be lost at the time of buying again. It is worth 
mentioning that the market for investments, pensions and securities is the 
worst perceived by consumers in the European Union in terms of ease to 
compare products, trust in suppliers and consumer satisfaction (European 
Commission, 2011a). 
Empirical evidence also calls for investor protection. The behaviour of 
investors in retail markets has been abundantly researched, including for 
policy purposes.133 Two recent experiments revealed that retail investors (a) 
have difficulties to choose the optimal product, even within simple 
alternatives; (b) make worse decisions where fees are framed as percentages or 
returns not compounded; (c) rely heavily on advice, base many of their 
decisions on trust and are vulnerable to persuasion by the adviser (Charter et 
al, 2010). Behavioural economics has demonstrated that investors have 
bounded rationality and are easily influenced. Ordinary biases in decision 
making are exacerbated by the specific characteristics of financial products but 
some of these biases persist even in financially literate subjects since they are 
closely related to psychological factors (de Meza et al, 2008).  
Investors would benefit from uniform rules. So far however, EU regulation 
has largely followed a sectoral approach, applying different requirements to 
substitutable investment products according to their legal form and the sales 
channel. The divergences in the rules exceed the measure of the particular 
characteristics of each product and result plainly in an uneven level of 
protection. UCITS is the most tightly regulated product range both in terms of 
pre-contractual disclosure (KIID) and selling practices (MiFID). Non-UCITS 
funds and unit-linked insurance policies marketed to retail investors are not 
subject to the KIID but to national rules. The rules in MiFID I apply to all 
investment funds and structured securities but not to unit-linked life insurance 
policies (sold under the IMD) and structured term deposits (no rules at EU 
level).  
Progress has been achieved on standardising disclosure. Empirical evidence 
suggests that standard and simple product information can improve retail 
investment decisions significantly (Charter et al., 2010). Based on extensive 
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research and consumer testing, UCITS IV introduced a standard key investor 
information document (KIID) in July 2011. The document overcomes the 
deficiencies found in the simplified prospectus in terms of length, content and 
ease of comparison.134 The KIID is composed of no more than two pages using 
a standard template and clear language. It presents in a concise manner (a) the 
investment objectives and policy of the fund, (b) past-performance, (c) a 
charges figure, and (d) a synthetic risk-reward indicator. The calculation 
methodologies are fully harmonised to ensure these figures are comparable. 
The content of the document is tailored to the specificities of some products, 
such as funds of funds and structured UCITS. 
But standardised disclosure is no panacea. Consumer testing has shown that 
the KIID, while significantly facilitating investor understanding, has some 
limitations (IFF Research et al., 2009). Most customers did not read the whole 
document and focused selectively on particular sections, both when reading 
alone and guided by advisers. Investors have difficulties understanding the 
concepts behind some of the strategies, risks and assets mentioned in the 
documents. They also had difficulties understanding the application of charges 
and their effect on returns. In effect, the effectiveness of disclosure is closely 
correlated to the degree of literacy and experience of each investor.  
Many retail clients need professional advice. Investment advice may help 
investors to overcome some of their limitations in making optimal investment 
decisions. The use of advice is indeed widespread among retail investors. 
There is evidence that 80% of retail investments are undertaken in a face-to-
face setting where intermediaries influence investor decisions (Charter et al., 
2010). MiFID regulates investor protection at the time of purchase. It provides 
rules on conduct of business, conflicts of interests and inducement based on 
the principle that investment firms need to act honestly, fairly and in the best 
interest of their clients.135 This principle results in different practical obligations 
depending on the nature of the service. Where providing advice or portfolio 
management, the intermediary is required to assess the suitability of the 
product for the investor.136 Where it provides non-advised sales, it has to assess 
the appropriateness of the product for the investor.137 Both tests are similar and 
essentially demand the firm to consider the characteristics of the investor and 
                                                        
134 The simplified prospectus was the standard of pre-contractual disclosure fixed by UCITS 
III. 
135 Article 19.1, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
136 Article 19.4, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
137 Article 19.5, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 108 | DISTRIBUTION: THE SINGLE MARKET, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CHOICE 
the product (for further reference see Valiante, 2011 and Casey and Lannoo, 
2009).  
But advice may be waived for simple instruments. As an exception for non-
complex financial instruments, investors may ask the distributor to execute 
their orders directly without any intermediate assessment of their 
appropriateness (so-called execution-only service). UCITS are under MIFID I 
considered non-complex financial instruments, which means retail clients may 
access UCITS without any assessment of their profile.138 This exception 
represents a significant commercial opportunity for management houses and 
distributors which are able to sell UCITS to retail investors using multiple 
channels, including in particular online platforms. It is estimated that in some 
member states execution-only services account for two thirds of retail 
investment transactions in shares, money market instruments, bonds, 
securitised debt and UCITS instruments (EC, 2011b). 
Conflicts of interest and inducements also need to be addressed by regulation. 
MiFID I prescribes that conflicts of interest are prevented or otherwise 
managed and disclosed in accordance with the directive.139 It is however 
revealing that inducements are not considered in the text of MiFID I but in 
secondary legislation. In principle, the directive prohibits investment firms to 
provide or receive any inducements (monetary or otherwise). However, 
inducements are allowed if they satisfy three requirements: (a) they are 
designed to improve the quality of the service to the client, (b) they do not 
impair the ability of the firm to comply with its duty act honestly, fairly and in 
the best interest of their clients and (c) they are appropriately disclosed.140 This 
test puts the weight on the individual self-assessment by firms of each 
inducement on a case by case basis.141 While it is correct in substance, it is 
loosely framed and therefore not operational for firms and supervisors. The 
European Commission (2011b) has recognised that it is not well articulated for 
investors. Implementation at EU level has followed a soft-approach based on 
interpretative guidelines and a market survey for firms to “benchmark 
themselves against industry compliance practices”.142 ESMA concedes that the 
test is not easy to apply in practice (therefore also difficult to supervise) and 
that a large number of firms have not substantially changed their behaviour 
                                                        
138 Article 19.6, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
139 Article 18, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
140 Article 26, Directive 2006/73/EC (MiFID implementation). 
141 ESMA Report, CESR/10-295 (inducements, MiFID), p. 18. 
142 ESMA Recommendation, CESR/07-228b (inducements, MiFID) and ESMA Report, 
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following its introduction.143 Moreover, the rules in MiFID I refer to 
inducements across all investment services and do not cater specifically for 
retail investor protection. Despite the different models of distribution in 
member states, the types of inducements employed by originators are 
similar.144 Most distributors receive one-off rebates of entry fees and ongoing 
rebates of management or performance fees from fund managers. They also 
receive non-monetary benefits such as training, marketing material, research 
and IT products.145 Some of these inducements may distort incentives in the 
application of the suitability and appropriateness tests or result in biased advice 
or recommendations that reflect more the economic incentives of the 
distributor than the interest of investors.146 The remuneration policy fixed by 
the distributor for its sales staff is the major transmission mechanism for these 
incentives.  
Gaps in the application of MiFID undermine investor protection. Concerns 
have been expressed about gaps in the application of selling rules to 
originators engaging directly with end investors (EC, 2009, p. 23). Relevant 
exceptions in MiFID I concern (a) collective investment undertakings and 
pension funds, their depositaries and managers and (b) persons providing 
non-remunerated investment advice in the course of providing another 
professional activity not covered by MiFID I. Similarly in the market for unit-
linked insurance products, the IMD does not cover the sales by employees of 
insurance companies. These provisions should be revisited from the point of 
view of their effects on investor protection and the opportunities they may 
offer for regulatory arbitrage.  
The distribution of responsibilities between originators and distributors remains 
unclear. It is estimated that 40 to 60% of fees gathered by asset managers are 
paid back to distributors (CACEIS & PwC, 2011). A report by Cerulli 
Associates (2012) suggests that €32bn were paid to distributors out of the total 
€60bn revenues generated by the European asset management industry in 
2011. Distributors face the responsibility of complying with the duties imposed 
to them by MiFID. This involves notably the application of the suitability and 
                                                        
143 “CESR [ESMA] acknowledges that the application of the test might not always be 
straightforward” – ESMA Report, CESR/10-295 (inducements, MiFID), p. 22. “Most of the 
investment firms sampled said that they assess payments and non-monetary benefits they 
provide or receive for compliance with the MiFID inducements rules” – ESMA Report, 
CESR/10-295 (inducements, MiFID), p. 8. 
144 ESMA Report, CESR/10-295 (inducements, MiFID), p. 18. 
145 ESMA Report, CESR/10-295 (inducements, MiFID), p. 18. 
146 Inducements may provide an incentive to push the products of those providers which 
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appropriateness tests in advised and non-advised sales respectively. For this 
purpose distributors need to have the ability to effectively understand the 
characteristics of the product and the needs of the investors. Manufacturers 
bear also some responsibility with regard to the general suitability of the 
products they offer in the retail market. The distribution of responsibilities in 
the production and distribution chain should however be clarified to ensure 
investor protection – notwithstanding that the legal framework for contractual 
and tort liability is mostly given by national law.  
It follows that regulatory reform is needed to strengthen retail investor 
protection in Europe. To overcome some of the problems highlighted above, the 
European Commission proposed in 2011 changes to the markets in financial 
instruments directive (MiFID) in the context of a full recast of the legislative 
text.147 The Commission proposes to (a) award the label independent advice 
where the distributor accepts no monetary inducements from the originator 
and (b) remove certain UCITS funds from the non-complex product category 
s o  t h a t  t h e y  c a n n o t  l o n g e r  b e  s o l d  o n  a n  e x e c u t i o n - o n l y  b a s i s .  I t  a l s o  p u t s  
forward additional measures to strengthen retail investor protection that are 
summarised in Table 12. The proposed changes are in line with of a broader 
initiative to improve EU legislation on retail products, strengthen its coherence 
and enhance investor protection after the financial crisis.148 This initiative was 
outlined in the communication on packaged retail investment products 
(PRIPS) in 2009.149 The PRIPS initiative is expected to propose the 
harmonisation of selling practices and conduct of business requirements across 
all packaged retail investment products, in a first stage, and to all retail 
investment products (packaged or not) in the long term. It represents to date 
the most comprehensive EU strategy on retail investor protection (see below). 
Under this strategy: (a) MiFID rules will be reformed as detailed above and 
extended to structure deposits where no EU legislation previously applied; (b) 
selling practices for unit-linked insurance products will be regulated in the 
insurance mediation directive (IMD) in a manner equivalent to MiFID but 
preserving the strengths of the IMD with regard for instance to conflicts of 
interest; (c) the standard of pre-contractual disclosure set by the UCITS KIID 
will be extended to other retail investment products. In sum the proposal aims 
at harmonising selling practices and disclosure for retail investors across 
investment funds (UCITS and AIFs), unit-linked insurance policies, structured 
                                                        
147 Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
148 Press Release, 2798th Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 8 May 
2007. 
149 European Commission Communication COM (2009) 204 final (PRIPS). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 111 
securities and structured term deposits.150 Beyond the changes proposed by the 
European Commission, the responsibility ultimately will fall on the European 
Parliament and member states to bring reform forward and improve investor 
protection. 
The next sections will consider the reform of distribution from a triple 
perspective, following the priorities identified by the task force to improve 
investor protection: (a) fostering disclosure and comparability so that investors 
can make informed decisions; (b) awarding a level of protection that takes into 
account the degree of complexity of each product; and (c) ensuring investors 
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broad  range  of  instruments  and  (b)  do  not  receive  any  monetary  inducements 
                                                        
150 The detailed scope remains subject to discussions. The European Commission is 
scheduled to table a legislative proposal in this regard in 2012. 
151 Article 1.3, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
152 Annex 1, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
153 Article 3, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
154 Article 9.6.c, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
155 Article 27.5, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 


















4.2.2.2  Fostering disclosure and comparability 
As noted above, empirical evidence suggests that standard disclosure helps 
investors identify the optimal choice when confronted with similar investment 
options (Charter et al., 2010). One of the main features of the KIID is that it 
allows retail investors to compare different UCITS and shop around for the 
best product according to their needs and aspirations. Building on the 
experience gathered in UCITS, the European Commission proposed to extend 
the standard of pre-contractual disclosure in the KIID to other retail investment 
products (EC, 2009c). The goal is to improve investor protection by (a) enabling 
investors to compare options across different product categories; and (b) 
raising the standards of disclosure for retail investment products other than 
UCITS in order to mitigate the incentives for regulatory arbitrage. The creation 
of a level playing field in pre-contractual disclosure should not be understood 
to benefit some originators over others but to benefit retail investors as a 
whole.  
The KIID standard is based on three pillars (a) selective content, short 
length and clear language to get the key information across; (b) standardised 
risk, cost and performance metrics to facilitate comparison; and (c) a single 
                                                        
157 Article 24.5, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
158 Article 24.6, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
159 Article 25.3.iv, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). The definition 
of complex UCITS in the original proposal of the Commission is limited to structured UCITS 
as defined by Regulation 583/2010 (implementation UCITS IV, KIID). 
160 Article 25.5, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
161 Article 30 and Annex II, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
162 Article 42.1, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 113 
document valid in all member states where the marketing of the product is 
allowed. Of course the KIID standard will need to be tailored to the specific 
characteristics of each product category. The challenge is to ensure both the 
comparability of products within a same product category and the 
comparability of different product categories. The existence of a key investor 
information document should not mislead investors about the nature of each 
product category. It is important that investors understand not only the market 
risk present in each product but also the nature of the product itself (ex: 
whether the underlying assets are owned by the investor). 
The extension of the KIID standard should be ambitious in scope. 
Ultimately, the KIID standard should be extended to all retail investment 
products, including plain-vanilla financial instruments such as shares and 
bonds. The principle of proportionality should however be applied in order to 
reflect the level of complexity of each product category. The European 
Commission has proposed to initially limit the extension of the KIID to 
package retail investment products (PRIPS): retail AIFs, unit-linked insurance 
products and retail structured products. In the future however, the European 
Commission should consider specific KIID standards for (a) long-term saving 
products including pensions; and (b) plain-vanilla instruments such as shares 
and bonds. It is acknowledged that the breath of the task does not allow for the 
immediate extension of the KIID standard to these later product categories. 
However, it is felt the Commission should set a calendar to put forward 
legislative proposals in these areas in due time. 
The UCITS KIID was introduced for new funds in July 2011 and will 
need to be rolled-out for all existing funds before July 2012. The document is 
no doubt a big step forward in pre-contractual disclosure. It could however be 
improved further by giving more relevance to certain aspects; namely non-
market risks (such as counterparty and operational risks) and recommended 
holding periods: 
o  When it comes to non-market risks, the UCITS rules require managers to 
disclose any material counterparty and operational risks in the KIID.163 
They also need to disclose the impact on risk of the use of derivatives 
and other practices such as securities lending.164 Additional regulatory 
and supervisory guidance would be helpful to strengthen the adherence 
of funds to these provisions. The European Commission could also 
explore the feasibility of introducing a synthetic indicator of 
                                                        
163 Article 8.5, Regulation 583/2010 (UCITS IV implementation, KIID). 
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counterparty, operational and other non-market risks (EDHEC-Risk 
2010a).  
o  ‘Recommended holding periods’ are not part either of the information 
that should be consistently disclosed in the KIID. Managers are only 
obliged to insert the mention “this fund may not be appropriate to 
investors who plan to withdraw their money within [period of time]” if 
they consider a minimum holding period is an essential element of the 
investment strategy.165 It is felt however that this phrasing is negative 
and may misrepresent to investors the importance of investment 
horizons and the nature of ‘recommended holding periods’. Disclosure 
of this essential element should rather be phrased proactively in all 
instances.  
Finding a coherent approach to the disclosure counterparty, operational 
risks and holding periods appears important not only with regard to UCITS 
but also in view of the extension of the KIID standard to other packaged retail 
investment products, in order to foster comparability.  
Last but not least, the approach followed in the UCITS KIID could also 
be useful to address the disclosure of the services offered at the point of sale. 
Investors would benefit from a short standard document to compare the 
services offered by different intermediaries in advised and non-advised sales. 
Among the key aspects to disclose: the breath of instruments and providers 
considered by the intermediary, and the presence and level of inducements or 
up-front charges. Disclosure could extend to the services offered in addition to 
the initial recommendation, such as the periodic survey of product 
performance, information on substantial changes to the product, and the 
ongoing assessment of suitability for the investor (disclosing both the content 
of these services and any costs involved). Investors should be empowered to 
shop around not only for products but also for advice services. In this regard, 
promoting the comparability of the service provided by different 
intermediaries is essential.  
Figure 17. Rules applicable under the scope of the PRIPS approach 
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(b)  Complexity in the  risk-reward profile; due for instance to the use of 
algorithms linked to the performance of certain reference assets or the 
realisation of specific conditions. 
(c)  Subjective complexity; from the perspective of the lack familiarity of 
investors with certain types of instruments and risks. For instance, 
investors are usually less familiar with the investment risk present in 
exotic securities, or the counterparty and other operational risks in 
derivatives.  
Limits to the complexity of financial instruments may be introduced for 
macro-prudential purposes (to ensure financial stability and in particular reduce 
the interconnectedness of the financial system) and micro-prudential purposes 
(to ensure product integrity and in particular the ability of product originators 
to manage counterparty and operational risks). Limits may also be introduced 
in the sale process of complex instruments for investor protection purposes (to 
mitigate the risk of misselling).  
One of the core principles of MiFID is that investors should understand 
what they purchase in order to avoid the risk of misselling. In effect, firms are 
required to check whether the investor has the knowledge and experience to 
understand the risks involved in the product purchased (suitability and 
appropriateness tests).168 So far regulators have focused on improving the 
awareness of investors about the level of market risk in each product rather 
than the level of counterparty and operational risks embedded in complex 
structures. Complex product structuring is frequently employed by originators 
to respond to investor demand and reduce market risk, for instance by 
introducing capital guarantees or otherwise mitigating the risk of capital losses 
due to movements in markets. The paradox is therefore that complexly 
structured products may present a risk-reward profile that is simpler and 
offers more certainty to the investor than plain vanilla securities.169 Investors 
however should not be misled about the importance of counterparty and 
operational risks and their potential impact on their investments. Market risk 
has on average low impact but high frequency while generally counterparty 
and some operational risks materialise more rarely but may completely wipe-
out the value of an investment. Retail investors cannot be expected to 
understand product structuring but should be made aware of the existence and 
                                                        
168 Articles 35.1.c and 36, Directive 2006/73/EC (MiFID implementation). 
169 For instance in the framework of UCITS, the industry recognises that funds which use 
derivatives systematically or extensively may provide a more linear market exposure to 
investors but a the expense of higher counterparty risks and operational risks derived from 
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level of counterparty, operational and other risks different to market risks. 
Targeted pre-contractual disclosure should be the first step to address this 
concern (see above). 
Beyond pre-contractual disclosure, complexity in the product structuring 
should be addressed in the context of product rules where they exist. In the 
case of UCITS, the directive imposes requirements to limit counterparty and 
operational risks and ensure they are appropriately managed. If there are 
concerns about the level of non-market risks in some UCITS, these should first 
be addressed by clarifying the rules on eligible assets, use of derivatives, 
depositary responsibility and management of collateral. Only then may 
residual issues at the point of sale be addressed at the level of MiFID.  
Complexity in the risk reward profile should be addressed at the level of 
selling practices. Structured UCITS which risk-reward profile is too complex to 
be understood by an average retail investor should require the participation of 
an adviser in the sale process. It is important however that equivalent limits 
are applied to all retail structured products, whether in a fund format or 
otherwise. Notably, if a risk return profile is so complex that there is a high risk 
of misselling (because the investor is unlikely to understand it even with the 
help of an adviser) the product should not be made available to retail clients in 
the first place. 
In conclusion, policy makers and regulators should consider that 
complexity is not a univocal concept and may therefore need a regulatory 
response at different levels. Complexity in the product structuring should be 
addressed separately to complexity in the risk reward profile of retail investment 
products. The former should be tackled by product regulation to the extent 
that it is deemed necessary to ensure product integrity (see chapter 2). By way 
of contrast, the latter should be addressed by the rules on distribution to the 
extent that it is deemed necessary to protect investors at the point of sale. 
Finally, regulators and industry should make an effort to improve the 
disclosure of non-market risks to investors so that products which reduce 
market risk at the expense of higher counterparty and operational risks are 
fairly represented to investors. It is fundamental that the same rules apply 
across Europe since divergent initiatives by member states would reverse the 
progress achieved in the single market. 
4.2.2.4  Reshaping advice services and sale procedures 
Advice plays an essential role to promote the participation of retail investors in 
financial markets. As noted above, the presence of advice is generalised in 
retail markets. Most retail clients lack the knowledge to understand the risks 
involved in financial products and to make optimal investment decisions – 
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Advice is meant to help investors indentify those financial instruments which 
best fit their needs and their ability to bear the risk of possible losses. In 
practice however, advice may be given that does not result from a professional 
and fair assessment of the investor needs and the characteristics of the different 
products available in the market place. Advisers may profit from information 
asymmetries to push products that are not in the best interest of investors. 
Regulation intervenes in investment advice to protect retail investors. 
The standard of protection afforded depends crucially on the definition of 
advice from three perspectives: (a) the circumstances under which an 
intermediary is understood to be giving advice, as opposed to merely 
executing an order received from the investor; (b) the conditions the 
intermediary should meet and the process it should follow to be able to deliver 
advice; and (c) the characteristics that the advice (final recommendation) 
s h o u l d  h a v e  t o  b e  d e e m e d  i n  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  i n v e s t o r .  T a b l e  1 1  






























Research has found important failures in the provision of advice to retail 
investors, affecting most of its aspects. Advisers have been found to generate 
ambiguity and confusion on investors about the process of advice and the RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 119 
responsibility of advisers (ESMA, 2011, p. 7). In the context of face-to-face 
intermediation, it is difficult to differentiate the provision of advice from the 
execution of client orders. This circumstance may be exploited by firms to 
avoid complying with the requirements imposed by regulation on the 
provision of advice. Poor recording of the process of providing advice 
exacerbates this problem. Unfortunately, most advisers have been found to 
follow poor recording practices (Synovate, 2011, p. 7). Research has also shown 
that:  
o  Many advisers do not understand the risks involved in the products they 
sell (FSA, 2007) 
o  Most advisers do not collect sufficient information on the knowledge, 
investment experience and financial situation of the investor (Synovate, 
2011, p. 6) 
o  Most clients are not asked for their risk-return preference and less for 
their ability to deal with investment risk (Synovate, 2011, p. 8) 
o  Most final recommendations do not meet investor needs in terms of 
liquidity and risk (Synovate, 2011; FSA, 2011a; FSA, 2010a) 
The widespread failures listed above may not be present in all national 
markets to the same extent but nevertheless call for a profound reform of the 
rules governing the provision of advice by investment firms. The content of 
such reform could be the object of a separate report. Yet, in line with the areas 
where failures have been detected, the reform should consider: (a) the 
definition of advice and the nature of the service provided; (b) the 
transparency about the nature and costs of the service provided; (c) the process 
of delivering advice; (d) the definition of suitability; and (e) the professional 
standards of advisers. The following paragraphs consider some of these 
aspects. 
(a)  The definition of advice and the nature of the service provided 
The distinction between advised and non-advised sales is vague in practice. 
MiFID I prohibits investment firms to issue personal recommendations to 
clients without carrying-out an assessment of the suitability of the 
recommendation for the client.170 The directive therefore does not distinguish 
                                                        
170 See the following: 
-  Article 19.4, Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID): “When providing investment advice [...] 
the investment firm shall obtain the necessary information [...] so as to enable the firm 
to recommend to the client or potential client the investment services and financial 
instruments that are suitable for him [emphasis added]”. 
-  Article 4.1.4, Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID): “Investment advice means the provision 
of personal recommendations to a client, either upon its request or at the initiative of 
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the context of the recommendation – for instance whether the advice is issued 
by an independent third-party (who may consider a broad range of products 
and providers and charges the client up-front) or by the sales staff of a bank 
(who may only consider a restricted sample of products and accept 
inducements from product providers). Research has shown that face-to-face 
intermediation induces on investors a high level of trust, which may be 
exploited by the intermediary if there is no regulatory and supervisory 
intervention (Charter et al., 2010). The intention of MiFID I is to mitigate the 
risk of misselling by imposing on all sorts of intermediaries the same 
obligation to assess suitability. It is argued here that the approach of MiFID I is 
right but should be strengthened to avoid circumvention. As noted above, 
intermediaries may arbitrage their obligations to conduct a suitability 
assessment by inducing confusion on the advisee as to their responsibility in 
the process of delivering advice, attempting to reclassify advised sales as non-
advised sales.  
It is important that all sorts of intermediaries are subject to the same 
minimum standards when dealing with retail investors (assessment of 
suitability). These standards are meant to avoid products being recommended 
to investors that do not match their risk aversion or their financial ability to 
sustain possible losses. They should be therefore understood as a minimum 
common denominator that every personal recommendation to a retail investor 
should fulfil. However, these standards should not be used as an excuse to 
hide to clients the nature of the service provided. It is possible to distinguish 
different types of intermediaries in accordance with two criteria (a) the range 
of product types and providers considered when delivering advice; and (b) 
whether the intermediary charges up-front for providing advice or is financed 
by the product provider. Figure 18 summarises the four main combinations 
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the investment firm, in respect of one or more transactions relating to financial 
instruments”. 
-  Article 52, Directive 2006/73/EC (MiFID implementation): “That recommendation 
must be presented as suitable for that person, or must be based on a consideration of 
the circumstances of that person [emphasis added]”. It is suggested that it should read 
instead: “That recommendation must be based on an ‘assessment of suitability’, as 












o  Comprehensive and independent advice has the potential to be the ideal 
standard for all investors. Individuals with a limited amount of money to 
invest would also benefit from comprehensive and independent advice, 
as far as it is made accessible to them in practice. 
o  Restricted but independent advice is adequate for investors looking for 
targeted expertise in a specific type of products and who are aware of the 
restrictions placed in the scope of the service. For instance, an adviser 
may be solely specialised in UCITS funds or in retail structured 
products.  
o  Non-independent advice presents a higher risk of bias in the 
recommendation given to investors. In particular, the adviser may be 
inclined to advise those products for which the product provider pays 
higher inducements. Yet, firms may negotiate inducements in a way that 
reduces their conflicts of interest. If the advice is comprehensive, 
investors are more likely to get a better service. Restricted and non-
independent advice is offered most frequently by originators who 
distribute their own products. 
(b)  Addressing the different nature of the advice service provided. 
To address the different nature of the service provided, there are two distinct 
policy alternatives: restrictions and disclosure obligations. The approach 
followed by MiFID I combines both. On the one hand, firms are required to act 
in the best interest of investors – a principle that justifies restrictions to certain 
practices.171 On the other hand, firms are required to communicate to clients 
any risk of damage to their interests the firm cannot fully control for – a 
principle that justifies disclosure obligations.172 Yet, implementation of these 
principles in respect of the provision of advice services is incomplete. There are 
three major shortcomings in MiFID I from this perspective:  
o  The rules are partial in scope and only address certain characteristics of 
the service provided. In effect, MiFID I only imposes specific restrictions 
                                                        
171 Article 19.1, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
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and disclosure obligations for inducements.173 Firms are not expressly 
required to inform investors about the range of products and providers 
they consider when delivering advice.  
o  The rules are poorly applied in practice. Research has shown that a very 
small number of advisers discloses inducements and other conflicts of 
interest to clients (Synovate, 2011, p. 9). Regulators have conceded that 
the restrictions imposed on inducements by MiFID I are difficult to apply 
and supervise in practice; and have not lead to substantial changes in the 
behaviour of firms in most member states (ESMA, 2010).  
o  The rules do not apply across all intermediaries and financial products. 
In effect, partial restrictions on inducements need to be specific enough 
to avoid arbitrage by investment firms and product originators. They also 
necessitate intense supervisory monitoring to ensure firm compliance and 
adapt the rules in line with market practices. From this point of view, the 
behaviour of national authorities is crucial. The problems to make partial 
restrictions work in practice speak in favour of two alternative policy options: 
(a) enforcing stricter disclosure of inducements or (b) ban inducements 





















A complete ban of inducements would eliminate the risk of bias induced 
by originators and probably bring more transparency to investors about the 
real costs of distribution. However, it may introduce significant side-effects 
that would need to be controlled for: 
o  Up-front charging may not be understood by less-sophisticated retail 
investors. Research suggests that between 20 to 30% of investors are 
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disproportionately averse to paying an up-front fee for advice (Charter et 
al., 2010, p. 10). The former is a credible threat to the level of 
participation of some retail investors in financial markets – it is uncertain 
however whether banks and other originators would start to demand a 
fee to advice investors about their own product ranges.  
o  The lack of inducements may discourage banks and other originators 
from offering products from competing providers, narrowing the scope 
of their services to the detriment of small investors.  
o  Independent advisers may not find sufficient economic incentives to 
serve individuals with few resources available to invest. Regulators 
would have to stimulate competition and the emergence of independent 
advice services for small investors, which may not be easy in practice. 
Moreover, independent it may not be economically viable to offer 
independent advice in certain geographical locations, such as rural areas. 
o  Adviser-charging would introduce other biases; for instance advisers 
may be inclined to sell more complex instruments, sell products that 
require ongoing services, or rotate portfolios to generate additional fees. 
These incentives may be addressed at least partially via suitability 
requirements and the unbundling of services.  
o  Given the current market structure of distribution in continental Europe, 
dominated by banks instead of third-party financial advisers, a sudden 
ban of inducements could result in disruptions to their service – as 
illustrated by the effects of recent reform in Australia. If regulators 
would wish to ban inducements, they should rather set a medium to 
long-term horizon, and design a (publicly available) road map structured 
in several phases for all players and all products.  
Disclosure is arguably a better policy alternative than banning 
inducements, at least in the short to medium term. The content and the form of 
the disclosure are however most relevant to ensure it is effective in practice: 
o  Empirical research has shown that investors have difficulties to 
understand how inducements may affect the independence of the service 
they are being provided (Charter et al., 2010, p. 9). Simply disclosing the 
existence of inducements is not sufficient to protect investors; they many 
need a short explanation of their potential impact on their interests. 
o  The presence of inducements is only one of the aspects that determine 
the nature of the advice. For disclosure to be complete, investors should 
also be informed about the range of products and providers considered 
by the adviser. 
o  Experience gathered in the fund management sector highlights that the 
format of the disclosure is important and that the content should be 124 | DISTRIBUTION: THE SINGLE MARKET, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CHOICE 
selective to get the key message across. Standardised disclosure in 
maximum two pages (similar to the KIID) should allow investors to 
understand the nature of the service provided more easily. It should also 
allow investors to compare different providers of advice. Ideally, the 
document would place the intermediary in a matrix according to its 
degree of independence and the comprehensiveness of its service, so that 
investors are made aware of the existence of services of a different 
nature. 
o  Hard disclosure would see investors being periodically informed about 
the costs of the services provided by distributors, whether paid up-front 
by the investor or in the form of inducements by the product originator. 
It is worth mentioning however that the impact of disclosing conflicts of 
interest is not straightforward. Empirical research has found that disclosure 
tends to result in better investment decisions when the interests of the advisor 
and the advisee are misaligned but to worse decisions when their interests are 
aligned (Charter et al., 2010, p. 9). 
(c)  Revisiting the duty to assess suitability. 
Beyond the nature of the service and its disclosure, the structure of the advice 
process also determines its quality. As noted above, MiFID requires advisers to 
carry-out an assessment of suitability before issuing a personal 
recommendation to a client. The recommendation issued needs to be suitable 
to the needs and characteristics of the client. To conduct this assessment, the 
firm has to gather information from the client. MiFID I requires firms to gather 
information in two respects: (a) his financial situation – income, assets, and 
regular financial commitments; and (b) his investment objectives – investment 
horizon, risk profile and purposes of the investment. There is enough empirical 
evidence that advisers do not collect sufficient information (Synovate, 2011; 
FSA, 2011a). There is also a great concern among supervisors that firms rely on 
poorly designed risk-profiling and allocation tools (ESMA, 2011b). Most 
worryingly a risk of misselling is derived from two aspects: (a) a significant 
share of advisers does not record the process of gathering information and 
assigning a profile to the investor and (b) most advisers do not inquire the 
ability of investors to financially bear the possible losses derived from the 
investment risk of the product recommended (Synovate, 2011; FSA, 2011a; 
ESMA, 2011). Supervisors should endeavour to raise the standards of 
information collection and recording. 
MiFID I defines suitable investment as one which (a) meets the 
investment objectives of the investor; (b) is such that the client is able 
financially to bear any related investment risks; and (c) is such that the client RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 125 
has the necessary experience and knowledge to understand the risks 
involved.174 As argued before, the assessment of suitability is meant to avoid 
the risk of (gross) misselling – that is selling a product to the investor that may 
put his financial situation at risk. By way of contrast, it is argued that the 
current definition of suitability in MiFID I does not require the adviser to select 
the best product of its class for the investor. Otherwise advisers would be 
explicitly required to: (a) consider a wide range of product types and 
originators; and (b) compare the fees and costs embedded in each product to 
select the less expensive alternative to the investor. Therefore, the current 
definition of suitability would allow advisers to recommend the product that is 
most suitable for the investor among the range of products offered by the firm 
(as long as there is no misselling), even if the adviser is aware that other firms 
offer products that are more suitable for the client. It follows that informing the 
client about the nature and the scope of the advice (independent and 
comprehensive or non-independent and restricted) would significantly 
increase investor protection.  
(d)  Addressing the professional aptitudes of advisers. 
As a final element in this discussion, it is worth noting that the quality of 
advice also depends on the professional aptitudes of advisers. In effect, 
advisers need to be trained in the process of providing advice and be able to 
understand and respond to the needs and characteristics of the client. Even 
more relevant is their ability to fully understand the risks embedded in the 
financial products they sell, given the increasing level of complexity of 
financial innovation. Unfortunately, research has shown that many financial 
advisers do not understand the risks embedded even in relatively non-complex 
products (FSA, 2011b). In the framework of its retail distribution review (RDR), 
the UK has introduced continuous professional development programs and 
raised the level of the professional qualifications advisers should hold to enter 
the profession (see box x). The European Commission should consider whether 
EU rules would be an appropriate incentive for other national authorities to 
follow a similar approach. Lax supervisory cooperation of the kind proposed 
b y  E S M A  m a y  n o t  w o r k  i n  p r a c t i c e  ( E S M A ,  2 0 1 1 b ) .  A n  i n t e g r a t e d  m a r k e t  
demands closer approximation of the training and competences required from 
investment advisers. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the failures found in the market for advice demand a 
comprehensive reform of the regulatory framework. Investors cannot rely on 
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suitability alone to ensure they purchase best-in-class products. Policy makers 
and regulators should not concentrate their attention on inducements only but 
also on the scope, transparency and quality of the advice. Intermediaries who 
only consider a narrow range of products are unlikely to select the best 
solution for the investor. Acting at the level of inducements would not on its 
own broaden the scope of advice, which should anyway be disclosed to 
investors. The standard of disclosure needs to be sufficiently high so that 
investors understand the nature of the advice given and the availability of 
alternative solutions which may suit their needs better. Investors should also 
be informed about the costs of the services provided by distributors, whether 
paid up-front or in the form of inducements by product originators. Moreover, 
regulators should reduce the opportunities to arbitrage the assessment of 
suitability and find a common European approach to raise the professional 
aptitudes of advisers. 
 
Box 7. The reform of investment advice proposed by the European Commission 
In  2011  the  European  Commission  proposed  a  reform  of  the  markets  in  financial 
instruments  directive  (MiFID).  With  regard  to  investment  advice,  the  Commission 
proposed to introduce a new legal category of advice called ‘independent’ that would 




firms  would  have  to  inform  clients  about  the  nature  of  the  advice  provided:  (a) 
whether the advice is provided on an independent basis; (b) whether it is based on a 
broad or on a more restricted analysis of the market; and (c) whether the investment 




advisers.  The  main  risk  to  the  success  of  the  current  proposal  is  that  third  party 




‘independent’  advice  would  undermine  the  competitive  position  of  third  party 
advisers  in  favour  of  banks  and  insurers.  To  avoid  these  pervasive  effects,  which 
would completely cancel the objectives of the reform, the emphasis should be placed 
on the effective disclosure to investors of the nature and scope of advice, as well as its 
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in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  so‐called  retail  distribution  review  (RDR).  The  review 
covered five areas: (a) the sustainability of the distribution sector; (b) the impact of 
incentives;  (c)  professionalism  and  reputation;  (d)  consumer  access  to  financial 
products and services; and (e) regulatory barriers and enablers (FSA, 2007, p. 13). 
Based on consultation with stakeholders, the FSA identified three priorities in 2009: 





















clients  as  such.  The  difference  does  not  strive  on  the  presence  of  inducements, 
forbidden  in  either  case,  but  on  the  range  of  financial  instruments  considered. 











the  word  restricted  to  label  non‐independent  advice  is  the  result  of  consumer 
research carried out on behalf of the FSA to find the most effective alternative to 
communicate to customers the nature of the advice given.  
























of  professional  standing  (SPS)  awarded  by  an  accredited  body.  The  SPS  will  be 
renewed annually and will notably identify the adviser and verify its qualifications. The 
RDR improves the robustness of the qualifications that advisers need to hold to be 
                                                        

















































                                                        
178 By way of contrast, the number of third-party financial advisors in continental Europe 
nears just 20,000 (European Commission, 2011c, p. 257). 
179 Original Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID recast). 
180 See, however, Article 26 Directive 2006/73/EC (MiFID implementation) and discussion 






4.2.3  Regulatory reform: preserving and enhancing investor choice 
Investor choice is an element of investor protection that does not receive 
sufficient attention, in spite of its importance. Investors need to have the ability 
to access the range of products they need to channel their savings in the most 
propitious and effective way to meet their investment objectives. Under 
strained economic conditions, falling wages and contracting public finances, 
the importance of investor choice cannot be sufficiently stressed in particular 
where it comes to long-term savings. Regulators should endeavour to better 
understand investor choice under appropriate safeguards. This section will 
consider first retail investors and later professional ones. 
4.2.3.1  Enhancing investor choice: retail investors 
Regulation pays a pivotal role in fostering the participation of retail investors 
in financial markets. In the field of asset management, EU rule-making has 
focused so far almost exclusively on a subset of open-ended funds under the 
UCITS regulatory framework. Other fund categories have not been 
harmonised so far, despite their track-record in some member states. This 
section considers four broad categories of investment funds that may merit 
regulatory action to foster access by retail investors: 
(a)  Illiquid funds 
UCITS rules impose strict liquidity requirements to allow investors to exit the 
fund at any given point in time. For this purpose, eligible assets are limited to 
liquid instruments, which have low transactions costs and bid-ask spreads 
assets, and can therefore can be sold with low friction. A stream of academic 
literature finds evidence that liquid instruments involve an opportunity cost 
for those investing to satisfy consumption needs in the long-term. In a 2010 
study presented to this task force, Amenc and Sender review the literature on 
the premium associated to illiquidity and find evidence of its significance RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 131 
(EDHEC-Risk, 2010b).181 While most UCITS funds can be used in long-term 
investing, investors may benefit from combining UCITS with investments in 
less liquid asset classes. Chapter 5 considers long-term investing in greater 
detail and proposes the introduction of a new category of illiquid retail 
investment funds in Europe. 
The level of liquidity of a given investment fund depends both on its 
underlying assets and the redemption policy applicable to its units, as 
advertised to investors. To avoid mismatches, redemption policies should be 
broadly in line with the liquidity of the underlying assets and strategies. In this 
respect, some industry participants fear that a small number of UCITS may not 
be as liquid as investors would expect. Illiquid products are legitimate but they 
need be marketed to investors under correct assumptions. The introduction of 
a harmonised category of illiquid funds would probably help preserve the 
UCITS brand from such intrusions.  
(b)  Real estate funds 
Open-ended real estate funds (OERE funds) are an interesting example of 
alternative funds with a track-record in being sold to retail investors. Over ten 
member states have national rules for OERE funds but no harmonised regime 
exists in Europe. Despite the absence of EU-wide market access, assets under 
management in OERE funds exceed €1 trillion (BVI Investment Statistics). 
These funds offer retail investors the possibility to access illiquid investments 
in real estate assets under risk spreading rules, borrowing limits, liquidity and 
redemption requirements. They can serve retail investors to diversify their 
portfolios and to channel part of their long-term savings. Some concerns are 
raised about liquidity transformation by these funds which can  render 
redemptions difficult under stressed market circumstances —as shown by past 
experiences (Bannier, Fecht, & Tyrell, 2007). Concerns have brought national 
regulators to limit redemptions by imposing mandatory holding periods and 
notice requirements.182 The national markets for open-ended retail funds are 
mature, which points in favour of their harmonisation via a single product 
regulation, possibly within a broader framework that would also cover other 
retail illiquid funds, for example. 
                                                        
181 Amihud (2009), Mendelson et al. (2005), Aragon (2004) and Loderer et al. (2003) in Amenc 
and Sender / EDHEC-Risk (2010b). 
182 See for instance as in the German Investors Protection and Functionality Improvement 
Act of 11 February 2011. It imposes a 12 month notice period for existing and new investors 
and a 24 month holding period for new investors for withdrawals of more than €30,000 per 
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(c)  Hedge funds 
As with open-ended real state funds, retail investor may benefit from accessing 
other alternative assets and strategies. Access to hedge-fund-style vehicles is 
subject to different national approaches. Member states usually require hedge 
funds to be nationally registered in order to be sold to retail investors, and 
impose minimum ‘entry’ tickets and investor wealth thresholds (PwC, 2008b). 
However, the use of wrappers to arbitrage national limits to the marketing of 
hedge funds to retail investors is widely acknowledged.183 The most popular 
ways of accessing hedge funds by retail investors are funds of funds, listed 
close-ended funds and structured notes or delta one certificates (AIEG - 
Alternative Investment Expert Group, 2006). Diversification in funds of funds 
may reduce the risk of investing in individual hedge funds. However, some 
subsectors of the industry still need to improve their transparency and 
governance – both offshore and nationally-regulated vehicles.184 The AIFM 
directive is expected to improve transparency and governance substantially 
but its standards are aimed at professional investors. Retail investors would 
need a further layer of protection in some regards, such as standardised and 
comparable disclosure. In effect, the lack of investor education and selling 
expertise remain key obstacles since they result in a high risk of 
misunderstanding by investors or outright misselling. The KIID represents a 
good benchmark for pre-contractual disclosure but may be difficult to adapt to 
represent the risks embedded in more exotic assets and strategies – it is hoped 
the PRIPS initiative would bring progress in this regard. The lack of selling 
expertise on its turn may only be tackled by raising professional standards and 
qualifications. It appears therefore that, while retail investors may benefit from 
hedge-fund-like vehicles, important barriers to an adequate level of investor 
protection remain.  
(d)  Responsible funds 
                                                        
183 “Well-intentioned national measures merely succeed in pushing investors to obtain 
hedge fund access through other means, such as acquiring hedge fund exposure through 
structured products, shares in closed- end funds or investing offshore”, Alternative 
Investment Expert Group – AIEG (2006). 
184 See for instance the case of the Arch Cru hedge funds in the UK. According to the 
Financial Times, the funds raised around GBP 422m from over 10,000 retail investors via 900 
financial advisors in the UK. The funds were suspended in 2009 and it became clear they 
had failed in late 2011. The funds were UK domiciled and regulated, however they were 
invested in cells listed offshore and manage in this way to arbitrage UK rules. See ‘Call for 
inquiry after losses at Arch Cru’ in Financial Times Fund Management (FTfm), 15 January 
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Socially responsible funds satisfy specific investor demand for investing in 
specific sectors, such as green power, or in companies respecting employment, 
social and environmental standards. Currently, retail investors directly hold 
less than 10% of the assets under management by SRI funds in Europe (Eurosif, 
2010). Yet, the potential for growth is elicited by the participation shares of 
retail investors in countries such as France and Germany – over 35 and 40% 
respectively (Eurosif, 2010). Contrary to some perceptions, SRI returns appear 
to be broadly in line with markets (Mercer, 2009). The challenge is instead to 
ensure the integrity of SRI funds with regard to the goals they purport to seek, 
while fostering the single market. The current approach based sometimes on 
national rules but mostly on self-regulation may be insufficient in this respect. 
Retail investors may therefore benefit from regulatory action at European level. 
Chapter 5 considers responsible investing in greater detail.  
4.2.3.2  Preserving investor choice: Professional investors 
Subject to prudential rules, professional investors face fewer restrictions to 
access alternative investment funds than retail investors. The AIFMD will 
create a pan-European market for non-UCITS funds, thereby expanding 
substantially the choice of professional investors. National rules limiting the 
access of institutional investors to locally-regulated funds185 will need to be 
removed to the extent that the AIFMD prohibits any discrimination against 
fellow AIFs coming from other member states. By advancing the convergence 
between traditional and alternative asset managers, the AIFMD discredits the 
use of nominal distinctions in prudential regulation. Capital and solvency 
charges should apply instead according to the underlying of each fund, as long 
as the manager complies with the AIFMD or equivalent standards. This is the 
principle followed for instance by Solvency II when it disapplies punitive 
capital charges for funds offering full look-through into their underlying.186  
A crucial question for investor choice is the limits that should be 
imposed on non-EU funds handled by managers who do not comply with the 
standards in the AIFMD. To avoid the risk of significantly curtailing investor 
choice, national private placement regimes for offshore funds will not be 
superseded by the AIFMD immediately but will coexist for some time. The 
directive will allow offshore funds to be marketed to professional investors 
under existing national rules at least until 2018. During this transitional period, 
non-EU managers will not be bound by the directive unless they wish to be 
granted its passport, in which case they will need to comply with most of its 
                                                        
185 See EDHEC-Risk (2010b) and Alternative Investment Expert Group – AIEG (2006). 
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provisions.187 However, from 2013 any manager marketing its funds in Europe 
will have to abide by the transparency provisions in the AIFMD, given their 
importance to enable effective due diligence and monitoring by investors.188 
In the case of reverse solicitation, managers will not even have to comply 
with the transparency obligations in the AIMFD. Where foreign funds offer a 
degree of transparency comparable to EU funds, reverse solicitation is a useful 
instrument to protect investor choice. The responsibility falls on the investor 
not to access opaque funds where meaningful due diligence is impracticable. 
In this respect, policy makers should speed-up its work to heighten the due 
diligence requirements where funds are accessed through reverse solicitation, 
as proposed in the preamble of the AIFMD. Moreover, prudential rules may be 
a useful instrument to limit the ability of institutional investors to access 
opaque funds, for instance through the application of punitive capital charges 
in a fashion similar to Solvency II but mindful of investor choice. A future 
review of the AIFMD should consider the extent to which reverse solicitation is 
used (if at all) to circumvent the transparency requirements in the directive, 
given their importance for investor protection and ultimately for financial 
stability.  
Limits to the choice of professional investors are also imposed to ensure 
financial stability oversight. The directive prescribes that no AIF may be 
marketed in the European Union unless the home supervisor signs a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) that allows the host member state to 
receive all information material to monitor macro-prudential risks.189 This 
provision will apply even for AIFs marketed under national placement 
regimes. While the directive dictates that the agreement is entered between 
national supervisors, for practical reasons ESMA should lead the negotiations 
so that a single model is simultaneously signed by all member states with each 
relevant third country.190 Ultimately, the EU would need a single supervisor 
with exclusive powers to deal with third country issues such as these. 
A related threat to investor choice is the international fragmentation of 
asset management regulation. Despite the AIFMD implementing a G20 
consensus, it is not fully in line with the legislation adopted elsewhere, such as 
the US under the Dodd-Franck Act. More worryingly, many other jurisdictions 
have not taken any steps to regulate alternative investment managers so far. 
The directive would nevertheless need to apply to all funds marketed in the 
                                                        
187 Articles 37-40, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
188 Article 42, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
189 Article 42, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
190 Box 122, ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation, AIMFD) RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 135 
EU regardless of their geographical origin if it is to attain its objectives. In a 
world of free capital flows, managers will otherwise move jurisdictions to 
avoid complying with the directive. Attempting to apply the AIFMD to 
offshore managers may however reduce investor choice dramatically so the 
process should be handled with care. The AIFMD foresees that ESMA 
undertakes, before phasing-out national private placement regimes, an in-
depth review on the possible effects of this change on investor choice in the 
EU.191  
Offshore managers will only be granted the AIFMD passport if they 
comply with most of the provisions in the directive and if their jurisdictions of 
origin engage in supervisory and tax cooperation to a very high standard – 
including for instance the possibility of on-site inspections at the request of the 
EU authorities.192 Poor levels of commitment by foreign supervisors would 
make the full application of the AIFMD to non-EU managers impracticable, 
with substantial limitations in terms of investor choice. In such circumstances 
two alternative options would emerge: (a) keeping national private placement 
regimes alive together with the passport, which would limit the single market 
but afford some protection to local managers; (b) substitute private placement 
regimes by a workable passport for offshore funds, which would consolidate 
the single market but, if the rules are too lenient, would remove one of the few 
i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  m a n a g e r s  t o  s t a y  o r  c o m e  b a c k  o n s h o r e .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  i n v e s t o r  
choice will determine the success of the passport as investor demand may shift 
from unregulated into AIFMD compliant funds. 
In sum, the AIFMD passport will greatly expand the choice of 
professional investors by creating a single market for EU AIFs and AIF 
managers. Where it comes to non-EU funds the situation will be somewhat 
different: In a first phase (from July 2013) the directive will limit investor 
c h o i c e  t o  m a n a g e r s  w h o  c o m p l y  w i t h  the transparency obligations in the 
directive and are domiciled in a jurisdiction willing to commit to supervisory 
cooperation for the purpose of prudential oversight. In a final phase (probably 
from 2018) investor choice would be limited to managers who comply with 
most of the provisions in the AIFMD and are domiciled in jurisdictions that 
engage in broad supervisory and tax cooperation with the EU. This final phase 
has not fixed date of entry into force and is full of uncertainties still. The 
success of the EU passport will depend on the willingness of offshore funds to 
comply with the directive to gain direct access to European investors. The 
process will be mostly demand driven and has a chance of being successful if 
                                                        
191 Article 68, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
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institutional investors continue to favour regulated over unregulated 
investments. The success or failure will also depend on the ability of EU 
authorities to speak with one voice in the negotiation of supervisory and tax 
agreements with third countries. Overall the process should be carefully 
managed to protect (informed) investor choice. Reverse solicitation will allow 
marginal relief but should be carefully monitored to avoid the arbitrage of the 
transparency obligations in the directive. The process of implementing the 
AIFMD is not over at the time of writing and the advice of ESMA reflected in 
this section may be modified by the European Commission. 
 
Box 9. Limits to investor choice imposed by depositary rules in the AIFMD 














to  prudential  regulation,  minimum  capital  requirements,  supervision,  and  periodic 
audit;  and  (b)  segregate  the  assets  of  its  clients  from  its  own  assets  in  a  manner 
equivalent  to  the  safe‐keeping  duties  in  the  directive.
194  These  requisites  would 





195  It  is  worth  noting  in  this  respect  that  no  transfer  of  liability  will  be 
                                                        
193 Articles 21.11 and 21.12, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD).  
194 Article 21.11.d, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). 
195 Article 21.11, second paragraph, Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD). To transfer liability 
there needs to be valid delegation of tasks as a pre-condition. Only the custody of financial 
instruments and the safe-keeping of other assets may be delegated (monitoring of cash flows 
and ancillary tasks may not). The main depositary will have to demonstrate the existence of 
an objective reason for this delegation. Liability is transferred via a written contract that 
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effective in practice unless the conditions for delegation are not fulfilled to begin with 
(see Figure 19). 












bring  the  main  depositary  to  object  to  servicing  such  assets.  If  the  manager 
understands  that  it  is  in  the  best  interest  of  investors  to  maintain  the  given 
investment,  he  may  authorise  the  transfer  of  liability  to  the  local  sub‐custodian. 
Crucially, investors will need to be duly notified of the manager’s decision and his or 
her  assessment.  By  allowing  liability  to  be  transferred  under  these  conditions,  the 





                                                                                                                                             
needs to expressly allow direct action by the manager against the subcustodian. The main 
depositary will also have to demonstrate the existence of an objective reason for this 
transfer. Where local entity does not satisfy the general requirements for delegation, the 
depositary may still delegate safe-keeping to a local entity, as long as the law of the third 
country requires local custody, the AIF manager authorises it and investors are duly 
informed. Additional conditions apply to the transfer of liability to this local entity, namely; 
the fund rules need to allow for such a transfer and investors need to be informed prior to 
their investment.  
196 Box 65, ESMA 2011/379 (technical advice, implementation, AIMFD). Article 21.11.b, 




























































5.  NOURISHING THE REAL ECONOMY: 
TODAY AND TOMORROW 
he asset management industry accounts for about €14 trillion in assets 
under management in Europe (EFAMA, 2011a). Beyond the sheer size of 
this number lies a significant contribution to the financing of companies 
and governments in Europe that is not apparent forthrightly and is seldom 
referred to. This final chapter will consider the participation of investment 
funds and investment mandates in equity and debt securities, next to the share 
of other intermediaries to better illustrate the position of asset managers. In 
addition, the chapter will explore the role of long-term investing, responsible 
investing and venture capital in fostering economic growth and prosperity in 
Europe. In the pursuit of deeper and broader capital markets in Europe, the 
asset management industry has an increasingly important role to play in 
providing finance to the real economy.  
5.1  The contribution of asset management to the economy 
The European asset management industry plays a significant role in financing 
the European economy. Investment funds are estimated to hold approximately 
13% of debt securities issues by residents in the euro-area, and over 16% of 
listed shares. If investment mandates are taken into account, the large majority 
of which are managed on behalf of institutional investors such as insurance 
companies or pension funds, the participation of the European asset managers 
would probably near 25% in debt securities and 30% of listed shares in the 
euro-area (EFAMA, 2011a, p. 40, based on ECB data). 
The relative size of asset management intermediation, in comparison to 
pension funds and insurance companies, has increased dramatically over the 
past two decades. Investment funds accounted for 40% of the assets under 
management by these three intermediaries globally in 2009, up from 25% in 
1995 (IMF, 2011, p. 5). This sizeable increase in the importance of the asset 
management industry (up by 40%) was accompanied by a reduction of 
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respectively 19% and 11% in the assets under management by pension funds 
and insurance companies over the same period. The change may be attributed 
at least partly to the move from defined benefit to defined contribution pension 
schemes, initially in the US and later in Europe. While these data refers solely 
to investment funds and does not include investment mandates it also reflects, 
albeit partially, the increasing externalisation of portfolio management by 




A study by Fitch Ratings in 2011 offers the most complete picture so far 
of asset allocation in Europe. According to this study, assets under 
management by long-term investment funds amounted in 2010 to 
approximately 43% of GDP in Europe. In effect, the economic significance of 
investment funds is positioned above that of insurance companies in Europe, 
which total investments amounted in 2010 to 37% of GDP (48% including unit-
linked insurance products). The size of investment funds is also well above 
that of pension funds in Europe, which total investments amounted to just 24% 
of European GDP in 2010, although the differences among member states are 
very significant – pension funds account from 134% of GDP in the Netherlands 
to 14% in Germany (Fitch Ratings, 2011b, p. 4). 
In terms of asset allocation, the study by Fitch shows that asset managers 
are the largest investors in non-debt securities, including listed equity. In 
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securities in 2010, well above pension funds and insurers.197 Approximately 
63% of this figure is estimated to be invested in listed securities (€2.3 trillion) 
(OEE, 2011, p. 36). In relative terms, investment funds allocate 60% of their 
assets to non-debt securities, similarly to pension funds (55%) but well above 
insurers (25%). Conversely, insurers are the biggest investors in debt securities, 








The picture for investment mandates is similar to that of investment 
funds. European asset managers were estimated to hold €1.9 trillion in equity 
and EU 3,3 trillion in debt instruments under discretionary mandates in 2009, 
most of which managed on behalf of institutional investors (OEE, 2011, p. 36). 
The sheer size of these figures is revealed by comparing them to the total 
investments by insurers and pension funds in the figure above (€8.4 trillion). 
What is then the direct share of participation of the asset management 
industry in securities issued by corporations and governments in Europe? A 
2011 study by the Observatoire de l’Epargne Européenne shows that 
                                                        
197 Long-term investment funds include UCITS and other open-ended investment funds, 
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approximately 49% of investment funds allocation to equity in Europe goes to 
shares issued by European companies, in contrast with 64% in investment 
mandates. The difference may be well explained by the higher allocation to 
emerging markets in investment funds and the conservative risk profile of the 
institutional investors in most investment mandates. An IMF study on the 
factors determining private asset allocation reveals that the long-term growth 
prospects in destination countries is the main pull factor for investors (IMF, 
2011, p. 13). In this respect, faltering growth prospects in Europe may well leas 
to a decrease in the allocation to local issuers in the next few years. In effect, 
investors increasingly see emerging market securities as a potential source of 
higher returns and are giving them more weight in their portfolios (IMF, 2011, 
p. 20). Unresolved liquidity and policy risks however continue to discourage 
investors wishing to invest outside the OECD. In contrast with equity, there 
are no differences in the weight of European debt securities between 





Other subsectors of the asset management industry also contribute 
significantly to the financing of the European economy. The collection of data 
outside harmonised investment funds in Europe has so far no followed a 
consistent approach. The introduction of the AIFMD, given the extensive 
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bring full light to the contribution of the whole asset management industry to 
the economy. Alternative managers frequently invest in assets that are less 
correlated to traditional equity and debt securities. An area where sufficient 
data collection exists is the private equity and venture capital industry. Despite 
the industry having very much suffered the financial crisis, after having grown 
significantly immediately before, in 2010 it represented €43 billion in 
investments in non-listed equity. According to industry statistics, over 70% of 
this amount was invested in European businesses and almost 50% in small and 





Taken as a whole, the contribution of the asset management industry to 
the financing or European businesses and governments is very significant. 
Moreover, tighter regulatory standards imposed on other intermediaries for 
financial stability purposes mean that asset management will play an 
increasingly important role in the future to finance the economy and channel 
savings towards productive activities. Yet, the asset management industry still 
needs to overcome come concerns, including the impact of management and 
performance fees on the returns that are ultimately delivered to investors, or 
the potential contribution to volatility and pro-cyclicality of some investment 
practices.  
The positive impact of asset management is magnified by best practices 
such as long-term and sustainable investing, which will be considered in the 
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capital play a key role in fostering entrepreneurship and innovation in 
knowledge based economies. 
5.2  Long-term investment 
‘Long-term investors have the ability to create investments, rather than look for 
assets in the market and invest in them’ (WEF, 2011, p. 44). 
The asset management industry offers product solutions that can be employed 
in long-term investing. The World Economic Forum defines long-term investing 
as ‘investing with the expectation of holding an asset through an entire 
business cycle by an investor with the capability to do so’ (WEF, 2011, p. 11). It 
is not so much an investment style as an approach that may employ a variety 
of strategies based on both liquid and illiquid instruments. Asset classes such 
as unlisted equity, real estate or infrastructure require a long-term approach to 
investing given their illiquid nature. Yet, relatively liquid instruments may also 
be an integral part of long-term investing strategies, typically in combination 
with more illiquid asset classes. The asset management industry offers a choice 
of products with different levels of liquidity, from the less liquid (private 
equity, venture capital or infrastructure funds) to the more liquid (hedge, 
commodity or mutual funds).  
Long-term investing is essential for the economy since it directs resources 
towards those activities which pattern of returns is more skewed towards the 
long-term and therefore cannot be undertaken under short-term financing 
constraints. Activities such as innovation, research and development or 
infrastructure development are frequently characterised by the uncertainty of 
their short-term profitability but also by their potential to generate outsized 
returns in the long-run and their many positive externalities. Investing long-
term is in line with the horizon of the liabilities borne by some investors such 
as the provision of retirement income and others. However, its positive 
externalities benefit society in general by driving supporting economic growth 
and competitiveness (OECD, 2011). Moreover, long-term investors are 
supposed to contribute positively to financial stability to the extent that they 
behave counter-cyclically in times of market stress, by holding to their 
investments, avoiding fire-sales and profiting from falling prices to increase 
their strategic stakes (WEF, 2011).  
The potential benefits of long-term investing do not impinge on the 
importance of short-term investors for the good functioning of financial 
markets. In effect, short-term investors fulfil an essential role in providing 
market liquidity and monitoring corporate performance at ever shorter 
frequencies. They also contribute to price formation by immediately feeding 
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of their investment positions, short-term investors will naturally give more 
weight to information referring to short-term rather than long-term 
performance. Long-term investors provide a counterweight by focusing on the 
developments that affect performance in the long-term – yet they remain 
sensitive to short-term drops in asset prices given constraints such as mark-to-
market accounting. The divide between short and long-term investing is a 
question of balance rather than anything else. 
Beyond macro considerations, investing long-term also carries potential 
benefits for the individual investors. As mentioned before, long-term 
investment strategies are usually the best fit for investors facing liabilities in 
the long-term. But investors may derive additional benefits from long-term 
investing such as: (a) accessing structural risk premia associated with the 
illiquidity, market risk or complexity of long-term investment opportunities; 
(b) taking advantage of emerging trends that will materialise in the future; (c) 
engaging with corporates to improve long-term performance; or (d) 
minimising the costs associated with transactions and market disturbances 
(WEF, 2011, p. 35). For all these reasons both retail and institutional investors 
should be able to access long-term investment opportunities. 
The asset management industry offers a range of products with a long-
term orientation, both in the form of funds and tailored solutions for 
institutional investors. Direct investments in infrastructure, private equity and 
venture capital may be administered by independent asset managers on behalf 
of institutional investors under investment mandates. These investments 
(given their size, illiquidity and return pattern) may only be undertaken by 
investors with sufficient resources both to fund the initial outlay and maintain 
their position over many years. Investors who are unable or unwilling to make 
this sort of commitment may access illiquid asset classes via fund products, 
offering more liquidity and the opportunity to pool resources with other 
investors. Funds investing in unlisted equity, infrastructure and real state are 
instruments that fit well in a long-term investment strategy (WEF, 2011, p. 14). 
Traditional open-ended investment funds (such as UCITS and mutual funds) 
may also be employed by investors in the framework of long-term investing. 
These latter funds invest in liquid instruments such as public equity and debt 
securities, allowing investors to redeem their units frequently and at short 
notice. Despite their liquidity, traditional open-ended investment funds may 
be held over the long-term to access some of the benefits of long-term investing 
described above. Yet, fund instruments are investing in more illiquid asset 
classes are better positioned to capture these benefits. The optimal combination 
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adjusted capital charges are higher for equity than for high-grade 
corporate bonds under the Solvency II framework. Mark-to-market 
accounting also undermines the ability of institutional investors to hold 
to their investments in stress market circumstances. 
In order to address these concerns, action is required both at industry 
and regulatory level. Asset managers and trade associations should endeavour 
to better understand how agency conflicts affect their fiduciary duty towards 
long-term investors. Remuneration, benchmarks and risk metrics should be 
revised to better factor the interests of investors. To avoid clients fleeing long-
term funds in times of market stress, the strategy of the fund should be better 
communicated, as well as any exceptional limits to redemptions. Where it 
comes to retail investors, regulators should facilitate their access to illiquid 
funds for their long-term and retirement savings. Harmonised product rules 
could be used to introduce a new category of retail funds in the EU that would 
invest in long-term financial instruments and real assets. Standardised 
disclosure and investment advice should give more relevance to investment 
horizons, while suitability requirements should be reinforced for illiquid 
products. With regard to institutional investors, regulators should re-consider 
prudential and accounting rules to ensure they promote rather than hinder 
long-term investing. Ideally, every legislative initiative would be screened from 
this perspective, in isolation and from the point of view of its cumulative 
impact. 
 
Box 10. A proposal to introduce long‐term retail funds (LTRFs) 




For  this  purpose,  eligible  assets  are  limited  to  liquid  instruments  (transferable 
securities), which given their low transactions costs and bid‐ask spreads, can be easily 
sold  to  meet  redemptions.  Proponents  of  a  regulated  LTRF  consider  that  retail 
investors  should  be  given  the  opportunity  of  investing  in  long‐term  financial 























o  Adequate  instruments  to  manage  redemptions  in  exceptional  market 
circumstances. 
Management and product provisions should be complemented with specific 
marketing  rules  aimed  at  expressly  communicating  to  investors  the  long‐term 
orientation of LTRFs and the pros and cons of illiquidity and limits to redemptions. 
Suitability requirements in investment advice would need to be revised to ensure 
LTRFs  are  sold  to  investors  where  they  are  in  line  with  their  individual  profile, 






5.3  Sustainable investing 
The asset management industry has the ability to offer products and services 
that cater for specific environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals. 
Sustainable or responsible investing may be broadly defined as any investment 
process that combines financial objectives with the consideration of 
environmental, social and/or governance criteria (Eurosif, 2010, p. 8). ESG 
considerations may be implemented in investment processes and in the 
exercise of voting rights attached to securities in the pursuit of different 
objectives that, despite their diverse nature, are frequently complementary in 
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(a)  Promoting ethical objectives (ex: excluding the defence industry). 
(b)  Promoting international standards and conventions (ex: human and 
children rights, international labour standards). 
(c)  Minimising certain risks (ex: liability arising from environmental 
damage). 
(d)  Profiting from macro-trends in specific subsectors (ex: investing in 
renewable energies). 
(e)  Proactively seeking to translate ESG factors into financial gains (ex: 
building stable relationships with stakeholders to raise productivity and 
gain a competitive advantage). 
Investors may employ ESG criteria to screen and select investment 
opportunities, either negatively or positively. Negative screening is used to 
exclude companies or sectors that do not comply with selected ESG 
requirements, while positive screening is used to find the companies that 
exhibit the best performance with regard to a set of ESG parameters (best-in-
class and best-of-sector approaches). Financial analysis increasingly considers 
ESG performance indicators next to traditional financial indicators to gain a 
better understanding of the risk-return profile in equity and debt securities 
issued by profit-oriented companies.198 Once an investment commitment has 
been made, responsible investors will engage in corporate decision-making to 
promote ESG criteria in line with their goals, whether ethical or profit-oriented. 
Ethics aside, the World Economic Forum defines sustainable investing as 
‘an investment approach that integrates ESG criteria into investment and 
ownership decision-making with the objective of generating superior risk-
adjusted financial returns’ (WEF, 2011b, p. 10). The word sustainable is 
preferred to responsible to emphasise that ESG factors are not only ethical 
considerations but can be translated into business practices with the potential 
to deliver higher returns to investors, at least over the longer-term. Several 
studies have shown that sustainable  investment performs in line with 
traditional benchmarks if not better, and shows better resilience in periods of 
crisis. The consultancy firm Mercer surveyed in 2007 and 2009 the academic 
literature studying the performance of responsible investment strategies and 
                                                        
198 See for instance the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for ESG 3.0 developed in 2010 by 
the European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS) and the Society of 
Investment Professionals in Germany (DVFA). KPIs are standardised sets of quantitative 
indicators for ESG in 114 subsectors based on the Dow Jones Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB). They are used to measure the ESG performance of profit-oriented 
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found that 20 out of 36 studies showed clear evidence of a positive relationship 
between ESG criteria and financial performance, while only three studies 
found a clearly negative relationship (Mercer, 2009).  
According to Eurosif (2010, p. 8), responsible investment may have 
reached €5 trillion assets under management in Europe in 2009. Yet, this figure 
includes investment funds and investment mandates with very different 
approaches to ESG criteria. One of the key challenges is to identify and clarify 
these different approaches and measure the performance of funds and 
mandates not only in financial terms but also with reference to the consecution 
of the ESG goals they purport to seek. Better defining the many different 
approaches to responsible investment would require considering both the goals 
pursued and the processes followed in selecting investments and exercising 
voting rights. Moreover, increasing investor participation would necessitate 
better tools to measure the success of managers in applying responsible 
investing processes to generate positive financial returns (through the 
consecution of ESG objectives). Otherwise stated, better reporting is needed to 
allow more effective monitoring and increase the confidence of investors in the 
integrity of responsible investing. While much has been achieved in this respect, 
the progress so far has not led to the emergence of universally acceptable 
standards. In this regard, it is worth noting the ongoing work of the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) to develop a global 
framework for integrated reporting. And the work of other private 
organisations, such as Novethic and Luxflag, to create quality labels for 
responsible funds that go well beyond assessing the level of transparency of the 
given fund. 
Institutional investors are estimated to hold over 90% of the assets under 
management in responsible investment schemes in Europe (Eurosif, 2010, p. 16). 
The weight of institutional investors is very much explained by the importance 
given to ESG criteria by pension funds, to which several member states apply 
regulatory requirements in this respect. By way of contrast, retail investors 
hold directly less than 10% of responsible assets in Europe. Yet, the small overall 
figure should not hide the latent retail demand for responsible investment funds 
proven by the success they have gathered in some member states such as 
Germany, France or Belgium (Eurosif, 2010, p. 18). In this respect, a 
harmonised approach to responsible investment funds for retail investors 
would be greatly beneficial in Europe. 
The European Commission has not scheduled so far a broad legislative 
action in the area of responsible or sustainable investing. It has however put 
forward an agenda to modernise company law and the framework of corporate 
governance in Europe (EC, 2010; EC, 2011; EC, 2012). While these initiatives do 
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5.4  Venture capital 
Venture capital invests in equity or quasi-equity instruments from small and 
medium enterprises with a high growth potential. It intervenes early in the 
product or business cycle by providing seed funding and/or expansion capital. 
As it invests in innovative ideas that may not necessarily succeed, venture 
capital is high risk. The logic behind it is that under careful selection and 
experienced management the profits realised by successful projects are likely 
to exceed the costs of financing the projects that failed. Moreover, venture 
capital does not solely provide funding but also specialised advice and 
assistance to entrepreneurs in highly specialised areas such as biotechnology, 
health or sophisticated IT. When the product or business model reaches a 
critical stage of development, the fund will sell its equity investment and 
channel the principal towards new opportunities.  
Venture capital can be very profitable where manager experience meets 
sufficient investor appetite and an attractive pool of investment opportunities. 
At the same time, venture capital benefits society and the wider economy by 
facilitating innovation, productivity and growth. Positive externalities are 
numerous and include increased expenditure in research and development, 
cluster formation, and job creation (EC, 2007, page 1). Venture capital invests in 
projects where traditional banking does not given a lack of sufficient expertise, 
risk-awareness or prudential requirements. It also finances ideas that threaten 
established products and services, and therefore would not be financed by 
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established companies. Crucially, it is long-term investing that takes on 
average five to eight years to mature, that is, before the equity investment can 
be sold either privately of publicly. 
Venture capital in Europe suffers from a problem in terms of size and 
performance. In effect, venture capital in Europe accounts for less than 3% of 
GDP in contrast to almost 15% in the US (see Figure 26). At the same time, the 
returns of European venture capital funds have been consistently weaker than 
in the US both in periods of economic expansion and contraction (see Figure 
27). A study by the European Investment Fund (EIF, Kelly, 2006) explores the 
reasons that might explain the lower performance of venture capital in Europe. 
It suggests that industry size affects performance positively since it contributes 
to the build-up of specialised networks and expertise, is crucial to reach 
optimally sized investments, and allows more diversification. In effect the 
venture capital industry in Europe has not yet reached its critical size given 
notably: (a) the fragmentation of national markets due to the absence of a pan-
European vehicle and harmonised taxation, and (b) prudential rules that very 












































Besides the size of the venture capital industry, lagging performance in 
Europe is also explained by factors such as (EIF, Kelly, 2006): 
o  Dispersion of available funds into too many projects —European funds 
invest in nearly twice as many companies as US funds. 
o  The weight of government money in venture capital funds, much higher 
in Europe than in the US, which may distort capital allocation in line 
with political considerations.  
o  The profile of venture capital managers —closer to finance in Europe in 
contrast with engineering and science profiles in the US. 
o  The relative weight of seed investing. European funds prefer instead 
start-up and later-stage ventures with lower risks but possibly also lower 
returns. 
o  Fragmentation of European exit markets, given the absence of a pan-
European small cap market similar to NASDAQ.202 
o  The numerous legal and cultural barriers to entrepreneurship in Europe. 
It follows that any policy response must be holistic and cut across all the 
elements above. Action at EU level to promote venture capital is not new and 
goes as far as 1998 under the Risk Capital Action Plan. Despite its horizontal 
approach to risk capital and entrepreneurship, the progress achieved by this 
plan during its implementation horizon, ending in 2003, was plainly 
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insufficient. In 2007 the European Commission proposed to step-up its work to 
facilitate the cross-border operation of venture capital funds based on the 
mutual recognition of the existing national frameworks (EC, 2007, page 9). 
After the financial crisis and the adoption of the AIFMD, the policy changed in 
favour of fully harmonising the rules that apply to alternative fund managers, 
including also venture capital. Once the AIFMD was adopted in 2011 it became 
clear that its provisions would not kill venture capital but would not promote 
it either. In effect 98% of venture managers will not be affected by the AIFMD 
but will fall under its de minimis threshold (EUR 500 million; EC, 2011b, page 
2). Those who exceed this threshold will however bear the full compliance 
burden, even though probably disproportionate to their size or untailored to 
the nature of their business model. Given this burden, the likelihood that small 
venture managers would opt into the AIFMD to benefit from its passport is 
almost inexistent. 
To overcome this impasse and create a single market for venture capital, 
the European Commission proposed in 2011 a regulation on European Venture 
Capital Funds (EVCFs)  that would allow these funds to be marketed cross-
border in much the same way as in the AIFMD but under management and 
product rules tailored to the nature of their business models. If managers wish 
to benefit from the passport for their venture capital funds, these funds will 
have to invest at least 70% of their capital in qualifying investments in SMEs.203 
Cross-border marketing will be enabled only for eligible investors, that is, 
professional investors under MiFID but also those who satisfy certain 
conditions.204 The proposal is aimed at reducing the administrative burden of 
managers in view of their relatively small size, their positive role in the 
economy and the need to facilitate entry and exit. It does not subject venture 
capital funds to depositary obligations, given the illiquidity of the equity 
instruments that they typically hold in their portfolios. In effect, most of these 
instruments cannot be freely traded given transfer restrictions. Moreover, these 
instruments are typically registered with the issuer directly or its agent, which 
would disqualify them from being held in custody, according to the 
implementation of the depositary rules in the AIFMD proposed by ESMA.205  
The introduction of EVCFs is no doubt an important step to overcome 
the fragmentation of national markets and allow the venture capital industry to 
gain critical size in Europe but it will not suffice on its own. Notably, tax issues 
                                                        
203 Articles 3-4, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 860 final (European Venture Capital 
Funds). 
204 Article 6, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 860 final (European Venture Capital Funds). 
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remain a major barrier to the operation of venture capital funds cross-border 
(EC, 2009d). The European Commission will work throughout 2012 with 
member states to find a solution to these issues (EC, 2011b, page 3). It would be 
very unfortunate if a lack of agreement among member states on second-order 
tax issues would hinder the potential of venture capital to foster innovation 
and competitiveness in Europe. As tax rules stand today, the treatment applied 
to investments in venture capital is frequently less favourable than for 
investments in public equity, despite the well known externalities of the 
former (EC, 2009, page 1). 
Europe will also need to reconsider prudential rules to better understand 
how to reconcile them with long-term investing, including investing in venture 
capital. Solvency charges for insurers and pension funds risk further 
undermining their ability to invest in venture capital and other long-term 
assets. Venture capital is a highly specialised asset class that requires building 
up sufficient in-house expertise to select and manage these investments. A 
reasonable objective for the average institutional investors would be to invest 
from 5 to 10% of their assets in venture capital. However, holdings of venture 
capital should not be artificially increased either. Professional investors should 
be given leeway to access venture capital as they see fit but under appropriate 
safeguards to mitigate related risks, including bubbles. The European ‘venture 
capital ecosystem’ will not be transformed overnight but will need much time 
to grow and consolidate, under appropriate incentives. It is now that those 
incentives need to be set, including the revision of capital and solvency 
charges. 
 
* * * * 
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Annex 2. The third country rules in the AIFMD 
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Annex 3. Task Force Participants 
 















































































































































































































































































































































ANNEX 4. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AIF Authorised  investment  fund 
AIFMD  Alternative investment fund managers Directive 
AIMA Alternative  Investment Management Association 
AMF  Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
AuM Assets  under  management 
BIS  Bank for International Settlements 
CDO  Collateralised debt obligation 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies 
CESR  Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CSD Central  securities  depositary 
ECB European  Central  Bank 
ECMI  European Capital Markets Institute 
EEA  European Economic Area  
EMIR  European market infrastructure Regulation 
ESG  Environmental, social and governance  
ESMA  European Securities and Markets Authority 
ESRB  European Systemic Risk Board 
ETF  Exchanged traded fund 
ETP  Exchange traded product 
EVCFs  European Venture Capital Funds  
FSB  Financial Stability Board 
FSOC  Financial Stability Oversight Council 
HFR Hedge  Fund  Research 
IMD  Insurance mediation Directive 
IOSCO  International Organisation of Securities Commission 
KIID  Key investor information document 
MCP Management  company  passport 
MiFID Markets  in  Financial Instruments Directive 
MMF Money  Market  Fund 
NAV  Net asset value 
PRIPS  Packaged retail investment products initiative 
RM Residual  maturity 
SIFI  Significantly important financial institution 
SEF Social  entrepreneurship  fund 
SLD  Securities law Directive 
SRI Socially  responsible  investment 
TA Transfer  agent 
UCITS  Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
WAL  Weighted average life 
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ANNEX 4. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AIF Authorised  investment  fund 
AIFMD  Alternative investment fund managers Directive 
AIMA Alternative  Investment Management Association 
AMF  Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
AuM Assets  under  management 
BIS  Bank for International Settlements 
CDO  Collateralised debt obligation 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies 
CESR  Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CSD Central  securities  depositary 
ECB European  Central  Bank 
ECMI  European Capital Markets Institute 
EEA  European Economic Area  
EMIR  European market infrastructure Regulation 
ESG  Environmental, social and governance  
ESMA  European Securities and Markets Authority 
ESRB  European Systemic Risk Board 
ETF  Exchanged traded fund 
ETP  Exchange traded product 
EVCFs  European Venture Capital Funds  
FSB  Financial Stability Board 
FSOC  Financial Stability Oversight Council 
HFR Hedge  Fund  Research 
IMD  Insurance mediation Directive 
IOSCO  International Organisation of Securities Commission 
KIID  Key investor information document 
MCP Management  company  passport 
MiFID Markets  in  Financial Instruments Directive 
MMF Money  Market  Fund 
NAV  Net asset value 
PRIPS  Packaged retail investment products initiative 
RM Residual  maturity 
SIFI  Significantly important financial institution 
SEF Social  entrepreneurship  fund 
SLD  Securities law Directive 
SRI Socially  responsible  investment 
TA Transfer  agent 
UCITS  Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
WAL  Weighted average life RETHINKING ASSET MANAGEMENT | 179 
WAM  Weighted average maturity 
 